We have already quite a few posts on the energy aspect of this conflict, but I think it is worth to take a look at this paper which supports what some have already written here and in the energy security thread:

Conclusions: A revolution, not a panacea

Our analysis suggests that commentators and policymakers need to better distinguish between the ways in which the US shale gas boom constitutes a ‘revolution’ and the ways in which it does not. The US unconventional energy boom has reversed the decline of domestic production, significantly lowered oil and gas imports, reduced gas costs for consumers, and created a political space for tougher regulations on coal-fired power plants. But it is not a panacea. Even if current estimates of production turn out to be accurate, the benefits to the US economy in the long run are relatively small, and the benefits to manufacturing competitiveness in most sectors are even smaller. In the longer term, US energy security and climate goals will still require a strong role for public policy frameworks. Improving energy efficiency and promoting low-carbon technologies will be just as important as before. For the EU, given its more limited known reserves of unconventional oil and gas, these conclusions are likely to be all the more relevant.
In this areas Germany has led the way among the large European nations, perhaps partly a reflection of the lack of ressources and the war-time experiences. It is no coincidence that Japan has overall the most similar approach amon the big industrial powers.

In Europe's case a better integration of the energy infrastructure (pipelines, gird), more strategic storage (gas, oil,), 'battery' capacity (pumped-storage hydro, etc) and LNG terminals are additional, important means to achieve long-term energy security.