Quote Originally Posted by carl View Post
Holding that line took rather a lot of effort, millions of men, tens of thousands of small war machines like tanks and planes and thousands of large ones like ships and fleets of big bombers. It took decades and decades and it took on the part of the West a clear resolve to actually go to war with all those men and machines if the need arose. It also took demonstrations of that resolve through things like the Berlin Airlift, the Berlin Crisis, fielding the Pershing II missile whether the Soviets liked it or not, US and British submarines constantly on the back of Russian boats and on and on and on. It took Ron and Maggie and the Saudis agreeing to increase oil production to break the Soviet economy, Pope John Paul II carrying on after the Russians tried to have him killed, Solidarity and a lot of brave, brave Poles (we still may have those)and on and on again.
Yes, mostly... except for this:
It took Ron and Maggie and the Saudis agreeing to increase oil production to break the Soviet economy
...which is a complete crock: the reasons behind the oil glut are many and complex, but it was never a deliberate construct targeting the Soviets.

I think you missed the point, though.

First, it needs to be stressed that all the talk about how all is lost if the Ukraine is lost is a load of bollocks. There is no reason to suppose that drawing a line will get suddenly more difficult if things continue to go badly in the Ukraine. Arguably the Ukraine is a poor place to draw a line: there's no functional government, the armed forces are in disarray, and there is a very substantial Russian population, much of which really does want reunion. All of that makes enforcing a drawn line a lot more complicated.

Precisely because drawing a line takes money and will, it's best done when allies (without whom any line-drawing exercise is going to be pretty fluffy in this case) and the domestic audience are really committed to the exercise.

Controlling Putin will of course be a lot easier than controlling the Soviet Union was: this is not Cold War 2.0. Still it will require will on the domestic front and cooperation in Europe. If we don't have those, it's a bad time to start a confrontation.

I don't see any of this as a function of who's in the White House. I don't think any administration in recent memory would have responded much differently.

It is very true that the analyst community missed a great deal here. The Maidan revolution was seen as an unqualified good, a way of sticking it to Putin without risk, and the regional watchers were too busy gloating and trying to figure out how to spread the joy to Belarus that they failed to see that the same revolution was opening the door wide for a Russian move. There's a lesson to be learned there, and I'm not sure it has been.

One obvious takeaway from all this is that Putin is an opportunist. If you give him a break, he'll take it. Among all the talk of deterrence and sanctions, one thing that's being missed is that when you're facing an opportunist, it's best not to give him opportunities. I certainly hope that the other frontline states are watching their borders carefully, monitoring pro-Russian groups, and keeping close tabs on any efforts to kick up a fuss. A few Russian provocateurs arrested and paraded before the media before being kicked unceremoniously back across the border will be a useful thing.

Putin is not Stalin. He wants an excuse, a lever, a justification, no matter how thin. Denying him those opportunities is as important and a whole lot less expensive than the big chest-thumping displays that so many are demanding. A lot of fuss gets made, for example, about how the withdrawal of US armor in Europe opened the door for the Ukraine move. I don't think that meant squat: whatever assets you have nearby mean nothing if you aren't going to use them, and I expect Putin would have reasoned (correctly, and again not specific to this administration) that the US wasn't going to go to war over the Ukraine, and rolled right ahead.

Quote Originally Posted by carl View Post
In short it took the West actually doing something and continuing to do something for a very long and expensive time. The reason we did all this was that we realized appeasement doesn't work. Appeasing just means you will have a much harder struggle on your hands later if you don't do what is needed to be done now.
You could argue that in the case of the Cold War in Eastern Europe, appeasement did work. Space was traded for time, an enforceable line was found, and the opponent was effectively contained. The argument that the struggle was harder than it would have been if initiated earlier is not being logically supported here. How does recognizing that we're in a poor position to draw a line at the Ukraine make the defense of Poland more difficult?

Quote Originally Posted by carl View Post
Those are real live breathing people with families and friends and goofy hobbies. Real live people that backs may be turned to when they ask for help. That means something.
Yes, the world is a ####ty place. All over the world, real live breathing people with families and friends and hobbies are getting smacked around. Many of them you don't know or care about: I've yet to hear you demand US action to protect, say, the Rohingya, who are getting it from people who make Putin look like Mother Teresa.

This is where you say "so because we can't help everyone, we shouldn't help anyone?" and I reply "no, because we can't help everyone, we have to decide who to help and when based on our own interests, capabilities, and needs".