While a critique of Roger Hilsman's "Plan for Victory in the Villages" would be interesting, it would most likely give rise to conventional warfare types fighting unconventional warfare types as to the policy that should have been followed in Vietnam. The policy that should have been followed in Vietnam was the most parsimonious counter-policy against the policy set by the aggressor. That was North Vietnam; and its policy was that of conventional-unconventional warfare expressed by Giap and a number of other North Vietnamese leaders.

However, before going there, Bernard Fall has a good, short biography of Giap, following Hilsman's polemic. Here are some snips, showing Giap's background in state security, and his command of a very hardball political struggle (including targeted killings and large-scale massacres). Giap often went where Uncle Ho would not tread.

At twelve, young Giap was sent to the Lycee National at Hue -founded a few years earlier by Ngo Dinh Kha, a high court official who was the father of President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam. Created precisely for the purpose of providing both a traditional and a modern education, instead of the solely modern schooling given by the French-run high schools, the Lycee National at Hue had counted among its students prior to Giap both Ngo Dinh Diem and his arch-enemy (and Giap's future chief), Ho Chi Minh. ...
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In 1926, while still a student, Giap joined the Tan Viet Cach Menh Dang, an underground nationalist group.... The Depression year 1930, which brought rock-bottom prices for rice and rubber in Vietnam and near starvation to the already poor farmers of Giap's home area, also brought Giap his first taste of prison. After the rifles of French-led militia troops halted a march of 6,000 peasants on the chief city of Ngh-An, the province neighboring Quang-Binh, Giap led student demonstrations at Hue and was promptly arrested by the colonial authorities. Ironically, it was to be one of General Giap's own crack divisions, the 325th Infantry Division, that was to crush another peasant revolt in Nghe-An in November 1956, when the farmers of that unfortunate area refused to endure any longer the harsh land-reform measures imposed by the Hanoi regime. But this time, there was no anguished outcry from student leaders.
In 1956, the 325ID killed many "counter-revolutionaries". However, Giap had long before became the North's "Enforcer" - from Fall's bio:

Having passed the stiff examinations of the French baccalaurat (for a high-school diploma equivalent to two years of college in the U.S.), Giap now moved to Hanoi, then the seat of French Indochina's single full-fledged university, and began his undergraduate law studies after a last year of precollege studies at Hanoi's Lyce Alhert-Sarraut, named after one of Indochina's most progressive French governors. (The Lyce Albert-Sarraut retained its name even after the Communist takeover of Hanoi and is still maintained and staffed by a French Cultural Mission.) While at the university, Giap took lodgings with a Vietnamese professor, Dang Thai Mai, whose daughter he was to marry in 1938.
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In 1937, Giap earned his LL.B. degree at Hanoi, with a poor grade in public law but very high marks in political economics, and decided to continue his studies toward a doctorate. But the meagre resources of his family were at an end and although his future father-in-law was willing to continue to house him, Giap had to find a way of earning a living. He found a post as a history teacher at Thang Long High School in Hanoi. Now a convinced Marxist in addition to being a Vietnamese nationalist, Giap turned his classroom lectures into political harangues, but he was well liked by the students as well as by his principal, Ton That Binh. Both Ton That Binh and his father-in-law, Pham Quynh, a leading Vietnamese scholar and nationalist, were executed by the Communist police during Giap's tenure as Minister of Interior, in 1945-46.

With his doctorate earned in 1938, Giap married the daughter of his landlord. ... [In 1939] Giap and his wife disappeared from Hanoi and returned to Central Vietnam. It was there, in Vinh, the chief city of Ngh-An Province, that the French authorities arrested Giap's wife. Both she and her sister were tried before a French military court for conspiracy against the security of France. Mme. Giap was sentenced to life imprisonment but died of illness - Giap himself says of ill-treatment - in prison in 1943; her sister was sentenced to death and guillotined. Giap himself escaped from Vietnam into neighboring South China, which, though theoretically Chinese Nationalist-controlled, was, in fact, a no man's land that sheltered revolutionaries and warlords of all kinds.
So, Giap had personal reasons to hate - and to kill.

... In October, 1944, Ho Chi Minh ordered him to set up an "Armed Propaganda Brigade for the Liberation of Vietnam." According to Ho Chi Minh's directive, the Brigade was to base its efforts "more on political action than on military force, because it is an instrument of political propaganda. In order to be militarily effective, the essential principle of the concentration of forces
must be observed. ..."

On December 22, the Brigade's first platoon, consisting of 34 men, was organized by Giap at Dinh-Ca Valley pear Cao-Bang on the Chinese border, and on Christmas Eve, Giap and his men attacked the two small French border posts of Phy Khat and Na Ngan and massacred their garrison. December 22 is now the official birthday of the VPA and a holiday in North Vietnam. With deliberate cruelty, Giap set about liquidating village chiefs and other notables "guilty" of collaboration with the French.
Thus, Uncle Ho's concept of "political action" was a bit more hardball than that of Chicago ward politics.

But Giap was to reveal the full measure of his ability in the four months beginning in June, 1946, while Ho Chi Minh and other top government members were absent in France. Giap then, held the de facto interim Presidency of Vietnam, as well as running the key Ministry of Interior, which controlled all the police forces and the administrative apparatus of the regime. In a series of swift stabs, he destroyed the back-country strongholds of the nationalist parties; executed hundreds of Vietnamese nationalists and even such old comrades in arms as the Trotskyite leader Ta-Thu-Thau, a personal friend of Ho Chi Minh. Finally, on July 11, 1946, Giap launched a country-wide purge of nationalist leaders and closed down Viet-Nam, the last opposition newspaper. When it re-appeared, on July 18, it was fully in line with the rest of the Communist-controlled press.
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... Although as late as 1947 Giap was described by Marcel Ner, one of his French professors in pre-war days, "as a sentimental and passionate man, deeply attached both to his country and to Communism," Giap remarked to another observer that "every minute, hundreds of thousands of people die all over the world. The life or death of a hundred, a thousand, or of tens of thousands of human beings, even if they are our own compatriots, represents really very little."
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Now middle-aged, Giap has never remarried. The very tiny, sentimental college professor of the 1930's, the self-taught guerrilla leader of the early 1940's, and the brilliant strategist of the 1950's have been combined into a stocky and competent commander in chief who may well be among the first of a new breed of revolutionary-warfare generals for whom the West may find it difficult to produce a worthy match in the foreseeable future; for it is almost impossible within our military system to develop men with both brilliant tactical abilities and wide-ranging political training.

It is Giap who defined the role of the Vietnam People's Army as being "the instrument of the Party and the revolutionary state for the accomplishment, in armed form, of the tasks of the revolution." Or, to misquote Clausewitz: "War is the continuance of revolution in another form." And that is precisely what the little "Snow-Covered Volcano" - the man who could kill his onetime benefactor and could send thousands of his men into the jaws of French guns - is doing in South Vietnam in the 1960's.
So, let us not mistake Giap for what he was not; nor mistake his concept of conventional-unconventional warfare for what it was not.

- to be cont. -