Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
"Clear-Hold-Build" is a fundamentally flawed concept.

It is like driving one's arm into a tub of water, and believing that the space their arm occupied will remain free of water once the arm is removed.

Until we get to a more intellectually honest appreciation about what insurgency is in general, and why insurgency exists in Afghanistan, we are unlikely to develop and adopt policies for foreign places that our military can actually enforce.

For the military, we defined this mission in the context of what we in the military do, and while that is a natural response of most institutions (USAID, State, DEA, and NGOs have done the same), it does not lead to an approach that is very helpful for Afghanistan getting to some degree of natural stability.

So long as the governance in Kabul (and at lower levels as well) is perceived as fundamentally illegitimate by many who live there (primarily those who had patronage power under the Taliban and now suffer under those who have it under the regime we put into power), there will be revolution.

So long as foreign forces occupy Helmand (and Afghan forces from the north operating in Helmand are perceived as being nearly as foreign as British and US forces operating there), there will be resistance.

This is natural. This is human nature. This is really not much about advancing some "Taliban" system of governance as the West envisions - but more about revolting against a system of governance the West imposed, and resisting those forces sent to enforce that il-formed policy decision.
You're conflating issues, tactically clear and hold works, but to do it effectively like Chang did in China against Mao (until the Japanese intervened), the Brits did in Malaya, and French in Algeria, it can require a high degree of brutality, which runs against our moral grain. If it is going to be employed it must be done in a logical manner, not random acts of securing a village here and there, while insurgents have freedom of movement to maneuver around the village.

I'm not advocating a clear and hold approach, but in fact that is what we're attempting with the VSO program. We're currently in a long war of attrition, which in our case isn't sustainable politically and our adversaries know it.

I actually agree with your points, but at the end of the day they're irrelevant to the guys on the ground who have been asked to achieve objectives that will generate continued resistance as you correctly pointed out. Assuming we're going to have that resistance, and that those on the ground can't change the policy ends, we can at least discuss a better tactical approach, without it always delving into the policy realm. We're stuck with the policies we're given, or more accurately since we're both out of uniform now, our uniformed members are stuck with the policy ends they have been told to pursue using military force. From that optic what would you recommend to Battalion commanders and below?