The new 2014 FM 3-24 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies

[TheCurmudgeon]

I have some issues with the way the JP describes an insurgency. My particular issue may be a bit tangential, but it appears that the JP implies that the narrative can control the people.

Compelling Narrative.
It takes dynamic and intelligent leadership to build a compelling narrative that links grievances to a political agenda and mobilizes the population to support an unlawful subversive and violent social movement. That narrative explains who is to blame for the grievances, how the grieances will be addressed, how the population will benefit under the insurgent’s ideology, and how the population and insurgency should work together to accomplish that goal. The compelling aspect of the narrative is not only in its content, but how it is presented (i.e., promoted and publicized) to the target audience, which normally requires ideological leaders. It is consistently reinforced through communication and through propaganda of the deed. Insurgents often frame grievances in terms of local identities, such as religious, ethno-sectarian, or regional groupings. A compelling narrative is often spun around the marginalization of a particular community, region, or class by the government.

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First, it creates the impression that insurgency is a rational action and that the participants are rational actors. It is my opinion that passion rules the population when it comes to insurgencies (or at least has a greater influence than rationality). War requires the passion of the people.

Second, identity does matter, but it is complex. To raise the passion of the people you must be able to create a level of hatred that is based on more than a simple narrative. There are plenty of different identities in many countries. They are not all in a state of civil war. The difference is the level or hatred, the need for retribution; for revenge. That is what makes the blood boil. So it is more than just a difference in identity - it is an injustice so sever that only retribution in kind will make up for it.

Third, the narrative seems to be used to create legitimacy in the insurgents. It creates the impression that all it takes to create legitimacy is a good public relations campaign. I have written against this view elsewhere.

Max Weber created a problem for many people when he defined legitimacy as a belief. While a belief is an internal motivator beliefs can be transitory. One can believe in one thing one moment and another thing the next. Beliefs are subject to change based on the influence of others. A powerful speaker or a well-crafted public relations campaign can change what people believe about a topic. This creates the false impression that all a government has to do to be legitimate is to convince its people to believe that it is legitimate. As David Beetham put it in The Legitimation of Power when describing the problem created by defining legitimacy as a simple belief: “[t]aken to their logical conclusion, such definitions would imply that the reason for the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989 lay in a deficiency of public relations, rather than anything actually wrong with the system of rule itself.”[43] While this statement may just be an ad absurdum argument for the proposition the idea that legitimacy can be created is alive and well. It is the foundation of America’s nation building and democratization efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.[44] Beliefs can be changed easily. Beliefs vary with the situation. Values are beliefs but they are enduring beliefs. They can remain engrained in a culture for centuries[45]. Values are a component of belief that forms the basis of Weber’s “legitimitätsglaube”. Barker recognized this when he identified values as a fourth form of Weberian legitimacy.

You cannot create legitimacy with a good story. Here is the failure of the way the narrative is described.

The JP makes the point that for an insurgency to be created there must be an opportunity. I would argue that that opportunity must have three components. The first is that a section of the population who can clearly identify themselves as somehow being different from, or separate to, the ruling elements of the government. The identity is a preexisting or can be created based on ideological differences. Second, the portion of the population already perceives the government as either being having weak legitimacy or being illegitimate AT LEAST in reference to their group. Third, that there is some recent or historical "wrong" committed by the government that is so severe that it requires retribution. This can be an actual act of the government (shooting protestors), a promise not kept (greater political freedom), or a historical difference (Shia'h versus Sunni).

Again, I am thinking out loud, but I don't believe that a good PR campaign is enough to start a civil war. It has to be tied to passion about an injustice that must be corrected.