Maximus, I get the feeling that this sort of "freedom" that McFarland mentions is really not so much freedom as an utter lack of a strategic plan under Casey and Abizaid. While McMaster and the 3rd ACR were implementing the Tal Afar plan in 2005 and McFarland (McMaster's replacement in Tal Afar, shifted to Ramadi in May 2006, meanwhile we've seen Tal Afar return to car bombings and sectarian killing) was working in Ramadi in 2006, the overall strategic thrust of the U.S. Army in Iraq was withdrawal to FOBs. Am I full of it? This is little more than a half-assed guess, so please feel free to correct me.

I think a key to remember here is something that both Yingling and McFarland point to as key: a viable Iraqi partner on the ground to work with. As McFarland notes, simply moving to combat outposts was not enough. Only when the shaykhs were moved to fight al-Qaeda did he see real results. Similarly, the mayor and IA commander in Tal Afar had key input at all levels of Operation Restoring Rights as detailed by Yingling.

That just makes things like this all the worse.