At the tactical level it is frustrating to see the flood of displaced civilians trying to get out of Mosul. Claims of 500K are floating around. Take even 1/50th of that number and you get 10K males who could take up arms and defend their neighborhoods against these knuckleheads, but apparently most are just trying to get from in-between ISIS and ISF (which is proving hard to do if they are fleeing and changing clothes as fast as the reports say).

Perhaps it is just the fatalistic attitude I came to sense deep in the soul of the Iraqi Arab that convinces them it is hopeless to defend that neighborhood against extremists, and put a stop to violence that can serve no good for Iraq's long-term interests. Perhaps they see ISIS as a good thing for the Sunni cause in the triangle, and a counter-balance to Shiite power clustered in the center, the government and the security forces.

It's surprising that ISIS has been able to mass and strike distant targets from traditional areas of operation in the Sunni Triangle and have such significant effect, but I expected the security apparatus to be less than effective. The will to fight has always been a shabby one.

At the strategic level, the question David poses of "what next" is something a whole lot of actors are looking at.

The US is limited in what it can do to bolster the Maliki government and ISF, unless the relationship changes significantly. Even if he did an about face and came begging for help, geography, distance, and collections capability conspire against us, limiting responses to what I imagine will be "too little and too late". It does pose the peculiar possibility of US-Iranian cooperation--or at least looking the other way for the moment--to halt ISIS progress, and what strange bedfellows we will make. The right answer will ultimately be adversely influenced by partisan politics and ill-informed public opinion.

Even if ISIS does not attempt to hold on to gains, but rather foment a general state of instability that upsets Iranian aims in the trans Syria-Iraq belt, the fracturing that I expected 4-5 years ago has begun in earnest.

I think we need to try to look less at what happens next, and focus on what happens well after the next, deep down the planning horizon. What that scenario is I do not know, but somehow the old OIF coalition needs to decide if Maliki's government is too important to let fall, mend up strained relationships, and take action achieve policy goals in the region.