UK military problems & policies

[Firn]

Fuchs,

I don't think you're accounting for political reality today, even if you and I don't agree with the general trend of political decisions to get involved in so called small wars, they are a fact of life. Maybe the economic crisis will bring us all to our senses, but in the mean time the challenge is having armed forces sufficiently large enough to support the current enduring occupation and peace keeping missions around the world, and in addition have enough strike capacity to conduct offensive/coercive military operations on short notice. I think you over estimate Europe's capacity to do so.

Of course a nation can attempt to mobilize to go to war, though I wonder how effectively modern, liberal democracies could actually do so if a real mobilization was actually required? Could Britian have sufficiently mobilized its industry to support and sustain major combat operations during WWII without extensive US support? Our industrial mobilization to support the UK and others at that time lifted us out of depression and perhaps enabled the allies to win.

The Wages of Destruction should deal nicely with the historic part. It is a complex topic but a highly interesting one. Needless to say that the effort of the US did play a huge huge part directly and indirectly.

Arguably today it would be much easier to mass produce the means to wage war then back in WWII at least as long the necessary ressources (raw materials!) pour in, enough time is available and the necessary willpower is there at all levels.

[Bill Moore]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kedBlURaRaE

These interviews impressed me as being balanced. Those interviewed realize that Afghanistan isn't a template for future conflict, and logically state the requirement for having a full range of military capabilities.

[davidbfpo]

Bill,

I have now watched and listened to the film clip twice. It raises a number of issues succinctly, although some of the footage was odd - the Russians in Kosovo and the IDF. Being an official product, when the MoD prefers to be in hibernation from public comment, it is a shame alternative voices do not feature. The speakers, with one exception, being MoD employees or contractors.

After a recent, speculative press report 'British Army's fleet of Apache helicopters 'could be scrapped' it was almost amusing to hear the remarks on "heavy" assets versus Apaches:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ukne...-scrapped.html

What was more valuable was the very careful skirting round the issue of, from various voices:

an ability to go with them (USA)...making a strategic difference to the USA....an ability to do a task alone..

There are dissenting voices that think the shrunken UK military have - now and will clearly do so soon - fallen below the US minimum level for a contribution.

Reductions in public spending are driving this process, not a change in strategic direction nor a change in public opinion - which gives defence a low priority. I suspect that politically no-one wants to ask, let alone hear either the British professionals or US politicians answer the question is the UK a meaningful ally when it comes to a fight? A fight not for national survival, hard to conceive of today, more likely an intervention with the USA somewhere.

Hypothetically had the UK not pushed others in NATO in 2005 over "making a difference" in Afghanistan; the decision for ISAF to go south, would the USA have done so alone? You can argue that the minimal campaigning by the USA in Afghanistan better suited your national purpose.

[Fuchs]

Some governments pay too much attention to maintaining relationships and cooperations of nebulous value.

It's as if they knew from an inexplicable source that a certain cooperation makes sense, and don't even bother to think about the "why" or even "if".
The result are expensive policies for the sake of maintaining said cooperation/prestige/relationship.

Germany had and has its strange fixation on keeping NATO and transatlantic cooperation strong, even though the value is probably zero (to cooperate prevents overt rivalry, but the latter doesn't need to happen without said cooperation anyway).
There were also expensive policies done in order to support the bid for a permanent UNSC seat (for which we have little actual use).

Same with the EU; European unification has become an ideology which tolerates no even only small step backwards. Officials rarely discuss the actual utility of additional European cooperation.

The fixation on maintaining big brother's good will is particularly strong in NZ, Australia and the UK. Maybe it's the common language which support this fixation?
Maybe it wouldbe wise to look at more relaxed, non-Anglophone countries and thier alliance policies?

[davidbfpo]

An IISS Strategic Comment 'Redesigned British Army: smaller, with more reserves':http://www.iiss.org/publications/str...more-reserves/

It concludes:

..the reforms have the potential to transform the army's capability and to incorporate the lessons of recent operations. Success depends on the programme being properly led, managed, resourced and politically supported.

[davidbfpo]

I can recall the British decision to end its defence role 'East of Suez' in 1968, mainly due to economic factors and to cut defence spending - much to the dismay of a few partners and before Gulf War One only a smaller presence was left in Oman, the Gulf and (with the USA) on Diego Garcia.

Two Gulf Wars later, the interventions in Iraq and - still - Afghanistan the UK is there in force in the midst of an economic recession, with substantial cuts in defence spending. You might think now was not the time to expand the British role in the Persian Gulf, wrong!

RUSI, a Whitehall "think tank", has published a paper; in summary:

The UK is approaching a decision point where a significant strategic reorientation of its defence and security towards the Gulf is both plausible and logical; and, for the first time since the UK unceremoniously left the Gulf in 1971, a coherent strategy for a ‘return to east of Suez’ is emerging.

There is a useful short podcast and a paper on:http://www.rusi.org/publications/oth...517AA8D59D1B3/

A BBC report notes:

We are already committed to the Gulf. But we are just not doing it very well. There are 160,000 British citizens living there so if there is a crisis we will be involved, so we need to be better positioned to mitigate the threat.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-22333555

[Red Rat]

The US strategic situation is very similar to what it was in the run up to WW2, especially in terms of force projection. Then the US could cover either the Pacific or the Atlantic, but not both concurrently. The fleet simply was not big enough.

With the US pivoting towards a Pacific/Asia focus it would make sense for a degree of rationalisation. In the same way that during a large part of the Cold war and in particular during the height of the Vietnam conflict the UK took on the burden of the North Sea and Atlantic Gap so today a UK/European towards the Middle East and Africa would make sense. The UK could not do what the US does (the UK does not have an effective global reach anymore (we now tread softly and carry a very small stick)) but by focusing efforts we can take a degree of the burden from the US.

[jmm99]

... and the UK-EU would assume responsibility in the Med as well - a return to origins so to speak (in Corbettese).

Regards

Mike

[Red Rat]

Churchill on the bank notes and the White Ensign all over the Med - what's not to like?

[davidbfpo]

A short commentary by a British historian 'Britain's '9/11 Wars' in historical perspective: why change and continuity matter' :http://www.historyandpolicy.org/pape...paper-143.html

[davidbfpo]

... and the UK-EU would assume responsibility in the Med as well - a return to origins so to speak (in Corbettese).

JMM,

I see little reason why the UK should return to a military role in the Mediterranean, let alone try to assume some responsibility in other spheres. After all there are three albeit rather lame - in economic conditions - nations, France, Italy and Spain.

After the lessons seen over the Libyan intervention, the EU has yet to emerge as a truly capable, independent military partner.

[davidbfpo]

Yes the UK has a number of strategic, national interests across the world, but IMHO a return to the Gulf, Med, Africa and other places ignores our much reduced military capabilities - not exclusively due to economics - and far more significant issues at home.

What is proposed is not smarter.

[jmm99]

My point re: the Med was simply and solely a necessary corollary of Red Rat's proposition re: the Middle East and North Africa ("Muslim Africa").

As a sidebar, "control" of the western littorals of Africa is tied to control of the Middle Passage and the South Atlantic (the US and Brazil seem the futuristic likely partners). "Control" of the eastern littorals of Africa is tied to control of the Indian Ocean (the "power points" are "South Africa", India and a "Greater Indonesia"). Those littorals are separate issues from North Africa (and from the African interior; exemplified by the Congo).

As to "control" of the Middle East and North Africa, a "Sixth Fleet" in the Med is a necessity. To be complete, one would also have to have (at least) localized control in the Indian Ocean (Arabian Peninsula and its Gulfs). Otherwise, one is dealing in a "pipe dream". One has to ask some basic questions before "Marching on Moscow" (or Beijing - I confess to both Montgomery and MacArthur sitting on my primary bookshelves).

As to methodology on the "basic questions", I liked this from Red Rat in the "5 Lessons from Astan" thread":

1) An insurgency is a political problem with a military dimension, treat it as such; understand the politics of the problem in order to understand the politics of the solution.

2) Set domestic conditions early for a long commitment. COIN takes time, nation building takes longer.

3) Build the police and judicial system first or at least concurrent with indigenous military capacity.

4) In a failed state establishing a government with no capacity to govern is not necessarily a good idea. A government with no civil service and no educated middle class to become a civil service is a government in name only, then giving it autonomy but no capacity is inviting failure.

5) Controlling [emphasis JMM] the population is as important as securing the population.

All of these principles are applicable in spades to "control" of regions - i.e., the Middle East, North Africa, etc.

Now, both of you know that I'm not an interventionalist where the US is concerned (and. rarely, a "nation builder"). As an example, the Med, Middle East and North Africa would be to me off-limits for the US, except for exigent circumstances (e.g., something akin to 9/11). A corollary of that is that I can't be an advocate for interventions by others - I don't believe in "war by proxy", absent "exigent circumstances".

That being said, vacuums in the Med, Middle East and North Africa will be filled by "someone" - not by the US as I see it. Thus, a good discussion point for you all UK-EUians.

Regards

Mike

[Red Rat]

The UK military referees to MENA - Middle East and North Africa which encompasses both the Middle East and North Africa (the Maghreb) and takes in most of the Mediterranean littoral.

I was struck by this Economist article on the French defence review. Three things struck me:

1) The defence review commission included senior British representation.
2) The article posits a pivot to MENA.
3) Growing talk of a US pivot to Asia causing the Europeans (probably under NATO and not the EU) to step up independent intervention efforts.

[jmm99]

in English (48 pp.), can be downloaded here (HT CFR).

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

the 2013 White Paper, in French, is here (160 pp.). Not yet in English that I found.

Regards

Mike

[Bill Moore]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TQmJwqRwFYs

While this video comparing U.S. Marine to Royal Marine training is obviously skewed and a bit comical, I still think it is relevant. It points to the direction our military may end up going in if the politically correct get their way. It definitely helps explain their relative poor performance in recent years.

[jmm99]

Female Special Forces; and at 2:21:

Soldiers from 1st SF call them "Killer Barbie Dolls".

Regards

Mike

[Bill Moore]

The big differences between these female warriors and our female activists are they're actually patriotic and serving for a higher cause (not media recognition), they're very fit and capable, and understand they may be employed into a very tough fight. I would be happy to serve with these ladies any day. Note they are training harder than the Royal Marines depicted in the film.

[davidbfpo]

The title is taken from testimony by Lord Hennessey, a journalist-cum-historian, who with two others gave evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee on Defence on:

a strategic inquiry, Towards the Next Defence and Security Review.

Not an exciting matter for the great British public and I expect many others. Within the testimony are many gems on how the UK does and doesn't do defence policy:http://www.publications.parliament.u...i/uc109001.htm

Here is one passage, Quinlan's law (named after a MoD civil servant of note):

A theorem: In matters of military contingency, the expected, precisely because it is expected, is not to be expected. Rationale: What we expect, we plan and provide for; what we plan and provide for, we thereby deter; what we deter does not happen. What does happen is what we did not deter, because we did not plan and provide for it, because we did not expect it.

Another witness, an academic strategist, Professor Julian Lindley-French, who is British and currently based in The Netherlands, has some enlightening remarks, especially on alliance matters. His blog is:http://lindleyfrench.blogspot.co.uk/

In one post the Professor is straight-talking:

The Royal Navy’s motto is; if you want peace, prepare for war. Thankfully, Britain today does not have to prepare for war. However, in a world full of friction if Britain is to help prevent conflict injurious to its national interests it must think and act strategically. Therefore, SDSR 2015 must finally look beyond Afghanistan and not simply re-fight it better. Indeed, the switch from so-called campaigning to contingency operations will make the 2015 review as close to a grand strategic year zero as Britain has known for a century. It is an opportunity to be seized not squandered.

Link:http://lindleyfrench.blogspot.co.uk/...-of-spear.html

No wonder Whitehall-Westminster prefer to make grand statements, but as our American allies know capability is needed with will. Just whether the UK has a strategy today is a moot point, plenty of policy or is it called retrenchment?

Hat tip to 'Red Rat' for the pointer to the testimony.