Modernization Theory is Hokum.

[TheCurmudgeon]

My working outline.

1. introduction/purpose
2. Modernization Theory and Policy – Why should I care
a. History
b. Types
c. Influence in American Policy
3. Modernization Theory Failures
a. Vietnam
b. Iraq/Afghanistan
4. Modernization – What is really happening?
a. Newer theories – value shifts
b. No magic bullet
c. A perfect world – assimilation.
d. Reality – a long, tough road.
5. What can and can’t be done … or COIN, it’s not just Genocide anymore.
a. The world since WWII
b. The Limitations of Force
c. The Limitations of Assistance

Would be interested in other historical examples of failures, primarily intereted in post WWII time frame.

[jmm99]

Using Dobbins' multiple monographs as a checklist, I'd pick Haiti as a good example of multiple failures; perhaps also Somalia (although how much "modernization" was actually done there ?). Congo must rank in there somewhere ("Gazing in the Congo" certainly gets enough views here).

Some Dobbins RAND stuff:

America's Role in Nation-Building - From Germany to Iraq

After the War - Nation-Building from FDR to George W. Bush

The UN's Role in Nation-Building - From the Congo to Iraq

Europe's Role in Nation-Building - From the Balkans to the Congo

Building a More Resilient Haitian State

Regards

Mike

[TheCurmudgeon]

JMM,

Thanks

I was just on the Rand site today pulling down stuff.

I realized that I needed to add another section on what Modernization was not. Modernization is not Nation-Building as defined in Rand's "The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building” which

…involves the use of armed forces as part of a broader effort to promote political and economic reforms with the objective of transforming a society from conflict into one at peace with itself and its neighbors.

That is pretty close, but it is self limiting by only dealing with economic and political reforms. It may be that people assume that those reforms are the triggers to full blown modernization, but I will deal with that elsewhere. Also the intent seems to be stabilization not modernization – you could ensure peace internally and with its neighbors without trying to turn it into a western democracy.

Likewise, it is not Democratization since that only deals with a specific political transition to democracy. Modernization is a complete change in the social structure as noted in one of my earlier posts.

I will dig though the material and see if I find conflict between the claimed definition and the reality of the operations.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Madhu,

"Mandarins..." in on its way – gotta love Amazon. I hope to have it today and will delve into it this weekend.

I will look over Milton’s piece. I have to admit I have not seen it before. I do like the idea of a lighter footprint where possible.

While my working title was “How to keep Modernization Theory from killing your Soldiers (or Marines, Airmen, and Sailors)” I may actually try to turn it on its head and use it to argue that attempting a limited change to either the economic or political system will not work without a complete realignment of the social structure – therefore limit your effort to what is needed and let the rest take its natural course. This is actually pretty dangerous since only a limited number of transitions have not involved multiple revolts and coups. Perhaps there are ways to limit the damage, but that one is beyond me.

As for your question, I don't think "development" was ever the true aim of the policy. My guess is that it first came about after WWII in response to communism. Development is code for freemarket capitalism first and democracy second. That was largely how Modernization got its big push in America. Reading the stuff on Modernization's application in the US it is almost as if we invented the idea in the 1950's even though it had been part of sociology in Europe since the mid 1800's.

Madhu, chech out "Partner Nation Capacity Building: Setting Conditions for Success" for a short history of Capacity Building.

[Madhu]

Madhu, chech out "Partner Nation Capacity Building: Setting Conditions for Success" for a short history of Capacity Building.

Thanks, I ran across that resource when I was searching for the modernization, CORDS, FM3-24 Council post I started. My understanding is that a lot of this stuff about capacity building as a sort of core military objective in preventing instability in states is very much tied to the UN definition from the 90's and 90's era peacekeeping. At any rate, something happened in the 90's to make this language more prominent. I think, I'd love to see a proper study. Maybe I'm wrong.

Another "model" you might be interested in is the following:

By Gian Gentile
Best Defense counterininsurgency critic

In general terms I would deconstruct the manual as it is now and break the singular link that it has with a certain theory of state building (known as population centric COIN). Once broken up I would then rewrite the doctrine from the ground up with three general parts: 1) would be a counterinsurgency approach centered on post-conflict reconstruction; 2) would be a counterinsurgency approach centered around military action to attack insurgent sources of military power (sometimes referred to as counter-terror or CT), but not linked to an endstate of a rebuilt or newly built nation state; 3) would be a counterinsurgency approach -- perhaps call it COIN light -- that would focus largely on Special Forces with some limited conventional army support conducting Foreign Internal Defense (FID).

The trick with this revised manual would be to present doctrinal alternatives for the U.S. Army when it goes about the countering of insurgencies and conducting stability operations with teeth. The trifecta trick would be to treat these three methods of countering insurgencies as operationally equal; that is to say, we would move away from the dogmatic belief currently held that anytime an insurgency is fought it must be of the population centric (FM 3-24, aka state building) persuasion, and that methods of CT and FID are subsumed within it and hence are seen as "lesser" operations. To reemphasize the key here is operational equality of the respective three.

Lastly, with regard to part one and the countering of an insurgency through post-conflict reconstruction which would invariably have the quality of state building to it, I would completely demolish the theory of population centric, hearts and minds COIN that FM 3-24 is currently built on, and update that part of the manual with much more current social science theory and better uses of history. Example is the really quite simplistic chart in FM 3-24 that depicts the population of "ANY" insurgency as 10% hardcore insurgents, 10% on the government's side, and the remaining 80% of the population malleable and shapeable and just waiting to have their hearts and minds won over by the counterinsurgent force. That kind of conception of populations in insurgency has not proven itself in history, nor do I think in current practice. After returning from west Baghdad in late 2006 as a Cavalry Squadron commander and witnessing firsthand Iraq's viscous and bloody sectarian civil war, when I first saw that FM 3-24 diagram I said to myself "shoot, only one line in it should be drawn across the middle with Shia on the top and Sunni on the bottom." The point here is to emphasize the limits of winning hearts and minds of a population at the barrel of a gun and to create a better, more sophisticated understanding of populations and societal motivation and actions in insurgencies and civil wars.

Next step after 3-24 is deconstructed and rewritten would be the much more difficult task of delinking the FM 3-24 style of counterinsurgency as it exists today, with its broader permeating effects not only on the Army, but on the greater defense and policy establishment as well.

http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts...urgency_manual

Over the years, I've collected various proposals on how to think about counterinsurgency from a third party expeditionary point of view. Some proposals view appropriate responses in a completely different way and somehow this is missed in the conversation. All of these are proposal about countering an insurgency, it is just looked at from a different lens, one where appropriate responses from the US include less maximalist solutions.

I sometimes think this is missed because of discussion on the myth of the Savior General, it's entwined with that myth and a part of it, yet, separate too. This is why I also get irritated when people don't take time to look at US history in South Asia in the immediate post WWII period. After partition or their respective Independence, as India and Pakistan began building their new nations, we and the UK and UN were very much involved. For some reason we keep forgetting. This forgetting was carried forward into NATO's approach toward nation building in Afghanistan, IMO. That is why I say, "hey, if you are interested in nation building why aren't you interested in this very interesting US history of assistance?"

Took me a long time to figure that out, though.

[TheCurmudgeon]

It was interesting to see that Gentile had anything constructive to say. Almost everything I have seen from his was simply a biased attack on counterinsurgency. It's nice to see a constructive comment.

You should write something. It seems you have collected a fair amount of material. You should write something. I would read it.

I think that the American military makes some fundamental errors in trying to define itself and its mission. Most of these are a reflection of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. First, we try to find the biggest threat and prepare for it rather than look to what our political masters are most likely to ask us to do. This leads us to look for near peer competitors even where they really don't exist. Second, we look to history for examples rather than realizing that the world fundamentally changed after the creation of the UN. We don't have the freedom to take certain actions or use certain tactics that were part and parcel of the war prior to that point. Finally, we fail to realize that in many of the far reaches of the world we are the only organization that works. Yeah, democracy is great, but it is not really the best way to conduct operations, or perhaps even run a country.

[TheCurmudgeon]

By Gian Gentile
Best Defense counterininsurgency critic

In general terms I would deconstruct the manual as it is now and break the singular link that it has with a certain theory of state building (known as population centric COIN). Once broken up I would then rewrite the doctrine from the ground up with three general parts: 1) would be a counterinsurgency approach centered on post-conflict reconstruction; 2) would be a counterinsurgency approach centered around military action to attack insurgent sources of military power (sometimes referred to as counter-terror or CT), but not linked to an endstate of a rebuilt or newly built nation state; 3) would be a counterinsurgency approach -- perhaps call it COIN light -- that would focus largely on Special Forces with some limited conventional army support conducting Foreign Internal Defense (FID).

OK, so I still don't like Gentile. First, number 1 is not COIN. COIN and post-conflict reconstruction are not synonymous. 2. Assumes the insurgency has reached the point of civil war. Afghan insurgency often never gets to this level, although specific operations clearly meet the criteria. Iraq I leave to others to debate. 3. I prefer but... and it is the big but ... none of these attemept to determine why the insurgency is occurring. They are tactical solutions to strategic problems. This puts us right back to where we started. They are no solution at all.

[Madhu]

My working outline.

Would be interested in other historical examples of failures, primarily intereted in post WWII time frame.

Curmudgeon - you might want to look at the work of Nils Gilman, much discussed here and elsewhere:

Because it provided the dominant framework for "development" of poor, postcolonial countries, modernization theory ranks among the most important constructs of twentieth-century social science. In Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America Nils Gilman offers the first intellectual history of a movement that has had far-reaching and often unintended consequences.

After a survey of the theory's origins and its role in forming America's postwar sense of global mission, Gilman offers a close analysis of the people who did the most to promote it in the United States and the academic institutions they came to dominate. He first explains how Talcott Parsons at Harvard constructed a social theory that challenged the prevailing economics-centered understanding of the modernization process, then describes the work of Edward Shils and Gabriel Almond in helping Parsonsian ideas triumph over other alternative conceptions of the development process, and finally discusses the role of Walt Rostow and his colleagues at M.I.T. in promoting modernization theory during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. By connecting modernization theory to the welfare state liberalism programs of the New Deal order, Gilman not only provides a new intellectual context for America's Third World during the Cold War, but also connects the optimism of the Great Society to the notion that American power and good intentions could stop the postcolonial world from embracing communism.

http://www.amazon.com/books/dp/0801886333


And the outline provided in this Melton paper here at SWJ:

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art...y-with-reality


Aligning FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency with Reality
The “U.S. in the Lead” COIN Approach Usually Fails Where Security Force Assistance Could Succeed

And there are other models discussed here, the SWORD model and I believe jmm99 has attempted to put together an outline of conflict such as the Melton paper.

I also asked on a SWC thread that I started about the origin of the term "capacity building" and when it started showing up doctrinally.

It seems that the "system" cannot think outside a few dated models which entail attempts at reengineering societies and this includes the civilian national security apparatus.

For instance, when did development become the main emphasis of State's diplomacy?