South China Sea and China (2011-2017)

[jmm99]

The issue of protecting trade routes in the Pacific, the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean is not a new issue for American policy makers and strategists. It existed in 1900, when Mahan published his collection of articles, The Problem of Asia and Its Effect Upon International Policies. The material at pp.177-181 (attached as a pdf) seems material to your post and may answer some of your questions.

Mahan introduces a factual situation not unlike that of today, with flexible suggestion for its resolution (emphasis added in all snips):

... we shall find ourselves one of several powers rivals in interest, — competitors, — with the danger, incident to competition, of degenerating into antagonism. The fact does not call upon us to circumscribe our independence of action by formal alliance with one, or declared opposition to another; but it does demand that we rid our minds of the caricature of independence, which receives frequent expression in words, probably because it reflects a condition of our popular consciousness. Each man and each state is independent just so far as there is strength to go alone, and no farther. When this limit is reached, if farther steps must be made, co-operation must be accepted. In that case the only certain foundation for harmony of action and continuance of relations is to be found in common interests and common habits of thought.
...
Co-operation, therefore, is indicated; but it is a mistake to assume that co-operation, which act by act is voluntary, necessitates or implies abnegation of that moral responsibility, involved in freedom of choice at each moment, in the retention and observance of which alone is real independence of action preserved, and which a treaty — of alliance, or of arbitration, if unconditioned — may impair culpably, because it pledges the unknown future.

Thus, the Mahanian basis of my disfavoring alliances and instead favoring co-operation between countries, with as much preservation of their independence and sovereignty as possible.

Mahan then went on to look at the two major trade routes which must be protected - a situation present today, with changed parties:

In final analysis the great lines of communication to the farther East are two, from Europe and from America. The former is by way of Suez, the latter by the Pacific ; but the present distribution of our national wealth, and its communications with our seaboard, require, and doubtless will insure, the opening of access for our Atlantic slope by way of the Central American Isthmus. In that case the American line of communications to China may be correctly said to be by Nicaragua, — or Panama, — as that of Europe is by way of Suez ; and as the Mediterranean, Egypt, Asia Minor, the Red Sea, and Aden, designate the points decisive of control by the one route, so do the Caribbean Sea and the continental surroundings of the future canal, with Hawaii and the Philippines, fix those of the other, the importance of which to ourselves make it our especial interest.

Today, we still have the US Navy for the American route across the Pacific. The logical successor to the Royal Navy for the European Route is the Indian Navy, with such of its neighbors as it can enlist in that co-operative venture.

Just after this point, Mahan takes up the question of quid pro quo:

I do not mean here to affirm an obligation of benevolence to other nations, strong enough to take care of themselves. I mean, on the contrary, that because of great common interests — with Great Britain especially, though not solely — in the Pacific commerce of the future, and in the nature of the development of China, we need to receive and to give support, and should be ashamed to receive more than we give, in proportion to our means and opportunities.

As an example, apportionment of trade route usage could determine the respective cost burdens of keeping trade routes open.

In conclusion, Mahan states what I have stated here:

From the conditions, we must be in effective naval force in the Pacific. We must similarly be in effective force on the Atlantic; not for the defence of our coasts primarily, or immediately, as is commonly thought, — for in warfare, however much in defence of right, the navy is not immediately an instrument of defence but of offence, — but because the virtual predominance of our naval power in the Caribbean is essential to preserve the use of the Isthmian Canal to our commerce, and to give our navy quick access to the Pacific.

The main adversary to all of this is China - although the USG certainly wants to put a sugarcoating on that Land of Unrestricted Warfare. In Mahan's time, China was a semi-feudal, semi-colonialized nation. Japan was the rising Asian power, even in 1900 - soon to prove itself in 1905. China is naturally following the same path; see, Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 5 September 2013), RL33153.

I've written of containment vis-à-vis China - not a USG policy, for sure. Containment can backfire; one can make a decent argument that Japan was pushed into WWII by an over-containment policy of the US and its allies.

Let's look at an example of a Containment Zone that I cited earlier - a line drawn in the sand. I give you Gaius Popillius Laenas.

He was sent as an envoy [an Army of One] to end a war between Antiochus IV Epiphanes of the Seleucid Empire and Ptolemaic Egypt (then weakly ruled by co-kings). On being confronted with the Roman demands that he abort his attack on Alexandria, Antiochus played for time. Laenas is supposed to have drawn a circle around the king in the sand with his cane, and ordered him not to move out of it until a firm answer had been given. Antiochus' answer implied submission; and in fact, the Syrians withdrew.

Why was Laenas there ? Was it because Rome felt an obligation to assist a smaller, weaker nation that was not able to defend itself against the neighborhood bully ? Not likely.

No, Roman was there because of Egypt's grain, which with North Africa's grain, were existential to Rome (see, Grain supply to the city of Rome). As one author put it:

Those who read about ancient Rome are often struck by the importance attached to the shipping of grain from Egypt. Without Egyptian grain, Rome must starve.

Rome knew power and the uses of power - a Thuycidean Realist in some ways, though we have better ways to preserve peace and avoid war (see, Stein).

I also earlier cited another legend; this one also dealing with a line drawn in the sand, but setting up a Protective Zone - the Lakshman Rekha.

The Lakshman Rekha was a line drawn by Lakshmana around the dwelling he shared with his brother Rama and Rama's wife Sita. The three had to flee their homeland because of their main adversaries, the shape-shifting Rakshasas. Rama was drawn away from the home by a golden deer (actually Rakshasa Maricha who had shifted shapes).



Sita pled with Lakshmana to search for his brother. Lakshmana agreed subject to his condition that Sita not cross the protective line he draws. Only Rama, Sita and himself can cross the line without being fried by flames erupting from the line.

Once Lakshmana left in search of Rama, the Rakshasa king Ravana came in the form of a mendicant and asked Sita for alms. Not expecting a trick, she unsuspectingly crossed the Lakshman Rekha to provide alms to him and Ravana kidnapped her.

After a long and arduous search tested his personal strength and virtue, Rama fought a colossal war against Ravana's armies. In a war of powerful and magical beings, greatly destructive weaponry and battles, Rama slew Ravana in battle and liberated his wife.

The salient points are that dangers exist outside the Protective Zone; the Protective Zone is not completely safe; and that defeat of external enemies requires leaving the Protective Zone to fight them on their own turf.

Regards

Mike

[Firn]

Just a couple of short points:

1. There is no doubt the free trade is a pillar of prosperity, be it for the Western world or China. Arguably strong and profitable economic ties decrease the incentives to go to war, but it just a (powerful) tendency. In war the ability to protect the own trade and to disrupt/block the opponents trade can be one of the keys to victory. The precise value depends of course on the type of war, relative naval strenght, geography and many other circumstances.

2. Currently Chinas economy depends to a large degree on seatrade both to import goods like basic ressources and to export manufactured products. It's geography makes it very difficult to protect its sea trade, which might be mostly a moot point anyway in a conflict with 'the West' as most trade partners would just stop it on their own. In a big war with the USA China would arguably need a stronger navy relative to its opponent and near allies to be able to keep its own naval trade flowing and to disrupt the trade flow to the US in an decisive manner.

3. Chinas recent actions sea and land disputes are difficult to grasp. Possibly they are mostly about putting on a show for the often unhappy crowd at home. Does a good part of the leadership truly believe that the potential ressources of the disputed areas are really important for China*? Does it think that China is just entitled to those areas and any concession/compromise is unworthy or does weaken the position in the next dispute? Before I tended more towards the first argument but now I'm no longer sure. Some of Chinas arguments have some merits, others much less so.

4. From a Western/US perspective China seems to be eager to score own goals against many neighbours. Arguably it could be foolish to stop China from doing that, it makes yourself just a so much more attractive option. Perhaps the US should also be not too keen to play up the containment to avoid unnecessary tensions but it does of course always depend on the situation.

Overall it seems to me that China is in many ways in a surprisingly weak position from an economic and naval point of view. Things may change in the future when the Chinese navy is vastly stronger and the economy more developed but nobody can know.


*In relative terms even rich sea deposits seem to me to be just a needle in the economic haystack of China.

[carl]

The important thing is maintaining the system of free navigation as it exists now. It doesn't matter at all how that is done, be it formal alliances, arrangements for cooperation or winks and nods, as long as it is done. If that system collapses things will get very bad. All you have to do is look back at how things were in the Atlantic between the time the Spanish went west and the Royal Navy finally prevailed in the very early 1800s. Or you can look at the Med before the Roman navy took care of everybody who wasn't peaceable and after the Roman navy collapsed.

The system is the important thing, far more important than any one individual country maintaining a specific supply line to here or there. If the system of free navigation goes, that one supply route will matter, but not nearly so much as if all the supply lines for all the countries are maintained. That is because if all the supply lines are maintained that will have a synergistic effect on world prosperity. One good supply line to a place that is X prosperous is worth much less than a supply line to a place that is 2.5 X prosperous because the whole world is richer for the maintenance of our system of free navigation.

That is the menace of the Red Chinese claims on a large section of the ocean, the South China Sea. It doesn't matter if the kindly Red Chinese had every intention maintaining free navigation in that part of the ocean (care to bet on that?), if they got away with claiming a part of the ocean as theirs, the system would collapse. The crucial country at this point in time in maintaining the system that has helped make the world the richest and most peaceful it has ever been is the US. And the organization that is most crucial is the USN. There are no substitutes. There are a lot of countries that will back our play if it ever comes to that, but they will only back the play if we actually make it, and it must always be clear that we will if needed.

(Comparing oceanic freedom of navigation to the Panama Canal is expansively silly. I thought I'd just throw that in there.)

[carl]

Let me add one thing about maintaining the system. Let us say the system as we know it collapses after the Red Chinese annex the South China Sea. Nothing much happens for awhile. Then the most unexpected thing happens, Boko Haram takes over Nigeria. The slaughter of millions aside, what might happen? If that international system of free navigation has collapsed something like Boko Haram would be that much more likely to lay claim to the Gulf of Guinea. They can always cook up something to justify that. Then what? Since the system that benefits everyone has collapsed, the only people interested in that would be the countries directly affected by shipping going through that area. Maybe they have the sea power to do something about that, maybe not. Multiply that by every country that has a coastline and some money for a skiff or an anti-ship missile and you get an idea of what the effect on sea trade would be.

[Dayuhan]

if they got away with claiming a part of the ocean as theirs, the system would collapse.

In actual fact, the Chinese claim on that part of the ocean was made by the Kuomintang in 1947, and reaffirmed by the succeeding government in 1949, the first appearance of what is now called "the nine-dash line". Skirmishes over islands have been going on for decades.

The system has yet to collapse.

[Dayuhan]

2. Currently Chinas economy depends to a large degree on seatrade both to import goods like basic ressources and to export manufactured products. It's geography makes it very difficult to protect its sea trade, which might be mostly a moot point anyway in a conflict with 'the West' as most trade partners would just stop it on their own. In a big war with the USA China would arguably need a stronger navy relative to its opponent and near allies to be able to keep its own naval trade flowing and to disrupt the trade flow to the US in an decisive manner.

China is actually far more dependent on maritime trade than the US. In particular, China is massively dependent on the Indian Ocean, through which huge amounts of commodity imports and merchandise exports pass. At present China has close to zero capacity for sustained naval operations in that area, which is of course a matter of concern for them.

3. Chinas recent actions sea and land disputes are difficult to grasp. Possibly they are mostly about putting on a show for the often unhappy crowd at home. Does a good part of the leadership truly believe that the potential ressources of the disputed areas are really important for China*? Does it think that China is just entitled to those areas and any concession/compromise is unworthy or does weaken the position in the next dispute? Before I tended more towards the first argument but now I'm no longer sure.

An excellent point.

I've never been convinced that the SCS issues are really about resources. For one thing, estimates of oil and gas reserves outside littoral zones vary widely, with USGS estimates dramatically lower than Chinese estimates and the many unsourced estimates we see flying around the web.

Impact on the unhappy crowd at home is critical. One of the only things the Chinese actually like about their government is that it is perceived as having made China strong again. As economic growth slows and as rampant corruption, inequality, environmental catastrophe etc gain more attention, they'll have to play that card more aggressively. What the Chinese Government wants - in their eyes, what they need - is public submission from regional rivals. They need to be seen as dominant. And, of course, they need to do it without an actual war, which could have catastrophic economic consequences for them. Hence the escalating game of bluff and bully. It's a dangerous game, because it can spin out of hand and produce the outcome nobody really wants, but nationalism is one of the few cards they have to play domestically.

Unfortunately for the Philippines, they are the logical target if ever the Chinese feel the need to show some actual military action. They could get away with some: if (for example) they seized Second Thomas Shoal and sank a boat or two they would get away with it, and could portray it as a "victory" of sorts.

Getting into a skirmish with Vietnam or (even more) Japan would be a lot more problematic.

I personally suspect that within the next decade we may be more concerned over China's internal stability than its external aggression, and that, ironically and counterintuitively, we'll be hoping to see the current dispensation stay in power... but that of course is speculative.

[carl]

In actual fact, the Chinese claim on that part of the ocean was made by the Kuomintang in 1947, and reaffirmed by the succeeding government in 1949, the first appearance of what is now called "the nine-dash line". Skirmishes over islands have been going on for decades.

The system has yet to collapse.

Sigh.

For the literal minded among us, read 'if they were to make their claim stick.'

Sigh redux

[jmm99]

OK, the Chinese actually use muscle to make their claim stick - where some of the ASEAN states would be the primary aggrieved parties.

ASEAN Members.jpg

The secondary aggrieved parties would be those states whose major supply routes cross the South China Sea and would be affected by an actual Chinese takeover.

Here is the ASEAN Worldview:

ASEAN Worldview.jpg

Note the non-ASEAN "orange line states" (in my prior maps) - India as the Western Anchor; Japan-South Korea as the Northeast Anchor. Then, we have Australia-NZ ("dark blue" states") and the US (blue normative force projection line) to fill the gaps. NB: Singapore's Navy has choke power over the major strait into the SCS.

IF the ASEAN states and the non-ASEAN states (those in the foregoing paragraph) are willing to co-operate, and IF they have the Will to do it, the Containment Zone (blockade of China) is already in place without drastic re-shuffling of naval assets.

Now, if the two IFs are not met, then you (Carl) say to the US: "You go it alone and kick out those aggressive Chinese; the MSRs must be protected."

To endorse or refute what seems to be your logic, we need facts. I'd suggest the following as a general framework:

1. Identify the MSRs, the states using them, the statistics on use, etc.; in short, the proportionate value to each state of its share. Subset, what alternate routes can be used once the blockade and/or other action begins.

2. Determine the capabilities of the US vs China in a one-on-one in the South China Sea (with optional scenarios for each side).

3. Do #2 with respect to the capabilities of the ASEANs and non-ASEANs vs China in a multiple-on-one in the South China Sea (with optional scenarios for each side).

In Mahanian terms, determine the proportionate "means and opportunities" for each interested party - and who shells out the treasure and gives up the blood.

One does not want to be non-realistically altruistic in this kind of situation, which is rife for the free-rider problem if everyone knows that the US will step in unilaterally regardless.

Regards

Mike

[carl]

No Mike. Individual trade routes don't matter. It is the world system as a whole that matters. If the Red Chinese were to successfully annex the South China Sea, that system is gone. Your containment thing is really pointless unless the object was to get them to rescind that annexation. It wouldn't do any good anyway because I figure if the Red Chinese were able to pull that off they would have had to do one of two things, beat the USN and allied navies in battle, in which case there wouldn't be anything left to do the containing. Or they would have stared down the USN and allied navies, beat them psychologically, in which case there would be no will to fight with is the same as getting beat in battle.

I figure the rest of the world would see no will or no weapons and start figuring how they could take advantage of the situation. Poof! The system that has been so good for so many is gone.

The problem with the system from a 'I resent free riders!' standpoint is preservation of the system for you, can't help but result in free riders. Pick any number of countries as examples of 'free riders', Panama, Liberia, Norway, Bangladesh and on and on. It is something the great navies, the RN and USN, have accepted as part of the deal.

[jmm99]

OK, we'll just have to agree to disagree - the ideological gulf is simply too wide to ever bridge.

Regards

Mike

[Bob's World]

The largest "free rider" of US naval power is China; just as the US was once the largest free rider of British naval power. The Monroe Doctrine served us well during those key developmental years of 1823-1900ish

Then we became more global in our pursuits and built our own navy...becoming a threat Britain thought they may well have to fight someday.

But China is not the US, nor is China Russia. Sometimes we act like we can't appreciate that fact. We need to do a better job of thinking of and understanding China through a Chinese lens. Certainly the old adadge of "Fear, Honor, Interest" drives Chinese thinking. Fear of internal revolt, Honor of a hundred years of external humiliation, and interest in avoiding the first while correcting the second.

[Firn]

I became a bit more interested about the importance of sea trade for the Chinese economy and looked first at the visuals of some basics. Even if I consider myself rather wellinformed about the Chinese economy I was a bit surprised just how important naval trade is for China.

The location of the population determines to a large degree where the infrastructure, industry etc is concentrated. It is needless to say that high density clusters are also high density clusters of economic activities and trade. The vast amount of goods gets moved to, within, between and from those areas.

First a view on the world-wide population density:



An excellent visualization of Chinas population concentration:



One of the two famous Chinese population-lines:



Another visual take on the location of Chinas population



It is important to keep in mind that the concentration has become denser and denser due the vast flow from the poor rural areas into the coastal population centers. Obviously a good part of that huge shift happened within the Eastern regions but the other came from the interior.

Now imagine that Chinas sea trade with the world collapsed due to the US&allied interdiction well away from the Chinese sea denial area. Even if coastal 'internal' shipping continued the results would be absolutely and crushingly devastating for the economy.

First I thought that land trade might be able to absorb a good deal of the blow but that is just impossible under the current circumstances. The transport capacity on land is just minuscle compared to the shipping and it has to be streched over vast distances. Most of it is concentrated within the population clusters with the shipping getting almost all to the stuff to and from the clusters.

The rolling and trucking stock to keep the economic basics going does just not remotely exist , the road&rail capacity is just not there, nor in China or across the land borders, in short even the import of the most vital ressources would create massive problems to say the least. It is not far-fechted to say that many of the problems of the German war economy in WWII look small compared to what China might face, and I do not say that lightly.

I will just add a short pdf about the increasing dependence of China on importing of animal feed for its protein. Ironically this was one of the biggest problems for the German-occupied Europe in WWII, without all that animal feed from the rest of the world the cows and pigs could just not be sustained and a great part had to be slaughtered.

I don't know how aware the Chinese leadership is of those dire facts but I hope for all involved, especially the Chinese citiziens, that they are aware how much is at stake if a clever move over an economically insignificant piece of land or sea spirals out of control.

[Dayuhan]

For the literal minded among us, read 'if they were to make their claim stick.'

Exactly. What matters is not the claim, but the ability to make it stick. That ability is restricted to nations with significant navies, a fairly small club. That's why your concern about nations all over the world following suit is, IMO, misplaced. Anyone can make a claim, very few can make it stick.

Are you assuming that the intent of China's claim is to interfere with trade? If so, why? After all, if they chose to interfere with trade they could, claim or no claim. It's hard to see what they would gain, as a huge majority of the trade in the area is moving in and out of their own ports, and they are extremely vulnerable to repercussions elsewhere. China is more dependent on maritime trade than any nation in the world and is poorly situated to engage in a contest of reciprocal trade restraints.

As above, I'm not convinced that resources are a major part of the equation either. There's considerable doubt over the extent of the oil and gas deposits in the area, and the Chinese already fish wherever they please. I suspect that the objective is largely to impose submission: to force the smaller players (Philippines and Vietnam) to perform the kau tau, and to force the larger players to acknowledge Chinese dominance of the area. That sounds like it would not have enough importance to be worth pursuing, but in Chinese terms it's hugely important, almost necessary.

[carl]

The largest "free rider" of US naval power is China; just as the US was once the largest free rider of British naval power. The Monroe Doctrine served us well during those key developmental years of 1823-1900ish

Then we became more global in our pursuits and built our own navy...becoming a threat Britain thought they may well have to fight someday.

But China is not the US, nor is China Russia. Sometimes we act like we can't appreciate that fact. We need to do a better job of thinking of and understanding China through a Chinese lens. Certainly the old adadge of "Fear, Honor, Interest" drives Chinese thinking. Fear of internal revolt, Honor of a hundred years of external humiliation, and interest in avoiding the first while correcting the second.

Absolutely. The greatest beneficiary of the system of free navigation has been Red China, in gross terms anyway. That is why any argument saying the rapid buildup of the PLAN is due to a need to protect their overseas trade is weak in my mind. There isn't any demonstrable threat, or at least nothing that inhibited the ships coming and going.

You are wrong about the USN and its global outlook. The USN has mostly had a global outlook. A maritime trading nation can't help but have a global outlook. We let the RN handle the big stuff but we still handled the little things. For example, the major units of the USN were mostly deployed across the oceans when the Civil War started.

The British never thought they would have to fight the USN after 1900 or so when the USN began its serious buildup. Perhaps in 'the staff has plans for everything sense' but never in the realistic sense. By the time the buildup came the countries were just too close for that to be realistic.

Obviously Red China isn't anything but Red China. But one thing it is, is China ruled by the CCP for the benefit of the CCP. We should view their actions through that lens, for it is the most accurate; the lens of 'What will benefit the CCP? The Chinese be hanged.' To use any other lens is to give the actions of perhaps the largest group of organized killers in the world more respect than they deserve.

With that in mind, I understand perfectly the utility to the CCP of the 'let's get them back for the Siege of Peking' argument. I also understand that getting some back means taking it out of somebody else's hide. That I object to.

[carl]

OK, we'll just have to agree to disagree - the ideological gulf is simply too wide to ever bridge.

Regards

Mike

There isn't an ideological gap. We're talking about different things. I am talking about what would happen if the Red Chinese were able to pull it off, however they managed to do it. You are talking about the mechanics of a war to prevent that from happening.

[carl]

Firn:

You are right. The people they will hurt most if they wreck the system are the Chinese, but the Chinese are not the main concern of the Chinese Communist Party, the CCP is. If they figure chancing wrecking the Chinese economy will help the CCP, they'll do it. They've done it before. The Cultural Revolution is a good example of that.

They aren't the only country so dependent upon free sea trade. You can add the US, Japan, Australia, NZ, Chile, India and probably every single developed economy to the list. That is why the collapse of this system would be such a disaster for the world. And this free navigation system is not the norm in the history of the humans. I think it has only existed twice, one time being now. The only other time was when the Roman navy controlled the Med. That's it. This is a very rare situation. People shouldn't take it for granted but they do.

[carl]

Dayuhan:

Making it stick is the key of course. If they can do it, like I keep saying, there goes the system because in order to do it, they have to beat the USN. The system as it has existed, only twice in the history of the humans, depends upon a big navy being committed to preserving it. There have only been three, the Roman navy, the RN and the USN.

I ain't gonna play the Dayuhan game of "Why do you...", "Why should they...". It is very tiresome. If you trust the CCP to maintain the system of free navigation in their territorial waters be my guest. And that is what they want, to make the South China Sea territorial waters. Personally I don't trust those guys not to be anything but the corrupt killers they are.

You are right about the CCP's motivations I think. There appears to be a large emotional component there. The problem with that is they have to step on a lot of people to fulfill that desire of theirs to feel warm and toasty. People tend to object to getting stepped on. You don't think it's so bad. Fine. We get that (oh boy, do we get that). But most countries don't, especially if the cost of fulfillment of CCP dreams of Imperial restoration is the destruction of the system of free navigation that has benefited so many for so long.

[jmm99]

It is an ideological gap. It is between idealism and realism. In other areas of discussion here, you see the carnage and I see the carnage. Yet, our messages in response to those carnages often have been quite different.

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

Excellent analysis. Do you have "stuff" on the SCS major routes by country ?

The population densities of the US, Russia, China and India (to name the four major nuclear powers) also illustrate the propellant power of nukes (how easy to destroy another country) and the deterrent power of nukes (how easy it is to be destroyed by another country). So, Andre Beaufre's concepts become material.

Regards

Mike

[Firn]

@jmm99: Thanks, I think it is of great importance to try to grasp the basics. Something which I completely missed myself before is just how insignificant the land trade is for China. It is pretty hard to overstate the difficulties the Chinese economy would face if it's international trade collapsed.

World-wide shipping routes:



Growing importance. Shipping volume worldwide:



Chinas trade partners. Australia, Brazil and to some degree Malaysia are special cases for specific reasons:



There are many great angles to underline the importance of maritime trade for China, including some possible reaction to this reliance. Such 'strategic' planning might be behind the pipeline projects:



I will leave it there and focus on the agriculture and perhaps the SCS shipping routes.

P.S: The increasingly greater concentration of the world population does indeed make nuclear warfare more devastating in relative terms to, let us say fifty years ago.