Quote Originally Posted by TheCurmudgeon
AP, I do not agree that this is Al Qaeda. However, it does loosely follow the Maoist doctrine that the next step is actual creation of a state. None-the-less, this is where they are at their weakest - having to control not only a war but also control a state. This is where they will fail, if they are given the time and space to fail.
Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore
With the exception of this being a Maoist model which we liberally misinterpret every insurgency as Maoist I agree with your comments.
From a structural perspective, the name of the organization is really a matter of semantics. The protracted popular war (PPW) as a model I think is applicable regardless of its origins in Maoist political theory. The value in communist theory is not its ideologically prescriptions for the ills of capitalism, but it's rigorous dialectical materialism which divorces analysis from the subjective normative values that so often cloud assessments. The Islamist movement was born in its current iteration in 1979 - the Iranian Revolution, the attack on the Grand Mosque in Saudi Arabia, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. We are witnessing today the culmination of an escalating series of events which trace their roots directly to those three events.

That said, I do agree with TC (and with the COIN FM) that the 'insurgency' is most vulnerable when transitioning from one phase of conflict to the next. I do not think ISIS is incapable of governing in the most broad and basic sense - that is, to monopolize violence in its territory and to extract rent from the population. As another poster stated, they have done that already in Syria. Fundamentalist movements have been successful in those basic tasks in Iran (1979), Afghanistan (1996), and Saudi Arabia (~1924). I have no illusions that ISIS will somehow form a Westphalian, bureaucratic, complex state. That's not in their politics.

Here's what we know: the ISIS is well-organized, relatively well-armed, apparently relatively well-disciplined, and flush in cash. The question is how they will translate that into sustainable political power. There are clearly undercurrents we are not observing given their ability to mount a Tet-like surprise offensive across northern Iraq in a matter of days. Who are their power-brokers and stake-holders? Does ISIS have a state-sponsor (looking at you Saudi Arabia)? Overt intervention by Iran and/or the United States could degrade their material capabilities but probably add to their political and ideological legitimacy. After all, it was the original US invasion of Iraq that spurred their growth and consolidation in the first place.

Quote Originally Posted by Slapout
Why are we calling this an Insurgency instead of a Sunni vs. Shia Civil War?
Why can't it be both?

From a US perspective, we should be considering what this change means in the security dynamics of the region. The weakened Syrian and Iraqi governments are displaced by violent, fundamentalist movements - that's not a coincidence after 35 years of violence in the region and the total delegitimization of the secular regimes.

Quote Originally Posted by Ray
The root of the issues?
Boundary issues are pretexts for conflict, not cause of conflict in themselves. How many peaceful border disputes exist elsewhere? Since 1979 there has been a gradual regime change in the politics of the region - from the secular Arab nationalists to the religious fundamentalists. This is compounded by the competing fundamentalisms of Iran and Saudi Arabia, and US penetration of the region with its odd couple allies in Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt; none of which presently constituted make for 'natural' alliances with one another. ISIS is the culmination of the escalating religious fanaticism, the degeneration of governance and legitimacy, and the proliferation of weapons and cash. With every state failure and war, where do the weapons go? Say Iraq beats back the ISIS offensive or the Syrian government makes peace with its secular opponents, where do the insurgents migrate then? The PLO was a similar problem after being expelled first from Palestine and Jordan, making their way to Lebanon and Syria and contributing to the civil war in the former country.

I disagree that this is a Shia/Sunni issue - it is that issue superficially, but as a pretext. The root cause is political; the way power is organized and distributed in the countries and region in question. Resistance movements - secular, religious, whatever - will continue to emerge in the Middle East until those political problems are solved. Some groups like ISIS are apparently more successful than others. It doesn't have to be that way.