Kandahar Province: catch all thread

[davidbfpo]

The BBC is reporting:

The half-brother of Afghan President Hamid Karzai has been assassinated in Kandahar, officials say.

Ahmad Wali Karzai, a leading power broker in the country's south, was shot dead at his home in a blow to Nato's battle against the Taliban in the area.

He was shot twice by his long-time head of security Sardar Mohammed, who was himself killed almost immediately.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14118884

Given the lack of updates on this thread I am unsure if anything much happened in Kandahar city itself and there was a comment by an ANP officer the insurgency had been it's worst recently.

Added later, SWJ item:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=13770

[TDB]

The power vacuum left by his death could cause more trouble than the Talbian. If the Taliban are behind it, this really is a master stroke of luck.

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Abu M to a short piece at the end of June, which refers to AWK being locally nominated as the next provincial Governor, which President Karzai rejected:http://harpers.org/archive/2011/06/hbc-90008134

[davidbfpo]

The former EU envoy in Afghanistan adds a portrait of AWK:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...er-vacuum.html

Ends with:

Nato made a kill or capture campaign targeted at the Taliban leadership a key feature of their surge in Afghanistan. Of late the Taliban have taken a decision to repay in kind, targeting key figures in the Afghan Government security apparatus. With the creation of this vacuum in Kandahar they have indeed claimed their most valuable scalp yet.

Methinks that securing the population may have to alter, securing the elite better and then the population!

[jcustis]

More at the Army Times link:

http://www.armytimes.com/news/2011/1...ander-112711w/

A snippet:

Report blames lapses on Stryker commander
532-page report finds colonel ignored doctrine, proper procedure in leading undisciplined BCT
By Michelle Tan - Staff writer
Posted : Sunday Nov 27, 2011 9:06:28 EST

The frustration and confusion that permeated the 5th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, was so pervasive that the brigade almost wasn’t certified to deploy, and senior commanders in Afghanistan lost confidence in the brigade commander’s ability to lead, according to an Army investigation.

The 4,000-member brigade, commanded by Col. Harry Tunnell, was rife with lapses of discipline, misdirection and mixed signals about its mission in one of the most important regions of Afghanistan.

Much of the blame is put on Tunnell, whose lack of emphasis on administrative matters such as command inspections and urinalysis “may have helped create an environment in which misconduct could occur,” the investigation found.

The environment created the setting for a series of deadly events:

• Five soldiers from one platoon in 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment, were accused of killing innocent Afghan civilians “for sport.” Four of the soldiers have been convicted for their involvement in the deaths.

Staff Sgt. Calvin Gibbs, the accused ringleader, was convicted Nov. 10 of 15 counts, including three counts of premeditated murder, and was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole. The court-martial of the fifth soldier is scheduled for January.

• One soldier died from a vehicle rollover in part because he was not following regulations requiring seatbelt use.

• Seven soldiers and an interpreter were killed when a platoon ignored procedure and failed to dismount from their Stryker before driving over a “suspicious chokepoint” — when the platoon directly in front of them did so to minimize the risk of being hit by a roadside bomb. A massive bomb hidden in that chokepoint was “detonated by a patient triggerman,” an officer from the unit told investigators.

• About 15 soldiers from the same platoon are accused of regularly smoking hashish in their housing units and even in one of the unit’s Strykers.

As a result, at least eight soldiers — five officers and three senior noncommissioned officers — have been recommended for letters of admonition, memoranda of reprimand or letters of concern.

The inside story of the brigade came in a scathing 532-page report obtained by Army Times. Brig. Gen. Stephen Twitty, the investigating officer appointed to determine the command climate within the brigade and whether it had any causal relation to the alleged criminal activity, describes a brigade that was rife with turmoil from the start.

[Bob's World]

I served in RC South under general Carter and worked with him and BG Hodges on a daily basis. I also worked closely with Harry Tunnell and his staff. I'll just offer this: I have not read this lengthy report, but from the highlighted quotes I have seen there is a middle perspective that is not addressed very well.

Harry and his Brigade did indeed "clear" the Arghandab valley; though when he would tell me that he "defeated the Taliban in the Arghandab" I would tell him that I believed he overstated the effects of their actions. (But this is no less true of the Clear-Hold-Build operations later pursued under the team led by Carter and Hodges). As to the follow-on mission Harry was given to keep the highways open from East to West across Helmand, Kandahar and Zabul; and North to South from upper Kandahar down to the border crossing at Spin Boldak, there is a "Feasibility" assessment that needs to be applied to bridge the gap between BG Hodges and COL Tunnell. There is probably 50% of the populace of that region that lives with in a few miles (walk over and plant an IED at night range) of that route. Strykers are well suited to running up and down roads and engaging threats; such units are not well suited, nor nearly large enough to engage the vast, diverse populaces along that route in "pop-centric COIN" and convince them that they have no need to attack the ISAF forces that were bringing Northern Alliance forces and governmental officals down to rule over them.

I don't think Harry was right in his perspective, and he was a powerful, dynamic, outspoken advocate for what he felt was the most effective employment of his command. I never heard or saw him disrespect his seniors; only disagree professionally as was his duty. I never saw or heard of him disobeying any orders; only fail to meet expectations that were arguably not feasible to begin with.

Not taking sides, but as I said, there is a middle ground that is not well addressed in what I have seen on this so far.

[davidbfpo]

Oddly considering the key role of Kandahar Province and city this thread has not been updated for a long time. So it was refreshing to see this update, which contains an optimistic assessment, notably on the ANSF. It ends with:

But make no mistake about it, Kandahar right now is much improved, and continuing to head in the right direction. And so are the Afghan national security forces.

Link:http://www.brookings.edu/research/op...em_alert032513

[davidbfpo]

A rare article on Kandahar, mainly the city, but also the Arghandab River Valley, by an ICG analyst for a Canadian newspaper:http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/...3542/?page=all