Political War and Woolly Thinking

[TheCurmudgeon]

I offer the following for your consideration.

Assuming that Clausewitz observation that war is used as an instrument of rational political policy is only half right; war can also be used as an instrument of irrational political (or non-political) policy.

If I define "Rational" as "the desire to live to see the policy goal come to fruition", or more simply, that life is more important than the policy goal and that life will only be risked where there is a reasonable expectation of achieving that goal, then I can make the following categorizations:

Rational actors will chose to use either conventional war (direct or proxy) or terrorism to achieve their purpose. This fits with the rational actors concept of bending the enemy to my will. If I have the power I will go directly against my enemy. If I lack the power I may chose to use a proxy, either though a proxy war or via terrorism to achieve my goal. In all of these cases there is the potential for a negotiated solution or even surrender of the policy goal if the rational actor sees his own death as the cost of continuing to military action.

Irrational actors can chose any of the above, but in addition to those they can chose asymmetrical warfare. This is because the ideological zealot is less interested in surviving the conflict than he is in seeing his goal come to fruition. He will continue to attack even when the outcome seems impossible. He will continue to fight until he loses his conviction or he dies. For the religious zealot, death may yield the ultimate reward making fighting, even where the odds of success are low or nil, still worth the effort. Asymmetrical warfare is a tactic unlikely to be chosen by the rational actor since it involves a risk that outweighs the reward. Other options are likely to be explored and asymmetrical warfare only chosen where no other reasonable option exists.

The distinction between rational and irrational policy also helps with another quagmire, enemy combatants. The idea of holding prisoners of war beyond the end of the conflict does not fit with our idea of war conducted by rational political actors but it does if the war is conducted by irrational actors. In a war pursued for rational purposes it is reasonable to expect that, at the end of the conflict all prisoners of war can be released to go home. There is no expectation that any of them will continue the fight. Not so with irrational actors. They will continue the struggle even where there is no hope of success. So they remain a threat even after the hostilities have ceased. In fact, in their minds the hostilities never cease. So they cannot be released.