That is why I don't like using the word 'strategy'. People tend to start arguing whether this or that is actually strategy or something else. The question is what do we want and what do we have to do to get it? Recognition of the Pak Army/ISI as the enemy should flow from that. It never did. I am perfectly serious when I use the Battle of the Atlantic analogy. The magnitude of our failure is that great, greater even. It is as if there were Kreigsmarine liaison officers working with Western Approaches Command because Dudley Pound was buddies with Doenitz.
In order to effectively contest the Pak Army/ISI there was never any need to invade Pakistan, which is one reason I almost always say Pak Army/ISI and not Pakistan. There were many things that could have been done, things like not giving them any aid of any kind, not providing any technical or spare parts support for equipment, publicizing from the start that we knew what they were up to, attacking the finances of the Army/ISI and the generals etc. There were other things to ranging up to the ultimate, reducing our use of or even abandoning the use of the Karachi supply line. All of these things would have hit the Army/ISI and the feudal elites with whom they are allied. The goal was not Pakistan per se, the goal was the actions of the Pak Army/ISI. But we never did any of that in a serious way because we wouldn't see who the enemy was.
You're right. What if you try to do something that can't be done? We tried to beat Taliban & Co in Afghanistan without dealing with the support and sanctuary provided them by the Pak Army/ISI. About the only thing to be learned from that is not to be so blindingly stupid in the future. But that brings us to the question of why we were/are so blindingly stupid and why for so long? I've never seen that question answered anywhere.
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