Mr Bremer has reiterated what he said in his book about the de-baathification. I believe that he makes this case as well as acknowledging the mistake of handing that process over to the Iraqis prematurely. With regard to disbanding the army, his case is weaker. First, he adds a number of layers to what he said in the book. Second, he neglects to point out that his predecessor, LTG Jay Garner, and his staff were in contact with the officers of the regular Iraqi army. Garner's point man on this was COL Paul Hughes. Paul told me that Bremer cut the rug out from under ORHA's plan with disastrous results. Hughes today is at the US Institute of Peace and was one of the senior staffers on the Iraq Study Group.

I had heard Bremer's position articulated by one of his senior staffers, Dr. William J. Olson, now at the DOD regional center for Near East and South Asia. While I have a lot of respect for Bill, my sense at the time of these conversations was that Paul had it closer to right. Bremer's expanded explanation seems to me to be one that is seeking justification for a poor policy decision after the fact, although I could be wrong.