Mali mainly, 2012 coup, drugs & more

[M-A Lagrange]

Radical Islamist in Mali used the same old strategy: vanish to come back and destabilise. This week end combats erupted in Gao.

France bombs Islamist hideout in Mali

GAO, Mali — France bombed Islamist targets in northern Mali on Monday following a string of guerrilla attacks by the extremists a month after Paris launched an offensive to drive them from its former colony.
In a pre-dawn attack, witnesses said a French army helicopter destroyed a central police station in the northern city of Gao from where rebels from the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) had opened fire from the station on Malian troops Sunday, sparking an hours-long street battle.

Sunday's attack was the first large-scale urban guerrilla assault on territory reclaimed by French-led forces.
It started early in the afternoon when Malian soldiers clashed with Islamists in the city centre, near the governor's offices and the police station, which the rebels had used as the headquarters of their "Islamic police" until French-led forces recaptured Gao on January 26.
A witness said the gunmen had hidden in the empty police station then attacked Malian soldiers when they arrived, as snipers hidden in surrounding buildings opened fire.
He said that after a fierce gunbattle, French troops had intervened.

http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp...b16cbd985e.4d1

I believe the response was ready since long... I tend to disagree with the idea that european (basically the French) are not ready or facing difficulties as it is said in various news papers. The objective is to reconquere territory, free hostages and pass the ball to the AU and UN. That's most probably were the difficulty is not on the ground.

[KingJaja]

davidbfpo,

So what did the US 'Trans-Sahara' military assistance package achieve if AQIM were left alone from 2003-2012?

I don't think it achieved much. The Algerians have their methods of fighting terrorists (and I don't think the US changed them one bit).

As for Nigeria, grapevine suggests that they went as far afield as North Korea for advice - North Korean methods are reportedly "easier" to implement and more in tune with Nigerian Army culture.

(S/NF) SUMMARY: Nigeria has continuing military
cooperation with the DPRK, but the Nigerians tell us they are
only talking about missiles to keep the door open for
military aid from the DPRK, and do not intend to procure
missiles or their technology. DPRK VP Yang Hyong-sop is
visiting Nigeria this week for meetings with various Nigerian
leaders, including President Obasanjo, and Nigerian VP Atiku
has been Yang's main host. After Yang's meeting with Atiku
January 28, Atiku's spokesman said various things at
different times to the press about Nigerian interest in
missiles. President Obasanjo's Senior Special Assistant,
Ad'Obe Obe assured the CDA on January 29 that no military
cooperation of any kind was discussed in Obasanjo's meeting
with Yang, and that the GON had no intention of purchasing
missiles or missile technology from the DPRK. We asked the
senior MFA official in-country on January 29, PermSec
Wadibia-Anyanwu, for further information on what transpired,
which she said she would provide. END SUMMARY

If you recall how Sri Lanka dealt with the Tamil Tigers (with Chinese assistance), you'd immediately see where some serious African nations would turn to for advice on how to deal with terrorist issues.

[davidbfpo]

Kingjaja,

Then there was Zimbabwe, which imported the North Koreans to train the 5th Brigade, when "Super-ZAPU" appeared in Matabeleland in the mid-1980's; a unit that became the by-word for brutality.

Not to overlook the use of private and government assistance from Israel.

[M-A Lagrange]

Canada just announced that Mali was on the way to turn like Iraq or Afghanistan. Canada position, which is non fully decided yet, is echoing the “fear” of several experts across the Atlantic Ocean.
Mali threatens to become another Afghanistan: Canada

"I am very cautious about sending in potentially thousands of Canadian troops to Malian soil ... to what is already is amounting to a counter-insurgency. We're not at the drop of a hat going to get into another Afghanistan," Baird told a parliamentary committee.

"On one side we have a military government that took power in a coup last year and on the other side an al Qaeda affiliate. I don't think they're going to sign on for a peacekeeping mission," Baird said.

"It's very much going to be an insurgency on the ground like we've seen in Iraq and like we've seen in Afghanistan."

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/...91B1CK20130212

It is difficult to deny the fact the risk exists and a failure in Mali would have greater strategic impact than actually foreseen. That said, it is important to consider the terrain and situation on the ground. Mali is not Afghanistan and the French lead coalition certainly not the US lead coalition in Iraq.

Why?

First of all, Mali is a well known country with well known opponent and radical armed groups. There is nobody new in that game. Unlike in Afghanistan, the nationalist Tuareg demands do not concur with the radical Islamist political agenda. In fact, it is AQ who seized the occasion to infiltrate the Tuareg rebellion. Just listen to the Tuareg youth reaction after AQ departure and you’ll understand. AQ Islam, which is driven by radical Arab Islam, has neither consideration nor respect for the West Africa Islam which integrates parts of the local believes. West Africa Islam, even radical, is deeply tainted by Sufism and local animist believes. There is a strong desagreement between radical Islamist and the population on what is Islam and what is Sharia, unlike in Afghanistan.

Secondly, Mali domestic political situation is not comparable to post Saddam Iraq or post Taliban Afghanistan. Regime change (for the best or the worst) was induced domestically, for domestic reasons, without external support. The French and Chadians, and US, in Mali did not defeat the Mali government but came to the rescue. The insurgency Canada is speaking of is just the attempt by a small number of radical combatants to get back what they once hold for several weeks: just the time needed to alienate the local population against their practices of Islam. But it is true that the Tuareg political agenda remains and is part of the solution.

[KingJaja]

David,

Nigerian soldiers and their North Korean trainers:



Since the Nigerian Army has links with North Korea, some senior officers might think North Korean methods are better suited to dealing with Boko Haram than classical American "counter-insurgency".

Or maybe, they might be talking to the Algerians.

[Fuchs]

It is difficult to deny the fact the risk exists and a failure in Mali would have greater strategic impact than actually foreseen.

Now that's an opinion.

What you call "fact" is impossible to prove for the time being, so where do you get the insight that it's a "fact" from?

[M-A Lagrange]

Now that's an opinion.

What you call "fact" is impossible to prove for the time being, so where do you get the insight that it's a "fact" from?

First:
The possibility of a failure exist: it is a fact. If you have 90% to win, it still remains 10% you loose. It's basic math...
The "fact: it will happen" is an opinion and is for the time being impossible to prove.

My insight is that asking the UN or/an the AU to conduct a war or a stabilisation mission is a receipy for failure. And to come to that opinion, I have several historical exemples in the subregion: Darfur is one of them.

Now my point was that Mali is not Afghanistan or Iraq. The context in Mali is far different from those 2 exemples. This to say that engaged troops in Mali, at the moment, do not face the same risk.

Second:
The impact of a failure is always bigger than expected. There is a tendency to lower the strategic impact of a failure. In the case of Mali this will open a new transborder and transcontinental space to armed groups that western and eastern powers are not really willing to allow to exist. This will impact the force equilibrium in the subregion and increase destabilization in other weakened countries... (the domino effect does exist despite the fact it is over rated).

Does that mean that an half success is not enough (military success for France and Chad but complete colaps of the State in Mali after the French withdraw)... Never said that. But I disagree with the idea that a complete failure (no complete military success part from freeing several cities during few weeks and reinforcement of the radical Islamists because of a repression against Tuaregs by Malian State) will have a limited impact that will not go out of Malian borders.

Finaly:
What is your opinion Fuch?

[Fuchs]

The impact of a failure is always bigger than expected. There is a tendency to lower the strategic impact of a failure.

(...)

Finaly:
What is your opinion Fuch?

I doubt the "tendency" and I'm sure the "always" is utterly wrong.
Evidence A: Domino theory # lost Vietnam war.
Case closed. "always" was by far over the top.


I personally believe the Salafism/Wahhabism/AQ thing is irrelevant in the epitome of a desert, and not much more relevant a slightly bit to the south. Moreover, the Christian majority (with regional/animism influence as well, no doubt) to the south of Mali means the maximum expansion of the crooks doesn't even reach to the South Atlantic.


In other words;
Mali may disappear or declare war on my country; I wouldn't have the slightest impact on my daily life.

Save for an uneasiness about heights I really don't have much fear, and I certainly wasn't infected by the hysterical hyping of Mali. The newspaper kiosk on the street corner with its tobacco wares is more of a problem.

[Bill Moore]

Not a new development, but this article goes in more depth than most.

http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2013/0....html?spref=tw

Jihadists and Latin American drug traffickers merge

He explains to the reporter: "During the last decade, Latin American cartels created new routes in Africa to transport cocaine and synthetic drugs to Europe and, to a lesser degree, to the United States. All of the continent is affected by drug trafficking, from South Africa to the Magreb countries. Independent research centers --like the CF2R and specialized institutions within the UN or in the European Union -- tried to alert the politicians. They weren't successful.

"It didn't take long to see the results. The drug trafficking gangrene infected the majority of the West Africa governments and established contact with radical Islamic groups. Today, we are faced with a new, very explosive phenomenon; "narco jihadists."

[davidbfpo]

This may indicate at least one African leader is impatient with other nations:

Chad's President Idriss Deby appealed to West African leaders on Wednesday to urgently speed up deployment of their forces to northern Mali where Chadian and French forces are locked in bitter fighting with al Qaeda-linked rebels. Chad's contingent of some 2,400 troops has borne the brunt of battles with die-hard Islamists holed up in the Adrar des Ifoghas mountains..most African units remain in southern Mali...

Link:http://uk.mobile.reuters.com/article...30227?irpc=932

The Chadian military have been reported as being professional and well versed in fighting in such conditions - unlike some of the others who IMHO will prefer to remain in comfort.

How the ECOWAS contribution can become a UN mandated peacekeeping force is beyond me, this is an enforcement mission. ECOWAS want others to pay them, step forward the UN.

[KingJaja]

David,

Debby owes his presidency to the French, so he was very enthusiastic about committing troops to Mali.

Having said that, other African presidents don't want to be stuck with the Malian "tar baby" - and they are happy for the "highly competent Chadian forces" to do the bulk of the fighting.

(PS: This isn't a solely "African" phenomenon, European nations do it, a lot).

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Andrew Lebovich on Twitter for identifying this NY Review of Books:http://www.nybooks.com/articles/arch...gination=false

Andrew's comment:

This is some very interesting Mali reporting from Joshua Hammer, raises some questions, confirms a few things...My biggest question with the Hammer piece is about some of the sourcing for specific claims.

[davidbfpo]

A Le Monde article which has promise, but disappoints. That aside it does explain what is happening in parts of Northern Mali:

Those who have had the opportunity there to agree on one point: Adrar Tigharghar seems to have been specially created by the god of rebellion for shelter combatants in war against conventional forces.

Link:http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/articl...0262_3212.html

[davidbfpo]

An article from CSM on the Chadian military:

The Chadians have proved to be a useful partner not only because of their decades of experience fighting in a similar climate and terrain, but because they have spent much of the past decade fighting a panoply of rebel groups in their own country, many of which preferred to operate as light and mobile units, using tactics similar to those currently employed by the jihadis in Mali.

Then there is an ex-DoD regional expert, Rudy Atallah:

It depends how you define effective. In terms of aggressive team players supporting the French, they are doing a great job. If the definition is based purely on capability to continue the fight on their own, I don't think they can survive. Chadian troops are a blunt edge and good scouts for the French, but they couldn't be as effective without French intel, guidance, and air power.

Link:http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Afric...ner-for-France

[Stan]

Then there is an ex-DoD regional expert, Rudy Atallah:
Quote:
It depends how you define effective. In terms of aggressive team players supporting the French, they are doing a great job. If the definition is based purely on capability to continue the fight on their own, I don't think they can survive. Chadian troops are a blunt edge and good scouts for the French, but they couldn't be as effective without French intel, guidance, and air power.
Link:http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Afric...ner-for-France

We now have two teams there and they are by each day more skeptical than that of the last. As we should be teaching instead of reacting, things are getting out of hand with the Chadians (who have concluded they are in charge).

It was years ago on the Libyan border with Hawk batteries that we determined the same regarding our Chadian brothers.

However, they can and do survive without any assistance (in the middle of nowhere). Effective is a relative term that one would use with caution. Violent comes to mind and it seems to work with the local problem. Africans are not accustomed to Western intel, guidance, etc.

Where and when the West backs off due to political ramifications, we then let the Africans do their thing How ironic that we then decide to tell them how neanderthal they are

[davidbfpo]

There have several examples in African conflicts that small European nations have been able to assist a dialogue and peace. That Switzerland has a role in Mali does come as a surprise:

The Point.fr revealed this week that two members of the Democratic Union of the Centre (UDC), a formation belonging to the ruling coalition had challenged the Swiss government, stating that, "according to a reliable source," the soldiers an elite Swiss have spent two months in Mali . The information was denied by an official, but not by the defense minister nor his counterpart Foreign Affairs.

There is more on the link:http://www.lepoint.fr/monde/mali-la-...1638207_24.php

[SWJ Blog]

Who’s on First? Or Why Fences Matter More Than Al-Qaeda in Mali

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[M-A Lagrange]

Apparently Ansar ed-Dine was financially rewarding the jihad combattant...

Mali: jihad premiums for captured city
Jihadists Ansar ed-Dine were rewarded for their achievements in Mali. Thus, for the capture of the town of Kidal, "it was 400,000 francs" CFA is 610 euros, according to a Touareg.

http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/mon...ml#xtor=AL-447

I made light editing on the title. Here is the link to original article in French:
http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/mon...ml#xtor=AL-447

Apparently faith does not pay anymore...

[jmm99]

Hey MAL,

I conclude (using the utmost of post hoc, propter hoc logic) from this in your link:

January 9, at the time of the lightning attack of the djihadists towards the south of the country, the promised reward would be raised to 1 million francs CFA (1520 euros) in the event of conquest of Sevare, strategic suburb of Mopti. It is this raid which precipitated the French military intervention.

that, once the price of poker exceeds 1500 euros per head, one can expect arrival of the TdM and Legion.

Now, why didn't the US think of that as a standard for intervention ?

Faith hasn't been much of a payer since Martin Luther nailed his thesis re: indulgences and benefices to the Church's door.

Regards

Mike

[davidbfpo]

Andrew Lebovich has written a FP article 'Mali’s Bad Trip: Field notes from the West African drug trade', which covers much of the pre-coup information and adds what happened afterwards:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...trip?page=full

The impact of new wealth and the "oil" of corruption account in his judgement for much of the public support for the coup in Mali; removing an incompetent, corrupt government.