That's the reality of sanctions: if they aren't hurting the sanctioning party, they aren't going to hurt the sanctioned party either. To deprive the Russians of oil and gas revenue, somebody has to go without oil and gas. To deprive the Russians of manufactured goods, somebody has to forego export revenues. In this case both burdens land largely on Germany, and the Germans aren't likely to go along with it... and if they don't, the sanctions don't work.
Unilateral US sanctions would achieve very little beyond allowing US politicians to say they did something.
What do you want to see the US do?
Very true, and if Germany wants to send a signal to the Soviet Union, one of the clearest signals they could send would be to announce a plan for a major LNG terminal, the capacity of which would (coincidentally, of course) be roughly equal to Germany's gas imports from Russia.
In the short run, of course, the equation is somewhat different. Germany (and the rest of western Europe) certainly can wean themselves from Russian gas, but they can't do it overnight: there's enough LNG available, but the infrastructure would have to be realigned to support it. That process would reduce Russian leverage and force the Russians to find other outlets (probably very long and expensive pipelines to Asia), but it might also be an incentive for the Russians to try to play the gas card while they still have it.
Also true, but this may be less about a specific strategic or economic goal than about an emotional goal, the desire to restore former Soviet territory and lay claim to the "make Russia great again". These actions aren't always entirely rational: look at the Falklands for an example!
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