As I have noted before Gen. Abizaid pursued a small foot print strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq. It has worked tolerably well in Afghanistan and it has not worked well at all in Iraq. Rather than argue about the officer selection process, it seems more productive to have a debate on when counterinsurgency warfare should be done with a small force and when it should be done with a greater force to space ratio. I have always favored the latter and I think that is what the current surge is finally doing in Iraq.
Whatever chance the small footprint model had, it was dashed when the need (or was it silly desire?) to provide internet cafes, dry cleaning, and barbershops, drove us into super FOBs. I don't think the FOBs came first. The amenities (or at least pursuit of them) were a contributing factor in the rise of the FOB, and it killed us.

From a historical perspective, I offer this excerpt from a threat report signed by the Commander of the Army, Commissioner of Police, commander of the Air Force, Director General of Intelligence, and Commander of Combined Operations of Country X, and delivered to the leader of X, roughly 3 years before a political settlement was finally arrived at in one of the nastiest "small wars":

Military and Police. The continued and rapid construction of protected villages is essential if food is to be denied to terrorists and steps should continue to be taken to control the terrorist ability to obtain goods and cash internally.

Classical War. It is not anticipated that the (country X) Security Forces will be involved internally in classical war during this quarter, but transborder operations could escalate the situation towards a classical war.

Of over-riding concern is the present inadequate and diminishing force level with the resultant urgent need for additional manpower to even contain the situation, let alone prevent its inevitable deterioration.

No successful result can be attained by purely military means. It is now more vital than ever to arrive at an early political settlement before the point of no return beyond which it will be impossible to achieve any viable political or military/political solution.