Ukraine (closed; covers till August 2014)

[TheCurmudgeon]

Despite all the calls for direct action now least the West be seen as emboldening Putin or appeasing him, I think that is misreading the situation. Putin's aspiration are clear to those that can see things through the his eyes, but they are nominal ... limited.

Of course, the Russian empire and the Soviet Union were not harmonious multicultural paradises, nor is the Russian Federation, but the ideal is still an influence in Russian thinking and policy. At the same time, Putin contradicts this simple vision in worrisome ways. A good example is how he wavers in his March speech between defining Ukrainians as a separate “people” (narod, which also means “nation”) or as part of a larger Russian nation. Until the twentieth century, very few Russians believed that Ukrainians were a nation with their own history and language, and many still question this. Putin works both sides of this argument. On the one hand, he expresses great respect for the “fraternal Ukrainian people [narod],” their “national feelings,” and “the territorial integrity of the Ukrainian state.” On the other hand, he argues that what has been happening in Ukraine “pains our hearts” because “we are not simply close neighbors but, as I have said many times already, we are truly one people [narod]. Kiev is the mother of Russian [russkie] cities. Ancient Rus is our common source and we cannot live without each other.”

Putin’s frequent use of the ethno-national term russkii for “Russian,” rather than the more political term rossiiskii, which includes everyone and anything under the Russian state, is important. Even more ominous are Putin’s suggestions about where such an understanding of history should lead. Reminding “Europeans, and especially Germans,” about how Russia “unequivocally supported the sincere, inexorable aspirations of the Germans for national unity,” he expects the West to “support the aspirations of the Russian [russkii] world, of historical Russia, to restore unity.” This suggests a vision, shaped by views of history, that goes beyond protecting minority Russian speakers in the “near-abroad.”

Putinism often tries to blend contradictory ideals—freedom and order, individual rights and the needs of state, multiethnic diversity and national unity. Dismissing these complexities as cynical masks does not help us develop reasoned responses to Putin.

While the author views this statement as an ominous threat to Germany, I could read it as an attempt to get Westerners to understand his mostly ethnic motivations. In the earlier paragraph he refers to the Ukrainians as a separate, people. This could be a ruse, but I see it more as a view into how he thinks. As the rest of the statement says, he expects Westerners to understand what he sees as an ethnic minority/majority seeking to join their brethren. Just as Westerners feel the need to help fledgling democracies, he feels the need to help repressed Russians. Our SF are designed to go in and help freedom fighters; his are doing the same.

From that perspective the best tact might be to pursue stabilization and self determination. Agree to the peacekeepers and establish elections. If Putin is confident then he will agree (but hedge his bets by keeping his spetsnaz in place). Still, it creates a defacto line. If he does not agree than it is an indication of more to come (beyond the obvious ethnic enclaves in places like Estonia).