I understand the catagories:

1. Personnel Risk Aversion, involves both Command Responsibility and Responsible Command.

2. Personal Risk Aversion, involves almost exclusively Command Responsibility (perhaps ?)

but I think the construct needs more development.

I'd suggest a distinction between "personal risk aversion" and "unit risk aversion" (which I'd distinguish from "personnel risk aversion"). E.g., under one set of facts which could be argued in the Behenna case (which involved multiple, variant and contradictory sets of facts and "facts"), with respect to a specific individual (say, a unit commander), personal self-defense would be not justified to him, whereas unit self-defense would be justified to him - all under the same set of posited facts (or "facts"). In short, a unit commander in killing a person could be unjustified with respect to the concepts underlying personal self-defense (variable), but justified with respect to the concepts underlying unit self-defense (absolute).

More broadly, we have the concepts underlying "individual" and "collective" self-defense; as well as the concepts underlying "individual" and "collective" offense against what is perceived or defined as "evil". I'd argue that both Command Responsibility and Responsible Command are involved as soon as a "unit" (e.g., a 4-man fireteam) enters the picture. So, the "Strategic Lance Corporal".

Thus, the focus should be focused on what I'd call "Comparative Combat Philosophies and Policies", driving "Comparative Combat Law" (not Google categories) - a very non-objective topic, subject to biases and emotions (and rightly so, I'd argue).

While the "laws of war regulating combat" (jus in bello) have been discussed ad nauseum (at least to me presently), discussion of their underlying philosophies and policies is less frequent. Perhaps, I've missed some things.

Gabriella Blum is one who has discussed this topic in two recent articles (abstracted below).

For an introduction to her, see these videos (less than 10 min each): Gabriella Blum, Tomorrow 2008 (JMM comment: Focus is on the future of International and Regional Organizations - "coalitions of the willing" vs "coalitions of the pi$$ed"); and Gabriella Blum, Tomorrow 2009 (JMM comment: Focus is on Liberal Arts Education vs "Trade Schools", to include law schools; "a collection of slaves").

Besides being interesting (much more so than Michael Walzer), she has great methodology and depth, as exemplified in the following:

Gabriella Blum, The Dispensable Lives of Soldiers (2009)

Abstract:

Why are all soldiers fair game in war? The laws of war, under their current interpretation, divide up populations into two classes – that of civilians and that of combatants – and accord each its own set of privileges and obligations. Taken together, the legal principles of military necessity and distinction strike up a bargain by which combatants are to be sacrificed for the protection of civilians. Under this bargain, all soldiers are fair game, regardless of their role, function, or the degree of threat they pose at any particular moment. Consequently, the killing of retreating soldiers in Iraq, the attack on officials meeting in Korea or shooting soldiers playing soccer in Bosnia – are all legitimate military operations.

This paper challenges the status-based distinction of the laws of war, which has so far been widely accepted by international law scholars, calling instead for revised targeting doctrines that would place further limits on the killing of enemy soldiers. My argument stems from a recognition of the value of all human life, including that of enemy soldiers. I argue that the changing nature of wars – the decline in the importance of any generic ‘combatant,’ the growing civilianization of the armed forces, and the advance in technology – casts doubts on the necessity of killing all enemy soldiers indiscriminately.

I offer two amendments: The first is a reinterpretation of the principle of distinction, suggesting that the status-based classification be complemented by a test of threat. Consequently, combatants who pose no real threat would be spared from direct attack. The second is a reinterpretation of the principle of military necessity, introducing a least-harmful-means test, under which an alternative of capture or disabling of the enemy would be preferred to killing whenever feasible.

I discuss the practical and normative implications of adopting these amendments, suggesting some possible legal strategies of bringing them about.
Gabriella Blum, The Individualization of War: From Collectivism to Individualism in the Regulation of Armed Conflicts (2013)

Abstract:

In a celebrated humanitarian move, wartime regulation has evolved from a predominantly state-oriented set of obligations — which viewed war as an inter-collective effort — to a more individual-focused regime. In fact, the regulation of armed conflict increasingly resembles, at least in aspiration, the regulation of police activities, in which it is the welfare of individuals, rather than the collective interest of the state, that takes center stage.

I demonstrate that many contemporary debates over the laws of war, including the distinction between the jus ad bellum and jus in bello, proportionality, detention of combatants, and reparations for victims implicate exactly the tension between collectivism and individualism in the regulation of armed conflict.

I further argue that notwithstanding the humanitarian benefits of the move to greater concern over the human rights of those affected by war, reimagining war as a policing operation harbors real dangers that must not be overlooked. These include imagining more of policing as war, inhibiting military action for the protection of others, and inviting more aggressive acts “short of war” against targets around the world.
Her subject matter choices (from the 2009 article) are mine also:

The article proceeds as follows. Part 2 offers an overview of the general principles of the laws of war, as they pertain to the permissible targeting of combatants on the battlefield. Part 3 summarizes the mainstream philosophical justifications for subjecting combatants to deliberate targeting and the dissenters’ voices in challenging them. Part 4 fleshes out three fundamental strategic changes in the nature of wars and combatants, namely the declining value in killing generic combatants in modern
conflicts, the civilianization of the armed forces, and the technological sophistication of at least some militaries. In Part 5, I propose possible alternative doctrines, which aim at limiting the legitimate targeting of combatants. I discuss the practical implications of this amended reading and the possible legal strategies for bringing it about.
All that being said, for the most part, I strongly disagree with much that she opines as a recipe for the future. But, that is a matter of variant philosophies and policies - which proves my point (at least to myself ).

Where we end up on these issues of "Comparative Combat Philosophies and Policies", driving "Comparative Combat Law", hinges little on dry reason, but rather on our experiences and our concepts of integrity, moral courage, loyalty and accountability - see 1993 Krulak USNA, pt.1 and pt.2 (about an hour total); and Hugh Thompson at My Lai (USNA, 5 videos, about 1 hour).

Regards

Mike