I just finished War Comes to Garmser by Carter Malkasian.

http://www.amazon.com/War-Comes-Garm...mes+to+garmser

Everybody who hasn't actually been to Afghanistan, and I don't mean a big base somewhere, must stop reading whatever they are reading and read this book. Right now. For its conflict, this is as good as The Village. The author aspired to emulate War Comes to Long An. It has been a long time since I read that book but I remember how impressed I was with it and how it seem to shine a light on what had been dark. This book strikes me as the same.

The great thing about this book is it is about the Afghans. There stories and their names constitute most of the story. At the same time the British and the Americans are part of the story, a big part, but always as a influence on what is happening amongst the Afghans, not as the main show.

The author says three things give the Taliban an opening in Garmser, political infighting amongst the leaders of the dominant tribes, the sanctuary provided by Pakistan and the social disruption caused by the canal project. Taliaban's main support comes from mullahs who were elevated politically by them and poor immigrants who had no firm title to the land they stayed on. The story of how this all came to be is related in a way that is understandable. By the end of the book keeping track of mullah Naim vs Abdullah Jan (now he was something, a Magsaysay type) vs Omar Jan is a natural thing, as it probably should be when viewing this conflict.

One of the main points made in the book that I found surprising was that one of the very great strengths of the Taliban was not that they were furthering the interests of the Pushtuns, the conflict in Garmser was basically Pushtun vs Pushtun. The advantage over the Afghan gov was that Taliban was a hierarchical, disciplined organization with clear chains of command. There was one boss who decided and was responsible for an area. That was not the case with the Afghan gov (and not with us from what I've read) and it made a huge difference.

Another thing that struck me was something similar I read in Owen West's The Snake Eaters. In both books, on the eve of something important and good happening, the spec ops types did a night raid and 'effed everything up, to the extent people died who should not have died. The Afghans did not like night raids and repeatedly stated that to the author.

An additional point Malkasian makes is that things were not written over there and some of the bad things that happened happened because of things we did and decisions we made. A case in point is the woefully slow growth of the Afghan Army. In the 5 years between 2001 and 2006 only 36,000 troops were raised so there was nothing much to oppose the Taliban offensive of 2006.

I could go on and on but this is a great book and people should read it.