I agree, but I'm not sure the Chinese really think they are all that strong, though they badly need to be seen as strong, both regionally and domestically. I do not think the Chinese have any intention of crossing the line into shooting with the Japanese, as the outcome of such an encounter could easily go badly for them. Even Vietnam has the capacity to bite back: they couldn't win a full scale war with China, but China wouldn't want a full scale war and getting spanked in a skirmish would be a very unattractive prospect for them. That's why the focus is on the Philippines, where China can act aggressively (domestically they would say "assertively") with essentially no risk.
The danger, of course, is that as the Chinese economy runs into reality, the government will rely more and more on jingoism and patriotism to keep the populace in line. That could easily create a position whee they feel that talking strong isn't enough, and they feel the need to do something. Where that would go is far from clear, bit my guess is that the target would be the Philippines and the scale would be calibrated to fall below any level that would elicit anything beyond a verbal response from the US.
I don't think the Chinese want a war: they have little to gain and a great deal to lose. At the same time, their perceived need to look strong and keep proving that they have "made China great again" may put them in a spot where they feel they must do something.
Has anyone criticized the US history of imperialism in any context relevant to this particular situation? Seems to me that the issue is not whether the US is or is not “acceptable”, but what the US is or is not willing to do. The US has embraced strategic ambiguity as a useful tool, but I do not think anybody in this picture really believes that the US would impose serious military or economic repercussions on China over a scuffle in the Spratlys. It’s possible that this assessment could be wrong… but I doubt it.
Certainly so, but since nobody has invoked the word or the concept, it seems a bit of a straw man. The Spratly, Paracel, and Senkaku islands are irrelevant from a lebensraum perspective, all of them combined wouldn’t sustain the population of one Shanghai city block. Have the Chinese said or done anything that suggests an intent or desire to acquire lebensraum through conquest?
Of course the last one in the door always wants it closed behind them.
Certainly one cannot take over other countries without international condemnation, not that the Chinese care much about international condemnation, unless it is backed up by action. The Chinese haven’t taken anyone over, though. What imperial, colonial, or hegemonic ambitions would you assume that they have, and why?
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