William S. Lind :collection (merged thread)

[AmericanPride]

Carl,

After thinking about your comments some more, it appears that your focus on almost exclusively on tactical thinking and abilities. I don't think anyone argues (I certainly don't at least) that we "lost" Iraq and Afghanistan because of a want of tactics. The Army has strategists, but I'm not sure that you'd call what the Army does as "strategy" - and as Iraq and Afghanistan (and Vietnam, and a number of other wars) demonstrates, an unbroken chain of tactical victories does not necessarily culminate into strategic victory. And that's a GO-level problem. Bottom-line: is the Army organized, equipped, and trained for success on the modern battlefield? Is the officer corps capable of answering that question in the affirmative or making the hard choices to ensure that we can?

[slapout9]

Link to "Blue Angels vs. Red Devils" by William S. Lind

https://www.traditionalright.com/category/tr/

[slapout9]

This article is from 2013 I heard on a radio news program yesterday that in 2014 it is exploding. The true extent is unknown because most male victims are ashamed to report it, plus the political ramifications for the White House Gay policy make accurate reporting difficult. Lind,Wyly and even my old commanding General, Fredrick Krosen reported to senior military and political leadership that this was going to happen but Political Correctness won.
Some experts believe that the only other place where Gay rape exceeds the military is in Prison. don't know how they measured that but Predator Homosexual Behavior is just a know fact.

http://www.wnd.com/2013/05/military-...-sex-assaults/

[AmericanPride]

This article is from 2013 I heard on a radio news program yesterday that in 2014 it is exploding. The true extent is unknown because most male victims are ashamed to report it, plus the political ramifications for the White House Gay policy make accurate reporting difficult. Lind,Wyly and even my old commanding General, Fredrick Krosen reported to senior military and political leadership that this was going to happen but Political Correctness won.
Some experts believe that the only other place where Gay rape exceeds the military is in Prison. don't know how they measured that but Predator Homosexual Behavior is just a know fact.

http://www.wnd.com/2013/05/military-...-sex-assaults/

Slap,

The article highlights that it's reported sexual assaults. It doesn't actually mean (though it could) that sexual assaults are increasing, but that the mechanism for reporting the crime is being used more frequently. Military sexual assaults are a widespread problem, and has been for a very long time, but the openness of homosexuals in the ranks is not relevant to that pattern. Comparing male-on-male sexual assaults to rates in prison is not surprising, given the hyper-masculinity and attendant insecurity that's widespread in both environments. In this context, it's less about sexual orientation and more about power and domination. Research into this field, for both male and female victims and predators, establishes this fact. Therefore, targeting homosexuals is in fact the wrong policy solution, and instead targeting the predator mentality, like the military is feabily attempting to do, is the right course of action. Part of this is removing predators from the ranks, part of it is providing better protection and recourse for potential victims (male and female), but also part of it (the part most resisted by the military establishment) is changing the military's structure and culture to eliminate opportunities and incentives for predation.

[carl]

I was a part of a large group of officers last year which was assembled to listen to the musings of a three-star general who happened to be in town. One of the tidbits he decided to pass on to us was that by 2030, the US demographic breakdown is expected to be about 50% Caucasian, 25% Hispanic, and 25% other. He then went on to say that the demographic breakdown of the military's officer corps needed to reflect those percentages. Though it was not expressly stated, one wonders if the fact that the nation is about 50% female will play into that as well...

former_0302:

This is the stuff of nightmares. It is third world army meets PC monster and they spawn something that will always be beaten. He just said that fighting proficiency is not as important as whatever characteristic is fashionable this week.

But that isn't the worst thing, at least for right now. The worst thing is the window into the mind of a 3 star this comment provides, a three star, supposedly one of the best the Army has. So the best the Army has doesn't acknowledge the importance of being good at fighting, subordinates it to political fashion and can't see what the result would be, or doesn't care.

Lind commented about the moral collapse of the officer corps. Well that 3-star's words validates fully Lind's view at least as far as the multi-stars go. The problem is officers lower down whose morals haven't collapsed yet won't be able to counteract the disastrous effects the multi-stars will have on the military.

Out of curiosity, what was the setup like when he spoke? Did he wander about talking to small groups? Was it a big auditorium? Were questions taken? Were honest questions taken or was it understood that certain things won't be asked? That kind of thing.

[AmericanPride]

This is the stuff of nightmares. It is third world army meets PC monster and they spawn something that will always be beaten. He just said that fighting proficiency is not as important as whatever characteristic is fashionable this week.

But that isn't the worst thing, at least for right now. The worst thing is the window into the mind of a 3 star this comment provides, a three star, supposedly one of the best the Army has. So the best the Army has doesn't acknowledge the importance of being good at fighting, subordinates it to political fashion and can't see what the result would be, or doesn't care.

Lind commented about the moral collapse of the officer corps. Well that 3-star's words validates fully Lind's view at least as far as the multi-stars go. The problem is officers lower down whose morals haven't collapsed yet won't be able to counteract the disastrous effects the multi-stars will have on the military.

What the heck are you talking about? That a general believes the demographics of the officer corps should reflect the demographics of the nation from which it is drawn is "the stuff of nightmares...[subordinated] to political fashion" and will be the bringer of "moral collapse" and "disasterous effects"? It's exactly your kind of reactionary fear-mongering that obstructs the development of sound, rational policy and it creates the very problems you claim you want addressed!

You don't know the context of that 3-star general's conversation. Does everything he speak about at every turn must "acknowledge the importance of being good at fighting"? It goes without saying that in the profession of arms, the ability fight and win wars, is essential. That this forms the basis of your criticism reveals your superficial understanding of the real problems at hand.

Here are the fundamental problems facing the armed forces:
- people and equipment are becoming more expensive on a per unit basis because of long procurement times, increased healthcare costs, inefficient budgeting and expenditures, and technological transformation
- this cost growth exceeds both the rate of inflation and rate of defense budget growth
- the cost growth disportionately reduces the size of the force, meaning that as individual units are more capable, the size in reduction results in an overall decline in combat power
- increased automation and systems means more overhead and administration
- combined, this means less available forward combat power
- less available combat power means greater demands on available combat power
- greater demands means higher operations tempo on both people and equipment, driving maintenance costs, refit/replinishment requirements, and exhaustion in the force
- that in turn means more money devoted to operations and less towards personnel (and more to defense and less towards social services)
- and that means a less fit, less educated, less qualified population to actually design, man, operate, and/or maintain those systems

What does this mean for the officer corps? It means it actually becomes increasingly difficult to formulate an effective strategy - the structural constraints imposed on leaders leaves very few options in implementing a dynamic, flexible strategy capable of matching the threats faced by the country. Instead, the "strategy" is driven by the availability of resources, including the Congressionally-constrained billeting of officers, which is limited because of the structural contradictions of the country's defense political economy.

We have one of the largest military budgets in American history combined with one of the smallest militaries by manpower in history. We are in a high tempo operations environment because of the political obligations of the government - meaning that far more is done today by far fewer people. And that's without the additional burdens of the campaigns in Afghanistan and formerly Iraq. So, in this environment, junior and mid-career officers are incredibly busy, even in the Reserves, with constant training cycles and mobilizations. There's really not time to implement change in the organization - and in any case, that's the job of the general officers, the number of which is tied by law to the size of the force. I don't fault the generals entirely; maybe they're just bad politicians having been imbued with strict conditions on the appropriate boundaries of civil-military relations. That Lind is both wrong (there are officers seeking to learn and transform the Army) and right (that this change is not occuring) should speak volumes about the conditions of our nation's defenses. Blaming black hairstyles or homosexuals is not only wildly off the mark but fuels the kind of obstructionism and division that makes it difficult to seek effective change in the first place.

[AmericanPride]

And carl, since we're on the topic of the demographic of American officers, let's talk about where they come from. The trend for both officers and enlisted is overrepresentation of whites and blacks, and enlistees from the South. Recruits are overwhelmingly middle class in origin. But of the top ten states by percentage of quality recruits, only 2 are in the South (South Carolina and Louisana). Then there's this gem:

According to a report released in December 2010 by The Education Trust entitled “Shut Out of the Military: Today's High School Education Doesn't Mean You're Ready for Today's Army,” 1 in 5 high school students failed to qualify for enlistment in the Army based on their Armed Forces Qualification Test score.3 Students of color were more likely to fail the test. For future recruit pools, DoD may need to reconsider the value placed on a high school diploma if educational standards do not produce enough recruits able to pass the Armed Forces Qualification Test.

What does this mean? (1) The military does not accurately reflect the demographics of the American population from which it is drawn. If projections of ethnic group growth are accurate, and enlistment patterns remain the same, this difference will only increase. (2) Non-defense investments (i.e. education) is important in establishing the quality of recruits prior to them ever stepping into a recruiter's office. Today, only 1 in 4 candidates 17-29 are estimated to be eligible for enlistment. (3) This is the origin of the divergence thesis between the armed forces and the population - if the people are different, so are the values, and what are the consequences for the country and democratic governance if its military is not drawn from the same population as society at large?

The readiness of the armed forces to fight and win the nation's wars begins at home. By the time the soldier reaches the battlefield to close with and destroy the enemy, most of his odds have already been decided by the thousands of micro-decisions leading to that event - and not only in the officer corps, but across the country. By then it's too late to figure out if the soldier has the right weapon or equipment or values or education or training. That's the part of our strategy that's missing.

[AmericanPride]

And carl, since we're on the topic of the demographic of American officers, let's talk about where they come from. The trend for both officers and enlisted is overrepresentation of whites and blacks, and enlistees from the South. A single college in the South can easily commission more officers than the whole of New York City. Recruits are overwhelmingly middle class in origin. But of the top ten states by percentage of quality recruits, only 2 are in the South (South Carolina and Louisana). Then there's this gem:

According to a report released in December 2010 by The Education Trust entitled “Shut Out of the Military: Today's High School Education Doesn't Mean You're Ready for Today's Army,” 1 in 5 high school students failed to qualify for enlistment in the Army based on their Armed Forces Qualification Test score.3 Students of color were more likely to fail the test. For future recruit pools, DoD may need to reconsider the value placed on a high school diploma if educational standards do not produce enough recruits able to pass the Armed Forces Qualification Test.

What does this mean? (1) The military does not accurately reflect the demographics of the American population from which it is drawn. If projections of ethnic group growth are accurate, and enlistment patterns remain the same, this difference will only increase. (2) Non-defense investments (i.e. education) is important in establishing the quality of recruits prior to them ever stepping into a recruiter's office. Today, only 1 in 4 candidates 17-29 are estimated to be eligible for enlistment. (3) This is the origin of the divergence thesis between the armed forces and the population - if the people are different, so are the values, and what are the consequences for the country and democratic governance if its military is not drawn from the same population as society at large?

The readiness of the armed forces to fight and win the nation's wars begins at home. By the time the soldier reaches the battlefield to close with and destroy the enemy, most of his odds have already been decided by the thousands of micro-decisions leading to that event - and not only in the officer corps, but across the country. By then it's too late to figure out if the soldier has the right weapon or equipment or values or education or training. That's the part of our strategy that's missing.

[Fuchs]

We have one of the largest military budgets in American history combined with one of the smallest militaries by manpower in history.

I suppose these diagrams are a more accurate representation of reality:

PERSONNEL


http://www.comw.org/pda/1002BudgetSurge.html


http://www.marketsize.com/blog/index...duty-military/

[Fuchs]

SPENDING


http://www.abovetopsecret.com/forum/thread1002996/pg1

http://files.abovetopsecret.com/file...fa532776b1.png (image too large)
http://www.abovetopsecret.com/forum/...g1#pid17676345


http://www.heritage.org/research/rep...fense-spending

BOTH

(distorted by deployment-related extra compensations and reserve/active force balance)
http://www.heritage.org/research/rep...fense-spending


So the military (and army) aren't really small. Budget and manpower are merely somewhat below non-World War zenith. That's fine.

In fact, I think Americans are crazy for spending so much on the military because the public good of defence can be had with a fraction. Most of the effort goes into the additional bullying and 'messing in distant places' capabilities.

[Steve Blair]

What does this mean? (1) The military does not accurately reflect the demographics of the American population from which it is drawn. If projections of ethnic group growth are accurate, and enlistment patterns remain the same, this difference will only increase. (2) Non-defense investments (i.e. education) is important in establishing the quality of recruits prior to them ever stepping into a recruiter's office. Today, only 1 in 4 candidates 17-29 are estimated to be eligible for enlistment. (3) This is the origin of the divergence thesis between the armed forces and the population - if the people are different, so are the values, and what are the consequences for the country and democratic governance if its military is not drawn from the same population as society at large?

Considering that this is the way the military was recruited prior to World War II, I'd wager that the country will survive. As soon as you look at the pre-wartime draft military you see this sort of thing. And as for small manpower? Simply not true. The cost per solider is obviously much higher, but in terms of numbers the army has indeed been much smaller than it is currently, and for most of its organizational history.

If you study the history of the military in the United States, you'd realize that what we're seeing now is a return to normal as it existed prior to the Cold War.

[AmericanPride]

Hi Fuchs,

Thanks for the graphs.

From one of your links:

The upward trend in the DoD budget partly reflects decreased efficiency and a failure to make disciplined choices in procurement. It also reflects the decision to put the military to work in wars of a type for which it was not designed. Finally, it reflects increased readiness, activity, and capability. In some important respects, today’s US military is more powerful than its Cold War predecessor, even though the number of full-time military personnel is 30% less. Among the enhancements are a vast increase in its capacity to attack targets with aircraft and missiles. Also, its capacity to rapidly deploy troops and equipment has improved. In these and other ways, the power of the Pentagon has been re-inflated.

You and I have discussed this subject at some length before. One thing your graph is missing the growth of the operations and maintenance proportion of the DoD budget from a low of ~24% in the early 1960s to today's high of 45%. At the same time, the proportion of spending for military personnel has decreased from approximately 50% to today's 25% (even as your heritage foundation graph illustrates the per unit cost of servicemembers increased by 200%). Nine of the last ten years have seen the lowest military personnel spending 3-year averages since FY48. In contrast nine of ten highest years of O&M expenditures were between FY02 and FY14.

[AmericanPride]

Considering that this is the way the military was recruited prior to World War II, I'd wager that the country will survive. As soon as you look at the pre-wartime draft military you see this sort of thing. And as for small manpower? Simply not true. The cost per solider is obviously much higher, but in terms of numbers the army has indeed been much smaller than it is currently, and for most of its organizational history.

If you study the history of the military in the United States, you'd realize that what we're seeing now is a return to normal as it existed prior to the Cold War.

The issue here is that the pre-WW2 and post WW2 Americas are worlds apart. So in some ways we may be returning to historical norms in the long view of American history regarding the size of the force, but at the same time we are not returning to the pre-WW2 limited international engagements. Before World War II, there was no NATO, the US did not have combatant commands or bases in 100+ countries, or material interests in nearly every country around the world. Nor did the United States have a self-ascribed global police function as the centerpiece of the international political order. I don't think it's useful with these two different periods to use the pre-WW2 military as a baseline for measuring the current one.

EDIT: Also, let's talk about what 'normal' really is. It's been 237 years since 1776. It was 214 years between 1776 and 1991, 51 years of which included World War II and the Cold War (1940 - 1991). That's 23.8% of American history. Adding the 23 years between 1991 and 2014, the proportion increases to 31.2% of American history. So almost a third of American history has had a relatively large, permanent standing army. How long will it take for that to be considered the new normal?

[former_0302]

former_0302:

This is the stuff of nightmares. It is third world army meets PC monster and they spawn something that will always be beaten. He just said that fighting proficiency is not as important as whatever characteristic is fashionable this week.

But that isn't the worst thing, at least for right now. The worst thing is the window into the mind of a 3 star this comment provides, a three star, supposedly one of the best the Army has. So the best the Army has doesn't acknowledge the importance of being good at fighting, subordinates it to political fashion and can't see what the result would be, or doesn't care.

Lind commented about the moral collapse of the officer corps. Well that 3-star's words validates fully Lind's view at least as far as the multi-stars go. The problem is officers lower down whose morals haven't collapsed yet won't be able to counteract the disastrous effects the multi-stars will have on the military.

Out of curiosity, what was the setup like when he spoke? Did he wander about talking to small groups? Was it a big auditorium? Were questions taken? Were honest questions taken or was it understood that certain things won't be asked? That kind of thing.

It was a large auditorium, and he did take questions. That was only one of the comments at which I looked in askance. Another was his assertion that, among his peers, that getting females integrated into all units (combat arms included) is unquestionably the right move, and that the biggest problem facing the Marine Corps right now is sexual assault.

He did take honest questions, and some were willing to ask rather difficult ones. I would not have characterized his responses to those questions as particularly substantive, however.

[former_0302]

What does this mean? (1) The military does not accurately reflect the demographics of the American population from which it is drawn. If projections of ethnic group growth are accurate, and enlistment patterns remain the same, this difference will only increase. (2) Non-defense investments (i.e. education) is important in establishing the quality of recruits prior to them ever stepping into a recruiter's office. Today, only 1 in 4 candidates 17-29 are estimated to be eligible for enlistment. (3) This is the origin of the divergence thesis between the armed forces and the population - if the people are different, so are the values, and what are the consequences for the country and democratic governance if its military is not drawn from the same population as society at large?

In response to (1), the reason for this, IMO, is that there is a certain part of society which has a tradition of military service, and this sector continues to feed the beast. Is that happening at the expense of another sector of society which is clamoring to get in? If that is so, I haven't heard about it.

(2), okay, but that is a societal problem, not a military problem, and the military is not capable of fixing societal problems, either here or abroad...

(3), I sincerely hope that the values of the military are different than the society from which they're drawn. If I'm not mistaken, that's part of the whole "...special trust and confidence in the patriotism, valor, fidelity and abilities..." thing. If the values aren't different, we have a problem.

[slapout9]

That's nice in abstract. But that does nothing to address the issues raised in the New York Times article. If the only thing the leadership should be concerned about is "to fight and win our Nations battles and wars" then why bother having restrictions on hairstyle in the first place? I don't think a war was ever won by the size of someone's beard or the way in which they braided their hair. So to be ideologically consistent, your recommendation shouldn't be to condemn the soldiers who are advocating for a change in the hair policy but supporting them in abolishing it totally. That applies to the new tatoo policy as well - the only difference is that tatoos are optional. Your genetically-determined hair type is not[/B][/B].

Now your talking. The side with the shortest hair always looses

The Supreme court made a ruling about things of this nature (cannot remember the court decision, maybe somebody can) but basically it ruled that the Military is a separate and special closed society and cannot be expected to follow what would be considered regular social and cultural norms, behavior,etc. The reason was/is because of it's very special "combat" mission to protect America. And combat was the key distinction between how the made the ruling. The point being all this social normalization/justice stuff has no business in the military IMO and it is probably even illegal per the Supreme court.

My Platoon Sergeant was right then and he is right now. "Everybody should be OD Green and everybody is going to bleed red, so you have to learn to work together"

[Steve Blair]

The issue here is that the pre-WW2 and post WW2 Americas are worlds apart. So in some ways we may be returning to historical norms in the long view of American history regarding the size of the force, but at the same time we are not returning to the pre-WW2 limited international engagements. Before World War II, there was no NATO, the US did not have combatant commands or bases in 100+ countries, or material interests in nearly every country around the world. Nor did the United States have a self-ascribed global police function as the centerpiece of the international political order. I don't think it's useful with these two different periods to use the pre-WW2 military as a baseline for measuring the current one.

EDIT: Also, let's talk about what 'normal' really is. It's been 237 years since 1776. It was 214 years between 1776 and 1991, 51 years of which included World War II and the Cold War (1940 - 1991). That's 23.8% of American history. Adding the 23 years between 1991 and 2014, the proportion increases to 31.2% of American history. So almost a third of American history has had a relatively large, permanent standing army. How long will it take for that to be considered the new normal?

My point is simply that we've been here before. Comparing the current reality with the artificial construct that was the Cold War isn't helpful, either. You need to consider that the military's current position of privilege is very much an outgrowth of the first Gulf War and lingering elite guilt about the way the Vietnam military was treated (in the aftermath of the Gulf War, at least...such feelings were noticeably absent during the 1980s and before). It's not a historical norm in the United States.

Popular sentiment has never really favored long-term external engagement. It could be swayed and to an extent justified by the Cold War, but once that ended popular enthusiasm faded (and I suspect a strong case could be made that it was fading during Vietnam). How much of your external engagement is really remnants of the Cold War? It's also interesting to note that the draft-era army was always considered something of an emergency force, and that its strength fell drastically in the 1950s. It was built back up for Vietnam, and then moved back to the more traditional (for the United States) volunteer force.

If you're going to talk about normal, you need some understanding of where that normal came from and if what you consider is normal is in fact something else. In the wider scope of American history (that two-thirds you mentioned), a large military (and especially one based on conscription) has never been considered normal by a fair chunk of the population. And for the bulk of its non-draft history (and even its draft history after the mid-1950s when deferments became more common) the army has never been especially representative of the population (either in the officer corps or the enlisted ranks). Very, very few of the issues you bring up are new, although the scale might be (although a compelling case can be made that the army that served on the Frontier between 1848 and 1892 faced many similar challenges in terms of distance, support structure, and very low strength).

[AmericanPride]

In response to (1), the reason for this, IMO, is that there is a certain part of society which has a tradition of military service, and this sector continues to feed the beast. Is that happening at the expense of another sector of society which is clamoring to get in? If that is so, I haven't heard about it.

Access to enlistment is not the issue. Willingness to enlist is the issue. As the country becomes increasingly Hispanic (and to some extent, Asian) while the Army remains white and black, the disproportions will only increase. This logic is also at work in the growth of metropolitan areas and the depopulation of rural areas - and the relatively fast growth of the West (driven by Hispanics and Asians) compared to the rest of the country. Is it "bad" in of itself that the Army is disproportionately white and black? No. But it becomes "bad" when, for example, senior leaders fail to recognize the demographic makeup of their institution and attempt to implement policies that are actually destructive of good order and discipline. And this will become an issue in the future as Congress, especially the House, begans to reflect the changing demographic patterns of the country, and it starts focusing its attention on dated military policies and culture.

(2), okay, but that is a societal problem, not a military problem, and the military is not capable of fixing societal problems, either here or abroad...

It is absolutely a military problem if 1 of 4 potential recruits are ineligible to enlist on the basis of their education or health. It was the military at the start of the Cold War that pushed for the national school lunch program, and it should continue to support policies that are conducive to maintaining an able-bodied and -minded population. This also applies to the country's technological policies. Policy-makers should rid themselves of the false dichtonomy between military and non-military spending and, through the painful process of Congressional appropriations, seek out a rational budget that recognizes the linkages between public policy and military capabilities.

(3), I sincerely hope that the values of the military are different than the society from which they're drawn. If I'm not mistaken, that's part of the whole "...special trust and confidence in the patriotism, valor, fidelity and abilities..." thing. If the values aren't different, we have a problem.

If the values are different, don't be surprised when Congress decreases defense spending, cuts back troop and procurement numbers, and limits pay and benefits. American veterans receive a special place in the politics of the public, and this is unique to the United States; with the country's changing demographics and diverging makeup of the military and general population, that's not guaranteed to last.

[AmericanPride]

The point being all this social normalization/justice stuff has no business in the military IMO and it is probably even illegal per the Supreme court.

So where do you draw the line on "social normalization/justice stuff"? Was integration a viable social experiment for the military pursue? If so, why?

[slapout9]

So where do you draw the line on "social normalization/justice stuff"? Was integration a viable social experiment for the military pursue? If so, why?

I don't draw lines at all that's the Commie way! The American way is to set performance standards of excellance. If they pass they get in if they don't then you tell them how they can improve and come back and try again and again and again if need be. Always the opportunity to be all you can be based upon your individual will and skill!

As to question number two of course not! We never should group people by color or custom or any other Commie collective grouping system but by performance standards. THAT IS WHAT MAKES AMERICA EXCEPTIONAL! If you work for it you get, not who your daddy is or what you look like or where you went to school or how much money you have.