The highly respected British military historian, Hew Strachan, has edited this small volume, thinner as officialdom prevented six serving officers contributions appearing and makes some pithy comments:
Like many armies in the past, the British army struggles to foster effective debate within a hierarchical command chain.....for fear of reputational damage and political controversy....The MoD has got to get real … Differences and debates need to be properly gone over. Otherwise we are none the wiser
If this is what retired officers are writing, as this review puts it I am not surprised controversy results:
An underlying theme in the essays by former generals and senior British staff officers is the almost complete lack of preparedness and failure to provide enough resources, in terms of both money and men, in Iraq. The failures, the authors write, were not learned and were repeated in Afghanistan.
Link to review:http://m.guardian.co.uk/uk-news/2013...als?CMP=twt_gu

Link to publisher's website, where John Nagl comments:http://www.ashgate.com/isbn/9781409437369

Found elsewhere a review by Sir Michael Howard, a historian who in his senior years remains sensible:
This collection must be almost unique in military history. Seldom if ever have senior military commanders discussed so frankly the difficulties they have faced in translating the strategic demands made by their political masters into operational realities. The problems posed by their enemies were minor compared with those presented by corrupt local auxiliaries, remote bureaucratic masters, and civilian colleagues pursuing their own agendas. Our political leaders should study it very carefully before they ever make such demands on our armed forces again.
From:http://ccw.history.ox.ac.uk/2013/05/...n-blairs-wars/

Amazon.com, with no reviews:http://www.amazon.com/British-Genera...Blair%27s+Wars

Amazon.co.uk: not available yet (ho-hum).