Dutch state liable for three Srebrenica deaths

[jmm99]

I agree with this:

The bansai attack was IMHO a non-threat, being forced to storm the city may have caused even more KIA on the Arabic side.

Consider the Japanese non-banzai defense of Iwo Jima, which cost our Marines 26,000 casualties, vs early Japanese island defenses where banzai attacks were employed.

However, in Balian's case (if his bet would have been called), and if he and his soldiers had executed "Masada" (agreed, the real threat):

... we shall kill our children and our wives, burn our possessions, so as not to leave you with a dinar or a drachma or a single man or woman to enslave. When this is done, we shall pull down the Sanctuary of the Rock and the Masjid al-Aqsa and the other sacred places, slaughtering the Muslim prisoners we hold - 5,000 of them - and killling every horse and animal we possess.

they wouldn't have had much to live for anyway (families and possessions gone); and, while defense of a fortified position would have been more "successful" body-countwise, going out in a blaze of glory probably counted more for them than an enhanced body-count.

At least that is what the Arab historian said Balian said:

Then we shall come out to fight you like men fighting for their lives, when each man, before he falls dead, kills his equals; we shall die with honour, or win a noble victory!

In any event, if unconditional surrender is rejected, there are two options I see in my viewscreen: (1) the banzai charge from an objectively hopeless position (numerous examples); and (2) defense of the fortified position without hope of winning (e.g., Iwo Jima and the Alamo). Add all others you think of.

A banzai charge which is a "forlorn hope" (the charge allowing some to escape the pocket) is a different issue. Here's an example from earlier in the Crusades (circa the time of Balian's grandfather); ref., History of Outremer -The Kingdom of Jerusalem, 6.Second Battle of Ramleh (2011; this is a totally online 15-week course, all you need free for anyone interested):

Surely one reason why they stayed was that Baldwin believed the force advancing from Egypt was a small force, only a reconnaissance. Baldwin decided to destroy it with only his cavalry. Stephen of Blois was hesitant and argued for a more thorough scouting report, but given his earlier acts of cowardice, no one listened to him.

They should have. The Egyptian army in fact was twice as large as the previous one. Baldwin and his army of about five hundred knights rode out over the hills. Coming over a particular rise, they saw the entire army in front of them. There was no possibility of escape, for the Egyptian cavalry was already cutting off retreat. The knights charged into the heart of the enemy.

This time the Egyptians held. Most of the knights were killed. A few managed to escape toward Jaffa, but the king was not among them. Baldwin, along with those unlucky Crusaders who had survived Anatolia, broke free and made it as far as Ramleh, taking refuge in the single tower there. The Egyptians immediately surrounded them, but night fell and saved them for the moment. During the night, Baldwin escaped. A few others managed it as well, each leaving separately. One of them, Gothman of Brussels, made it to Jerusalem, where he told the citizens to resist because the king still lived.

At dawn the Egyptians advanced on those who held out in the little fortification at Ramleh. They piled wood around the fortress and set it on fire. Rather than burn to death, those inside formed up for a final charge. Led by Conrad, constable of the kingdom, they plunged into the Egyptian army. Most died, including Stephen of Blois. The Constable was captured and sent with about a hundred other captives to Egypt.

There, we have two banzai charges. The first allowed some to escape. The second was more in the nature of Camerone, where the enemy allowed some banzai chargers to survive. The uncaptured survivors, namely King Baldwin, reformed a Crusader army with some success in stabilizing the kingdom's borders.

Stephen de Blois is an interesting figure. He was a craven coward at the earlier Siege of Antioch, where he was a "rope dancer" - escaping down a rope to safety in the countryside and eventually return to Europe. There, he sustained the continuous scorn of his wife, a daughter of William the Conqueror; until, not being able to take it anymore, he set off on the next crusade. Their understanding was that he would not return.

Questions to be answered by viewers other than JMM.

So, was Stephen's cowardice at Antioch redeemed by his courage at Ramleh ? And, was his charge at Ramleh really "courage" given his personal motive to redeem cowardice ?

They add to the other questions asked so far:

Does anyone here at SWC have personal experience in deciding whether or not to surrender, especially on the unit commander level ?

So what happened here [at Singapore]? What about his [Percival's] character was missed ? Can modern officer and soldier selection select out for this ?

Put another way, what made the 1st Marine Division special [on the Canal and at Chosin] ?

Would the Dutch commander, plus his command, have taken a different decision minus the blue beret ?

Did Percival and Wainwright even consider what Balian threatened ?

Would any reader consider doing that ?

Are "Masadas" a thing of the past ?

What were the options to unconditional surrender (the only option that Yama$hita said he'd accept) that should have been considered at Singapore and at Bataan-Corregidor before meeting with Yama$hita ?

What was (were) General Wainwright's [or Parcival's] bargaining chip(s) ?

What is the difference between a soldier and a warrior ?

If a difference, how will each perform in a "surrounded" situation and why ?

Hopefully, I've summed up all the questions asked from this thread's start to date.

Over three weeks, there's been 1500 views - what are the viewers' opinions on these questions ?

Regards

Mike