Background on AQIM: a growing threat?

[bourbon]

The War Nerd: It Ain’t Easy Being a Jihadi Middle Manager, Feb 15th, 2013.

Over and over, Droukdel says that it’s not politically smart to start amputating people’s hands and whipping women for not covering up. He talks like middle management—which he is, in the ridiculous Al Qaeda organizational chart. He talks about Mali as a “project,” as if he was dealing with product placement in a new franchise—which he was, according to his terms. And like a good guerrilla manager who’s read his Mao, he tries to teach the knuckleheads working for him that taking and losing territory isn’t nearly as important as winning over the people.

[davidbfpo]

RUSI's Director, Professor Michael Clarke, weighs in with his analysis:http://www.rusi.org/analysis/comment...511D272D72DDC/

He concludes:

What these documents show us is a centrally-directed attempt to achieve all the old Al Qa'ida ambitions; to ally with other political movements in order to hijack them; to fight heroic guerrilla wars for disputed territory, and to build up a new Caliphate that will extend across the Middle East and far beyond. They are aims which are as old fashioned as they are chilling.

Has anyone seen a reaction from AQIM to these revelations?

[davidbfpo]

Clint Watts adds his analysis:http://www.fpri.org/geopoliticus/201...essons-learned

Don’t feel bad U.S. military, you are not the only force struggling to make better decisions from your lessons learned. Al Qaeda and particularly their Sahel affiliate, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), struggle to improve their operations based on analyses of past failures as evidence in the Associated Press’s (AP) recent publication of AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdel’s confidential letter to his fighters in Mali. While an incomplete manuscript, three chapters of AQIM guidance discovered in Timbuktu provide some clarity to al Qaeda’s strategic thinking in a post-Bin Laden era.

Later:

The document provides a fascinating peak into the mindset of al Qaeda affiliates after Bin Laden’s death. While flashes of Bin Laden’s intent appear in Droukdel’s dispatch, AQIM’s strategic plan to integrate with local groups appears to undermine itself in two key ways.

[davidbfpo]

A fascinating AP report on the relationship between AQ centre and their affiliate Moktar Belmoktar in the Sahara (AQIM); almost amusing. There is a very short thread on AQ's management style, AQ's M&A Strategy is a franchising network:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=11974

Here is one passage:

Your letter ... contained some amount of backbiting, name-calling and sneering. And such brotherly, official correspondence should not contain this style of language....We refrained from wading into this battle in the past out of a hope that the crooked could be straightened by the easiest and softest means. ... But the wound continued to bleed, and in fact increasingly bled, until your last letter arrived, ending any hope of stanching the wound and healing it.

AP's article:http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/05...aced-internal/

Link to letter itself:http://hosted.ap.org/specials/intera...er-english.pdf

Step forward CWOT with is analysis:http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=1088

[davidbfpo]

A rather catchy title from Reuters, but has some gems within:http://mobile.reuters.com/article/id...30809?irpc=932

This report served as the catalyst for merging threads (see Post No.1).

[davidbfpo]

Professor John Schindler of the U.S. Naval War College and blogger 20Committee, has re-Tweeted a 2012 article 'The Ugly Truth about Algeria', with many links worth pursuing:http://nationalinterest.org/commenta...t-algeria-7146

One link I peered at:http://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n19/adam-sh...murder-mystery

Outside France few know of the Algerian military intelligence, DRS:

The lead agency in the fight against the Algerian mujahidin has been the country’s military intelligence service, the feared DRS. With a reputation for ruthlessness and efficiency second to none in the Arab world, the DRS is arguably the world’s most effective intelligence service when it comes to fighting Al Qaeda; it is also probably the most cold-blooded.

(Later on)To what extent the local Al Qaeda affiliate is secretly controlled by the military—as GIA and GSPC were—is an open question, but its recent record suggests that DRS influence over any Algerian extremist group is considerable.

The DRS appear in the main thread on Mali IIRC and there is a small thread on contemporary Algerian matters:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=2079

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Andrew Lebovich for noting this development in his blog commentary 'Of Mergers, MUJAO, and Mokhtar Belmokhtar', a summary and a longer 3k word piece:http://thewasat.wordpress.com/2013/0...ar-belmokhtar/ and http://thewasat.wordpress.com/2013/0...ar-belmokhtar/

[davidbfpo]

Not sure why RFI have taken months to publish this, but this week an update on the Droukdel document was published, in French so the link may need Google's translation to help:

RFI broadcasts all the roadmap for AQIM Azawad, a document signed by the hand of the leader of AQIM, found February 16, 2013 by Nicolas Champeaux and Jean-Louis Le Touzet, envoys of RFI and Liberation in Timbuktu. In this paper edifying, dated 20 July 2012, the bloody Abdelmalek Droukdel reveals black and white its target in northern Mali: create an Islamic state that will not be labeled Jihad. Droukdel clearly shows how: his men are fool local people to armed movements in the North the illusion that they have power, and not to arouse the attention of the international community. To achieve its goals, Droukdel is ready to give the full and immediate implementation of Sharia. This paper therefore reveals a surprising shift in the strategy of the terrorist leader and also confirms the deep tensions within the branch of al-Qaeda. Finally, he said that Mali is not immune to a return of jihadists. This is the first time such an internal document of AQIM is distributed in its entirety.

The document is within the article and is twelve pages long (which may not translate readily).

Link:http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20131006-m...da-sanguinaire

[davidbfpo]

A short BBC overview of the jihadist threat across West Africa; which fits here I think:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-35349005

There is a parallel thread on West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=11204

[davidbfpo]

Paul Rogers offers a brief overview of ISIS to AQIM across Africa and most recently an attack in the Ivory Coast:https://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-r...-isis-to-aqim?

He ends:

In late 2015 there was a common view in western security circles that ISIS was in retreat and that AQIM and Shabaab were greatly weakened. In the space of just three months that has been turned on its head. In a familiar pattern, a burst of optimism about the prospects of the 'war on terror' has been shown to have flimsy foundations. The west's continuing failure to understand what is happening fuels a conflict out of control.

[davidbfpo]

I expect this decision was not widely reported:

On March 2, several prominent North African terror groups announced their official unification with al-Qaeda’s regional affiliate, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In a video statement announcing the merger, the leaders of several Sahel-based terror groups pledge their allegiance to al-Qaeda’s central leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, as well as AQIM leader Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud. The official merger of some of the region’s most lethal terrorist organizations under the banner of al-Qaeda demonstrates the group’s successful strategy of cultivating long-term relationships with local extremist organizations to expand its global network. The consolidation of the Sahel’s extremist groups into an existing al-Qaeda franchise—coming just after a similar merger of extremist groups in Syria—makes clear that this model remains highly successful for al-Qaeda.

Link:http://www.soufangroup.com/tsg-intel...-in-the-sahel/