CAR Central African Republic: Fragile, failed and forlorn

[jmm99]

JMM
"Humanitarian interventionists" (to include HRW and Samantha Power) have a tendency to sugarcoat their interventions; so as to distinguish them from operations by those bad "military interventionists".

Max:
I think that's painting with too broad a brush. No question there are some that don't understand military ops whatsoever, but there are others who do (Marc Garlasco, for example).

This may be an instance of miscommunication (my "bad", your "bad, both "bad").

Let me start with the "bad military interventionists" ("bad" there is me being sarcastic); of which, on SWC, examples are JMM (I supported removal of Saddam et al in Iraq, but not "state building"; I supported killing UBL et al in Astan-Pstan, but not "state building"); and my friend JMA (He advocated removal of Qaddafi in Libya & Assad in Syria; I was and am negative to US intervention, military or humanitarian, in either country directly or by proxy).

Whether we cite it explicitly or not, the methodologies and historical context are summed in Stephen T. Hosmer, Operations Against Enemy Leaders (2001):

Operations targeted against senior enemy leaders have long been viewed as a potential means of shaping the policy and behavior of enemy states. As a result, the United States has launched a variety of overt and covert operations in efforts to attack enemy leaders directly, facilitate their overthrow by coup or rebellion, or secure their ouster through external invasion. This book examines a number of leadership attacks from World War II to the present to offer insights into the comparative efficacy of various forms of leadership attacks, their potential coercive and deterrent value, and the possible unintended consequences of their ill-considered use. The book concludes that direct attacks, coups, and rebellions have met with only limited success and, even when successful, have sometimes yielded counterproductive results. Moreover, neither direct attacks nor coups have been of significant coercive or deterrent value, although rebellions have at times provided useful negotiating leverage. By contrast, external invasions have proved to be more efficacious both in shaping the targeted countries’ policy and behavior and in exerting coercive effects. The book concludes by outlining the likely conditions under which future leadership attacks are likely to be sanctioned and by delineating the prerequisites of effective use of air power in such contexts.

Worth the read for anyone here who hasn't read it.

Here is an example of a limited military intervention: Special Plan Green - Mexico, which I posted 4+ years ago (link).

I'll just copy my post here.

STP, Iraq turned out much better ... than I expected at the end of 2003. So, you and others here can take credit for that.

My questions were more addressed to the political side of "best practices COIN" in general. I see some disconnects in the concept as laid out in FMI 3-24.3. For that matter, I see the same disconnects in the 1980s Summers-Krepinevich debate, and the current Gentile-Nagl debate - all very interesting from a military standpoint (the military effort); but without any real consideration by any of them as to the political effort required.

Most particularly, what do you do with an incompetent (corrupt, etc.) HN government ?

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I'd quibble about what "expeditions" and "expeditionary forces" do. Of course they can invade with the purpose of occupying the country - we seem to be fixated on that, as opposed to a punitive raid no matter how gigantic it might be. FM 27-10 (par. 352 explains the distinction).

Coincidentally, I was just re-reading parts of Brian Linn's The Echo of Battle. At p.91, he deals with War Plan Green (a war with Mexico). We've had war plans for Mexico since the 1800s, but by 1922 the Mexican army was so weak that War Plan Green was changed to Special Plan Green, an occupation plan not unlike what we intended for Iraq: the army would establish a government, reform the education and legal systems, employ honest police and civil servants, with the clear and expressed US intention to create "peace and good order."

Now, it came to pass in 1924 that Special Plan Green was war gamed; and, surprise, the most probable COA for the Mexicans was not to resist the main invasion columns, but to wait a while and then engage in guerrilla warfare, etc. The majority staff conclusion was that the occupation would morph into a long, slow and frustrating unconventional war.

So, in 1927, Special Plan Green was amended to provide for a rapidly moving direct attack with the purpose of deposing the Mexican government, and then immediately withdrawing. The plan required that it be made clear that it did not intend a military occupation, was not an operation against the Mexican nation, but was an operation against the Mexican government.

OK, in Linn's terminology, I'm just a dinosaur "Guardian" of the "Never Again but" school, who apparently sees disconnects where others don't.

The "humanitarian interventionists" (which may very well include you ) rely primarily on Responsibility to Protect (SWC thread)(searching R2P; 75 posts on SWC, including the thread cited); although, as Syria illustrates, multiple legal theories may be asserted.

My point (an opinion) was simply that "humanitarian interventionists" tend to sugarcoat their interventions as something that they are not (e.g., "peacekeeping", "save the children", etc.). I didn't say anything about the military operational expertise of "humanitarian interventionists", because that is not material to my point which addresses their agitprop.

As to Marc Garlasco (interesting Wiki; he's a bit controversial), his military operational expertise can be evaluated by professional militrary SWC members if they wish. It's not material to my point about "sugarcoating". His controversies are also not material to my point.

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To sample Max Kelly's writings, readers of this post may want to read a chapter in Eduarda P. Hamann and Robert Muggah (eds.), IMPLEMENTING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY? (2013), see chap. 7. Fighting for Their Lives: R2P, RwP and the Utility of Force to Protect Civilians, Max Kelly (shown in living color).

See also,

Kelly (with Giffen), Military Planning to Protect: Proposed Guidance for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (2011; Washington, DC: Stimson Center);

Kelly, Protecting Civilians: Principles for Military Operations (2010);

Holt & Taylor (with Kelly), Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations: Successes, Setbacks and Major Challenges (2009).

Regards

Mike