I have been thinking a lot about the way we approach war and how our preconceptions make it impossible for us to defeat an enemy like AQ or the Taliban. Getting back to the threads main question, you can take the metric of killing [insert insurgent group name here] leadership to determine whether you are winning or losing the battle against the [insert insurgent group name here again (make sure they match)]. If you take the approach that killing insurgent leaders means that the group is now weaker, then killing more is good, killing less is bad. If you take the approach that killing insurgent leaders creates new insurgents, and then killing more is bad, killing less is good. The numbers mean little without a clear understanding of how they affect the enemy and the local population. Perhaps the numbers are totally meaningless as the benefit in temporarily disrupting insurgent operations is offset by the increase in insurgent ranks as well as creating a younger, more violent cadre.
Also on the top of how we see war is the oft cited maxim that "all war is political."* The objective of a punitive expedition may have little to do with reducing enemy capabilities.
Like all other humans on earth, we American's seek revenge for acts perpetrated against us. Sometimes it is enough to just kick ass, take names, and go home. It was probably unlikely that the Afghan Taliban were going to invade New Jersey. Destoying them and allowing the Northern Alliance to take charge may (with some hesitation) have been enough. AQ is a different story.
* I firmly believe that the idea that "all war is political" leads us to attempt to interpret enemy insurgents and/or terrorists like AQ or the Taliban as rational actors (as opposed to religious fanatics) and therefore attempt to find centers of gravity, structures, or motivations to attack that we logically have, but they don't have or require.
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