Syria under Bashir Assad (closed end 2014)

[carl]

Carl:No, I believe Bill's point is that a complex sectarian and civil war with multiple ethnic militias and splintered anti-government factions is different than a classical Maoist insurgency/an insurgency in the mold of classical wars of liberation (post colonial).

To switch examples, would you have fought the American Civil War as a classical Maoist insurgency?

Every war is different from every other in some ways and the same as every other in other ways. Your description above isn't that different from China in the 20s and 30s. It wasn't always the the KMT vs. the ChiComs. In the beginning there was seemingly all against all plus the Japanese and it took decades to sort itself out. The same could be said sort of for Mexico from 1910 to the mid 20s. Societies that have come apart will take some time to put themselves back together. Different kinds of things will be needed in different places at different times.

The trick is to know what to do when. Bill said originally "our COIN theory" doesn't cover this. It also doesn't cover amphibious operations or operations to counter operational maneuver groups. If somebody tries to apply small war fighting to those kinds of fights, it is their fault, not the fault of the small war fighting practices that seem to work over the years. Somebody will eventually prevail in Syria and they will probably have to fight everything from small tank battles to pacification. And they will have to use the gamut of things from tank heavy formations swinging around a flank to get an HQ to small groups of soldiers garrisoning towns and villages. We did the same thing by the way in the American Civil War. In addition to the big fight there were lots and lots of small war operations that were conducted throughout the war and for years afterward.

Population centric counterinsurgency with its emphasis on providing government services by a third party on behalf of a quasi Sovereign entity in order to win over locals, as in the case of Afghanistan--sometimes we respect sovereignty, sometimes we don't--is something almost sui generis and it hasn't worked very well because it doesn't do the trick for a variety of reasons. Safe havens because of our heavy logistical needs, the Af Pak strategy paying or training two armies, the Taliban taxing our nation building work, our money serving as a corrupting source that prevents good goverment.

Why do you think this can be fixed? Developmental aid as nation building has been tried in many places around the world and it has often been a big fat failure. And that is in peace time.

What you are describing is the screwed up American way of doing things in the age of pro-force, power point, 1 year armies replaced by another 1 year army every year, completely impossible chains of command whose primary purpose is to soothe professional egos rather than win, state dept people who won't go into harms way, national leadership elites short on determination and on and on and on. Arguing that as an indictment is like arguing the failure of Arab air forces to get much of anything done in their history means airpower isn't very useful.

What evidence supports the thesis that money for development projects changes the essential governing situation?

None. It can't work if nothing else accompanies it. But it appeals to the American elite governing class because they have easily quantifiable metrics to point at when they prepare their resumes for their next step up. We don't do small war fighting so much as we more often do 'Career Centric Coin'. (There is a brilliant article about career centric coin somewhere back in SWJ about two years ago.)

Nation building as understood from population counterinsurgency is built on much bad science, poor quality studies, and outright mythology when examined clinically, IMO.

War fighting isn't a science, it is an art. People are too variable for it to be a science. But there are certain things that generally work, generally. Say this for example '"Hit the other fellow, as quick as you can, and as hard as you can, where it hurts him most, when he ain't lookin'." I think people who are good at it have a feel for it that can't be taught. An inborn talent, like great artistic ability.

What is the evidence to support that it worked? The actual, hard evidence by past example?

What worked? Career centric coin? Never. Successful small wars using say lots of patrols, quadrillage, local self defense groups, units staying in place (especially officers) a long time, minimizing sanctuaries, controlling the population etc? The Philippines, twice. Iraq, once. Check out the history of the Indian Army, multiple times. The Marines in Haiti. The fight against Sendoro Luminoso. The French conquest of North Africa and others.

If factors X, Y and Z add up to a particular small wars pacification, then how can one justify taking only Y out and saying it will work every time?What if you needed all three to break the insurgency?
Each event is contingent.

Yes each event is different. And you do need to do all the things. Dependence upon one at the exclusion of the others is foolish. Who are you arguing with?

On some of the famous papers from Military Review circa 2005, well, I understand the pressure the military was under and why practical papers were rushed out and it is noble when viewed in that context, noble and wonderful and admirable, and, unfortunately, flawed upon reflection. They are basically just a bunch of random opinion when examined critically. I am sorry to say that, but that is what I get from reading a few.

When examined at a distance and clinically, they are bunch of war stories about what some guys thought. Fine, that is one important data point but it has to be backed up with other data or you are basically just repeating a bunch of myths. Maybe they are correct, maybe they are not, but the evidence is not, "hey, this is what I think and my opinion is the same as a fact or evidence."

That is one thing about war, this forever a civilian thinks, when a guy who is good at it says this is what I think and here is my opinion; it is evidence and it should be considered. Warring does not exactly lend itself to the scientific method.