Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
The greatest educational dogma is also its greatest fallacy: the belief that what must be learned can necessarily be taught. — Sydney J. Harris
Apparent to whom?
What information did I not supply?
This post covers what I have stated here and more:
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...&postcount=148
If you look at Fuchs' original comment/question, you'll note that he was speaking specifically about non-combat personnel. This idea of exceptionalism has spread well beyond traditional combat arms, and that's a fairly recent development. So is the use of the term 'warrior' in official writing and publications.
I'll also remind everyone to keep the discussion civil and respectful. Lind's comments are worth discussing, but I think we can do it without sniping.
Last edited by Steve Blair; 05-12-2014 at 02:59 PM.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
It is understandable that after many years of opportunity for involvement in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan those who have served abroad will tend to look down on those who have made little or no effort to leave their comfort zone stateside.
As stated before I would suggest that if the Army is looking to cut costs they should get rid of all those who managed to avoid combat duty on overseas service over this period unless they can produce a rock solid reason/excuse.
Some of this was actually happening before Iraq. There was a great deal of angst, for example, about people who were avoiding deployments to KFOR and other overseas commitments.
Fuchs' study case also comes from the Air Force, not the Army. Quite a bit of the Air Force remains untouched by deployments, yet they have tried to latch onto the "warrior ethos."
I tend to agree with the idea that in theory that you get rid of those who didn't deploy without good cause, but (as also happened after Vietnam) those who stayed close to headquarters are often best-placed to work the system. And they will work to protect their own interests. And the idea of exceptionalism put forward by Fuchs can actually help them in that effort, since anyone outside the system who complains can be written off as "not supporting the troops" or something similar. Those inside the system will be less likely to take action against someone who is perceived as being close to the 'levers of power or influence,' so things go on as they have during most of the U.S.'s major military drawdowns.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
After reflecting on the Army's values as found in the old FM-1 and its replacement, ADP 1, I have come to the conclusion that Lind has it just wrong. Moral courage is alive and well in the U.S. Army.
A small part of my reason for saying that is the number of emotional responses to Lind’s article, which prompted JMA to start this thread. The US military does have its problem children; this is demonstrated in some of the posts made by JMA that quote negative comments about the U.S. military by some present or former U.S military members. However, even some of those posts may be forgiven if the posters thought they were only addressing fellow members of their military.
The visceral reactions displayed on this thread and others on this board to critical comments by Lind, and to Carl, Fuchs, and JMA to name a few, exemplify the institution’s moral strength.
Readers might reflect for a moment on the implications of adhering to the Warrior Ethos. The 4th tenet of that ethos specifies “I will never leave a fallen comrade.” This tenet exemplifies the Army value of loyalty, which is further explained in FM-1 as ”bear true faith and allegiance to the U.S. Constitution, the Army, your unit, and other Soldiers.”
Instantiating loyalty involves defending the institution to which one is loyal against criticism by outsiders. Thus, Lind, Carl, Fuchs, and JMA are responded to emotionally because they, as outsiders, do not have the right to criticize the institution to which American Pride, Bill Moore, The Curmudgeon, and I currently belong or have belonged in the past. JMA and Fuchs also do not have the right to criticize the US President or any other member of America's leadership because they are not Americans. This exercising of loyalty ought to be obvious to both JMA and Fuchs as they have expressed it themselves—Fuchs when JMA has castigated the Bundeswehr and the German people, to neither of which has JMA ever belonged; JMA when I, an American, criticized John Buchan, apparently one of his icons (and a former senior leader of a Commonwealth nation), or when I discounted his officer pre-selection process (excuse me, the British system which he espouses) without having been a selectee under that process.
Current and past members of the U.S. Army have the privilege, perhaps even the duty, to critically evaluate their Army, within the context of their Army. From the perspective of loyalty, Carl and JMA, having never served in that Army, do not have that privilege. Similarly, I, having never served in the Rhodesian Light Infantry, do not have the license to criticize JMA’s service therein, however much I might wish to do so; only he and his RLI mates have that privilege. To allow outsiders to make negative comments about the U.S. Army, and the United States in general, without response is to be disloyal to that institution and that nation.
Soldiers have a right to complain (perhaps it is the only right they have). However they have limits on how they may express that right, limits set by the Army’s values and American public laws. Airing the U.S. military’s dirty laundry by running off to the press with stories about the problems in the U.S. Army is equally disloyal, at least until such time as no other recourse exists within the appropriate chain of command. One might view that now infamous Rolling Stone article involving GEN McChrystal in such a light. I do not know enough to say one way or another and reserve judgment.
The very things that Lind finds indicative of moral rot are the things that seem to represent moral vigor. If Lind were to see the kind of critique he says is missing from the military, then he would indeed be witnessing the moral collapse he bemoans. He would be witnessing disloyalty. The fact that he doesn’t suggests that the U.S. Army still has a vigorous adherence to its values.
Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
The greatest educational dogma is also its greatest fallacy: the belief that what must be learned can necessarily be taught. — Sydney J. Harris
wm,
I will leave a response in terms of US 1st Amendment issues arising from your post to your fellow Americans.
But for you to suggest that non-Americans do not have the right to criticise anything US is quite delusional. What non-right would this be and where is it enshrined?
Then you misinterpret the value of 'loyalty' to use it to propose censorship. A truly horrifying thought pattern.
Buchan is no icon of mine. You libeled him in an attempt to undermine the point I was attempting to make through the use of that particular quotation of his. My defence of Buchan's reputation against your slander was not on the grounds of his being a Brit and you being an American. That should have been obvious.
I will not comment further as I find your thinking so far out in left field that it is not worth the effort.
This discussion is worth a quick scan through:
An Officer Corps That Can’t Score - Corvette Forum
A couple of comments:
Originally Posted by VetVetter
One thing he doesn't mention is that is very significant is that a volunteer army is very susceptible to reflecting too much of its societies civilian fabric core. I've always thought that a detriment to a true fighting force .... either you are a fighter .. or you are not. No in between.
Originally Posted by HOTXFIL
Well, I'm a retired Air Force O-5. 23 years in, retired in December 2010. Combat pilot, not a paper-pusher. Career flyer, 6+ years in ACC, 13+ in AFSOC. One tour on the ACC staff. I can't speak to the service academy parts, but I did see a LOT in this that had me nodding in the affirmative.
Originally Posted by Rule292
It's no longer a military bred to fight and win, it's a social experiment in equality and diversity.
Another article by Bill Lind from The American Conservative from 2013 on the failure of our senior leadership (Generals). At one time there were 60.....60 Generals in the Marine Corps alone. We are creating a Military 1% of Millionaires at the General level while creating a Marxist/Socialist 5th column in the rest of the Military.
http://www.theamericanconservative.c...ompetence-434/
Wm:
What a remarkable piece you've written. It not only illustrates one of Lind's main points, it also manages to remind us why the Founders had such a distrust of a standing army.
Let us go through your post in detail.
That is a remarkable statement. That some of the reactions to statements criticizing the US officer corps are visceral, in accordance with Lind's statement "They feed this swill to each other and expect it from everyone else. If they don’t get it, they become angry. Senior officers’ bubbles, created by vast, sycophantic staffs, rival Xerxes’s court. Woe betide the ignorant courtier who tells the god-king something he doesn’t want to hear."; exemplify moral strength. I think the visceral reactions are perfectly consistent with Lind's words.
Your first sentence is the classic argument of bad cops and bad police forces, or bad armies, "It's our business not yours. You are not one of us." There are several things wrong with that. I'll list them.
1. You work for me, the citizen/civilian, not the other way around. I, the citizen/civilian, pay you, equip you and feed you. In return, I (carl, this particular citizen/civilian) expect you to win and not get too many of my relatives killed and for you to tell the truth.
2. When you fail to do what I pay you to do, you will hear from me, and you will not whine about being criticized. I am the boss, not you.
3. Your loyalty is not to the officers corps. You are not a member of the El Salvadorian Army. If you want to be in an organization where officers owe their first loyalty to each other, leave. Your loyalty is to the Constitution, the country its citizenry.
4. If you can't handle that, leave. I, the citizen/civilian, will find somebody else to do the noble job of defending the country and the Constitution. I don't need whiners.
5. If you can't handle that and don't want to leave, we will have a major problem and you will lose, not me, the citizen/civilian.
6. One of the reasons the Founders distrusted standing armies I think is that such armies might tend to consider themselves better, apart from the citizenry and above the law, as exemplified by the suggestion (below) that carl does not have the privilege of criticizing the military because he never served.
7. I pay you to lead and think. Part of thinking is to look at things in other places, see what is good and adopt it. When people from other places make criticisms I don't want to you bow up and say how dare you?! I expect you to look and think about what they have to say. The Romans didn't refuse to adopt a short thrusting sword because it Spanish.
See above. No don't see above. I'll say it again. I am an American citizen. The US military was created to serve my needs, not me its. I pay for it. Any officer who takes exception to that is reflecting an imperial attitude, one of Lind's points I think.
Another example of the classic argument of the bad cop.
Moral vigor if moral vigor is corrupted to mean mindless parochialism. If it is not, you have an a very nice illustration of one of Lind's points.
Last edited by carl; 05-13-2014 at 07:41 PM.
"We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene
Carl,
Your inconsistency is humorous. On the one hand, you want the military to reflect fighting "values" - on the other, you want the military to respect your [civilian] values. These are not necessarily the same thing. The problem, as I have pointed out repeatedly, is that as society changes, so does its values. And as those values change, so will society's expectations of the military. The internal view that the military has become a "5th column of socialists" or a social experiment in "equality and diversity" is in fact a minority view and is at odds with society's perceptions of the armed forces. The very problem that you are ascribing to wm is a result of your own insistence that the military maintains a strict, insulated, and privaleged culture carved out and standing apart from the rest of society.
When I am weaker than you, I ask you for freedom because that is according to your principles; when I am stronger than you, I take away your freedom because that is according to my principles. - Louis Veuillot
Like I said before, if you can't follow what I say, don't reply because it is tiresome to refute arguments I didn't make. But tiresome is an occasional hallmark of the quotidian (yea! I got to use that word in a sentence) life so here goes.
First off I assume you are referring to post #240, my reply to Wm.
My primary point in that post was the military is subject to civilian command. The military must obey civilian leaders. That is a Constitutional or a chain of command matter. It has nothing to do with lack of martial values. There is no conflict with having and exemplifying classic martial virtues and recognizing the primacy of civilian command as dictated by the Constitution. In fact in our system it is a martial virtue to recognize the primacy of civilian command.
That is a matter of whose orders must be obeyed, it is not a matter of whose values must be adopted, especially if those values radically vary. The martial values must remain to the forefront in the military because the ultimate purpose of the military is to kill people and break things. In order to do that in a controlled way, as we strive to, a certain set of values must be held high in the military despite all. The reason for that is what the citizen/civilians expect and want from the military, to win wars. That is the prime expectation the citizen/civilian has of the military, to win and to do it without getting too many young relatives killed in the process. That may not be the prime expectation of the chattering classes and would be social engineers during peace time, but it is the primary expectation of us flyover people at all times. And I suspect that those chattering social engineers would suddenly expect the same of the military when they actually see the bloody face of war staring at them hungrily one day, as they inevitably will.
My "own insistence that the military maintains a strict, insulated, and privaleged culture carved out and standing apart from the rest of society."? Well refuting arguments I didn't make is a burden I said I would undertake this morning. Strict? Hell yes, as far martial virtues and values are concerned. Insulated? I don't understand where that one came from so I'm a little flummoxed on how to respond. Let's say that given soldiers are citizens and will again one day be civilians, many of the civilian citizens have been or will be soldiers and we are all under the Constitution (not to mention base housing can't hold everybody) that is a moot point.
Privileged culture? Again provenance unknown, but I will say this. When I was a policeman, I never figured I had any perqs or privileges beyond anybody else. What I had were responsibilities and duties beyond everybody else, duties and responsibilities that I was honor bound to fulfill.
"We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene
Came across this piece by Lind going back to february 2009.
On War #293: The Price of Bad Tactics
Then this issue will overlap with the issue of the type of aircraft used for CAS (close air support) which has been the subject of another debate.In Congressional testimony, Secretary of Defense Gates said that unless we stop killing Afghan civilians in airstrikes, “we are lost.”
Interested to hear from those who served as infantry in close combat as to this multi-faceted issue.
To address his three points:
1) "Hubris and intellectual sloth" is, I think, a bit harsh, though not entirely unjustified. I think most of the guys I've known as infantry officers are reasonably well-read for 20 to 30-something year old people. The particular problem with our tactics in Iraq and Afghanistan, IMO, is that the tools we have and have been taught to use from the beginning of our service, are analogous to using sledgehammers to kill flies against the enemies we face there. You don't build Javelin, TOW and Hellfire missiles, 2000-lb JDAMs, 155mm howitzers, and the like to go fight 5-10 man teams of insurgents carrying AKs and RPGs... but that's what we have, so that's what we take to the fight. As it happens, I think we need them, for the reasons I'll address below.
To me, the point of "tactics" is to find a way to exploit whatever advantage you have over your enemy. IMO, our only overwhelming advantages in a fight in Iraq or Afghanistan were/are firepower and armor. The Afghan/Iraqi is much lighter and faster than we are, whether dismounted or mounted, because of all the armor we are obliged to wear/drive around in. He almost invariably has the advantage of starting a fight, because he is almost always indistinguishable from any noncombatant in the area. This allows him to engage us at his leisure, on his terms, at a time and in circumstances when it is most advantageous for him. Our position in daytime is almost never unknown to any enemy within a 5 km radius. We have a marked advantage at night, but the enemy chooses not to fight at night, nullifying that advantage. Additionally, it's their turf; even if a unit's been in a given location for a year, it's still likely that the enemy knows it better. Oh, and every next step we take, or next meter you drive, might be onto a pressure plate.
So our main tactical advantages are the ability to bring bombs, artillery, missiles, etc., to bear against people with AKs, RPGs and IEDs who aren't playing by the same rules we are, and enough armor to withstand a fair portion of what they bring to bear. Frankly, it's a pretty stupid way to fight, but how do you change it? The only thing I can think of is changing the rules... but company grades don't make that decision.
2) There is a some free play training done in the Marine Corps. Not enough in my opinion, but it does happen. Frankly, I don't think we train enough, period, but a lack of training isn't really the issue in Iraq and Afghanistan. To use the catchphrase, it's all about how their asymmetrical advantages stack up against ours, and it's basically a stalemate. You only break the stalemate by changing the rules...
3) Absolutely no argument from me on this one. Our personnel system does leave a lot to be desired, and the reasons he brings up are valid, among others.
Don't know if that's what you were looking for, but there it is.
I guess the simplest way to say it is that only certain tactics are possible within the set of policies we fight under, and with the tools we're using. I think it's possible that if some policies were changed, or if a few different tools were used, a different outcome might come out of it...
But also maybe not. Pretty sure John Paul Vann thought something similar in Vietnam.
We are currently a long, LONG way from light infantry tactics, for a variety of reasons, most bad. Risk aversion and force protection are near the top of the list.
From my pretty limited perspective (five years as a USMC infantry officer, Afghanistan twice):
1. Don't agree with "sloth and hubris" at all. Anyone I've worked with who was any good despaired about how much better we could be, and didn't engage in a ton of pats on the back. Some of that stuff creeps into the service journals, definitely flows into political speeches, but I don't see a lot of it at the company or battalion level. Maybe higher up the ladder.
2. Dead-on about free play. I have done very little of this, and all of the bigger (division) exercises I have gone to are a non-dynamic rehearsal of live fire combined arms procedures. It is extremely frustrating, and a waste of valuable training time. Our Basic Officer Course has added a free play final exercise, but I have heard mixed reviews from guys teaching over there.
3. Could not agree more about our personnel system. Broken. Unit cohesion is an afterthought, guys are treated as interchangeable parts, and we lose many good officers and enlisted as a result. "Up or out" is a big part of the problem.
Recent interview on C-SPAN of Bill Lind on Foreign Policy and Fourth Generation Warfare.
http://www.c-span.org/video/?c4501370/william-lind
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