Iraq: Out of the desert into Mosul (closed)

[OUTLAW 09]

The insurgent situation today in Iraq is much different then before. It is much more homogenous. Serious analysts estimate that ISIS is responsible for anywhere from 75-90% of all attacks in Iraq. Some groups almost completely disappeared. The Islamic Army is an example. This week was the first time in 2-3 years that it claimed that it carried out an independent operation. 1920 Brigades, Hamas Iraq, etc. those groups are trying to make a comeback but were basically dead by 2011. ISIS by far is the largest, most well armed and effective group. It also controls large swaths of Syria which it administers like a state. After ISIS Ansar al-Sunna is likely the second biggest. It too sent fighters to Syria. It is closer to Al Qaeda central and a rival of ISIS. The Baathist Naqshibandi (JRTN) is third. It has cooperated with ISIS before but is really in its shadow as the constant attacks by ISIS upon its members over the last few months show. All these groups are trying to expand into the security vacuum but to say that they can make any serious challenge to ISIS is not possible right now. They are just very small compared to the Islamic State.

JWing---here is where we differ in views--spent way to much of my time in Iraq interrogating Ansar al Sunnah types in the Baqubah area especially after we rolled up the single largest group in late 2005 which had been there since our coming into the area in late 2003. At that time and up through late 2006 after they were weakened from the constant fighting-- yes they maintained a close working relationship with their "religious neighbor" AQI, but what was more interesting even closer ties to the IAI as the IAI provided a high level of new technology for the IED fight to the ASA cells.

The AQI while yes far more aggressive in nature did not "control" territory in Diyala while they could not count on the tribes but surprisingly the tribes accepted ASA and IAI. Territorial control was always in the hands of the IAI/ASA and 1920 with heavy funding flowing from al Duri who had three safe houses in Diyala and regardless of what the US IC thought was coming and going with ease from Syria.

The working relationship for the groupings was AQI provided the intel tips/funding for a specific attack to the IAI who then conducted the intel collection and planning, then the IAI approached ASA as the lead strike unit and the IAI in turn contacted the 1920 for the foot soldiers. At the same time AQI was far more into the suicide bombing side and the IAI and ASA felt it was a waste of good manpower---much as is going on now with the car bombings in Baghdad which seem to be more VBIED attacks mixed with key suicide attacks which seems to indicate ISIS learned from their past mistakes. Independent of the AQI campaign plan the IAI/ASA had their own campaign plans which at times gave an impression of a far larger insurgency and often misled the IC on actual strengths.

Did they "argue" and on occasions kill each other yes, were some or less religious than others-yes they were--but did they fight for a common cause --yes they did. That was never fully understood by the US IC. Why---because of the common enemy the Shia and then the US or vice versa depending on what day of the week it was or what messaging video had been released.

My understanding of the IAI is based on a very long number of weeks of talking to the leader of the IAI who we "accidently" picked up in a sweep near Abu Ghraib---we had his 500 page handwritten journal which started three days after we arrived in Baghdad up to mid 2006, all of their core media release videos and a 15 minute interview with him and a Finnish journalist. He knew I had recognized him and I knew he knew---but did the national IC help out---not a single response in multiple messages out to them. From the lack of support one could today state it seemed as if they did not care and or were interested in allowing him back out.

I could never get the IC or national IC interested, nor interested in doing a formal translation of the entire document, nor a biometric study of his face and the journalist interview which by the way was a perfect match-- he walked out of Abu G three months later to never been seen again. Spent hours with my interpreter going over that journal and it was an eye opener in how the IAI had functioning since 1991.

And by the way he had a PhD in western Hebrew, spoke a beautiful Arabic, was really tall for an Arab, and had been an Iraqi Intelligence officer trained at the University of Baghdad and anyone knowing Iraqi ISI history knows the one cannot study the language of the "enemy" without approval from someone higher---by the way he still spoke a great Hebrew.

He walked just by the way as did the current ISIS leader did from Bucca in 2009 after we picked him up in Mosul in 2005. And we had no idea who the ISIS leader really was other than he had be picked up by JSOC.

IMO the same problem exists for the ISIS that existed in 2005/2006 for the AQI ---yes they were/are aggressive--but they still must control territory both in the triangle and in Syria which requires manpower so they will share the load and while it appears they control they will share much like they did in 2005 through 2008 especially in Diyala.

Especially if the Kurds get more aggressive around the perceived old green lines, the Qud Force comes in force and the Turks cut the rat runs to Syria and dodging drone strikes.