Bill,
No, in many of the territories AQ are supposedly active they rarely govern. AQIM is a good example. It has gone through a cycle of militancy, retreat, crime (kidnapping & smuggling) and militancy in the Sahel where there are few people and even fewer who accept or need what they offer. Yemen I think is similar, with corruption replacing crime.
There is a big difference in deciding what the strategy should be in places where there are people in large numbers, Indonesia comes to mind.
I am not sure AQ's narrative has much appeal beyond inhospitable places with small populations (Afghanistan) where there is a competent state which can contain them (India), sorry also those that are ruthless (Algeria & Egypt).
I failed to find 'competitive control' instead this old thread Indirect and Direct components to strategy for the Long War (from 2008-2009) appeared and maybe useful:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=5070
Bookmarks