Quote Originally Posted by DavidPB4 View Post
Shek - Your two posts following mine make a good point, ie. the difference between what Summers actually wrote and what the Army thought he wrote. Summers wrote that isolation of the battlespace of South Vietnam should have been followed by counterinsurgency within the country, not that counterinsurgency could work without first isolating the battlespace or that conventional war alone was sufficient. If Summers became shorthand for downgrading counterinsurgency, then he became a symbol for something that he did not in fact favor.
Dave,

Thanks for the response. As I was checking out the book today, I was having a hard time finding where COL Summers didn't downgrade COIN for US forces. He specifically states that COIN, as an internal problem, should have been assigned to Vietnamese forces. In doing so, I think he portrays that not only should the US not have adopted COIN as a primary mission (although Krepinevich takes this conclusion to task), but that it shouldn't have even been a secondary mission - it should be sourced to local troops. He references this in the context of Korea first and then later in the book applies this to Vietnam (where he grants that assistance could be given to the local troops). Also, as I was going through some old SWJ Magazine editions, I came across this on the subject, http://smallwarsjournal.com/document...v3/collins.htm.

Quote Originally Posted by DavidPB4
There is also the question of whether more civilian education of officers will further widen the gray area between civil and military responsibility. The real need I see is for civilians to have more military content in what they learn of American history and civics, not for officers to spend more time in advanced civilian study.
I totally agree that the military should not try to expand its professional jurisdiction a la "if [fill in the blank] won't do their job, then we need to be prepared to do it for them." However, there is value in being exposed to other professional expertise, as sometimes [fill in the blank] may not be available to do their job because of the security situation, etc. So, I think it is important to have some rudimentary knowledge outside the traditional jurisdicational lines. However, I think an area that is often overlooked is the experience that civilian graduation schooling can provide, even if it is on topics that the current officer education system provides.

An officer could take a year of classes at the Army War College/Naval War College/Air War College/etc., and take the exact same classes at a top tier university, and while it may be a wash in terms of the overall quality of faculty and material presented, the experiences will be completely different. Surrounded by fellow military peers at the war colleges, one's views may not be challenged, and drastically different and competing view points may or may not be introduced. However, at a civilian university, the officer will be exposed to many different and varying viewpoints. Furthermore, these conversations will continue outside of the classroom.

I'll close with posting a link that I know I've posted here in the past, but I think this oped uses a perfect metaphor to deliver its message:

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute...les/PUB731.pdf