My last post before I'm off:
The Washington Post has an interesting article on how the Russian gas weapon has become much blunter compared to 2009.
As clunky Soviet-era factories and mines have become more efficient or gone out of business, Ukraine’s domestic gas consumption has dropped nearly 40 percent over the past five years, cutting its imports from Russia in half, according to a report by Sberbank Investment Research.
Domestic consumption might drop further if Ukraine trims the generous subsidies it gives households using natural gas, although so few households are paying their bills that it might not matter. “People will go from not paying the lower price to not paying the higher price,” said Thane Gustafson, senior director of Russian energy for the consulting firm IHS CERA.
...
“Ukraine has reduced its consumption of Russian gas, which puts them in a less vulnerable situation. Also the hardest part of winter is over. And there is a fair amount [of gas] in storage,” said a senior Obama administration official who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue. “Ukraine is obviously still in a precarious situation,” he added, “though very different from what it was in 2009.”
If indirect means do no longer cut it due to changed circumstances and one has to pull off a local 'counter-revolution' direct military force might become necessary in the eyes of a certain leader. Of course the Russian invasion is a peaceful affair and only an aggressive Ukrainian defense of it's territory could spark a war.
Some of the Russian news and moves remind me of a fine bon mot of good old Clausewitz:*In the original conquerer, it refers to the way Napoleon justified the invasion of Prussia and argued that he had wanted to keep the peace - after he provoked Prussia in everyway possible. It seems that Lenin, a avid reader of CvC, valued this bon mot highly. See the Wiki for the historical context.“The invader* is always a lover of peace; he would prefer to take over our country unopposed.”
Another cause was Napoleon's formation in July 1806 of the Confederation of the Rhine out of the various German states which constituted the Rhineland and other parts of western Germany. A virtual satellite of the French Empire with Napoleon as its "Protector", the Confederation was intended to act as a buffer state from any future aggressions from Austria, Russia or Prussia against France (a policy that was an heir of the French revolutionary doctrine of maintaining France's "natural frontiers"). The formation of the Confederation was the final nail in the coffin of the moribund Holy Roman Empire and subsequently its last Habsburg emperor, Francis II, changed his title to simply Francis I, Emperor of Austria. Napoleon consolidated the various smaller states of the former Holy Roman Empire which had allied with France into larger electorates, duchies and kingdoms to make the governance of non-Prussian and Austrian Germany more efficient. He also elevated the electors of the two largest Confederation states, his allies Württemberg and Bavaria, to the status of kings. The Confederation was above all a military alliance: in return for continued French protection, member states were compelled to supply France with large numbers of their own military personnel (mainly to serve as auxiliaries to the Grande Armée), as well as contribute much of the resources needed to support the French armies still occupying western and southern Germany. Understandably, Prussia was indignant at this increasing French meddling in the affairs of German homogeneity (without its involvement or even consultation) and viewed it as a threat. Napoleon had previously attempted to emolliate Prussian anxieties by assuring Prussia he was not adverse to its heading a North German Confederation, but his duplicity regarding Hanover dashed this. A final spark leading to war was the summary arrest and execution of German nationalist Johann Philipp Palm in August 1806 for publishing a pamphlet which strongly attacked Napoleon and the conduct of his army occupying Germany. After giving Napoleon an ultimatum on 1 October 1806, Prussia (supported by Saxony) finally decided to contend militarily with the French Emperor.
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