There is an ongoing wave of bombings and car bombings---usually the first indicator of more things come.Originally Posted by JWing
I just posted this video by the Institute for the Study of War "ISIS vs the Iraqi Security Forces: Can the State of Iraq Survive?" Very informative about IS's capabilities and campaign. IS has fighters in reserve to the west and south of Baghdad that are not involved in current offensive. It has also been able to carry out simultaneous offensive operations in both Syria and Iraq showing its manpower strength. IS's campaign against Baghdad is coming but hasn't started yet are some of the highlights of the video.
There is an ongoing wave of bombings and car bombings---usually the first indicator of more things come.
JWing---an interesting article from Haaretz on the tactics of the IS indicates with new recruits their strength is being estimated at the 20,000 range which as you indicated they are holding as their reserves in the rear---estimated hardcore fighters at 3,000.
This does not evidently include the Sunni coalition forces from IAI, al Duri, and the tribes.
http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/1.606590
Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 07-25-2014 at 09:06 PM.
I just published an interview with Small Wars Council's own Outlaw 09 aka Richard Buchanan. He goes through the development of the insurgency in Iraq's Diyala province, the entry of militias, the start of the civil war there and how the U.S. was caught in the middle of these warring factions never really understanding the environment they were working in. Here is a link to the interview.
Iraq is going through a political crisis not just a security one right now. It is still undetermined whether PM Maliki will gain a 3rd term or not. Here's my latest piece on it "Pressure Grows On Iraq’s Premier Maliki To Give Up On A Third Term".
There was a SWJ journal article a few years ago that had something to do with this angle. It was by I believe one of our counter-intel guys and the thrust of the article was one of the reasons the insurgency started up so fast was that it was in large part an operation run by Saddam's former security and intel services. The article concluded also that we completely missed what was actually happening.
Do you Joel or you Outlaw know of that article or remember it? It was very good and really the only one I've read until this interview that stated this opinion.
"We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene
Carl,
That sounds like Malcolm Nance, ex-USN; I have his book 'The Terrorists of Iraq: Inside the Strategy and Tactics of the Iraq Insurgency', pub. 2007, on my bookshelf. He is not a SWC member, but has several SWJ articles readily id'd by a quick search and glance.
Last edited by davidbfpo; 07-30-2014 at 09:04 PM.
davidbfpo
Am I the only one who is reminded of the Bolsheviks of almost 100 years ago by the IS?
"We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene
It depends at what point in their history. The Bolsheviks were actually a fairly small party in the grand scheme of things. Their October coup only succeeded because the Mensheviks and other moderates couldn't get their acts together.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
I don't think it was him. I just checked all the Journal articles for 2011 and 2012 and couldn't find it. I'll keep looking. The article was mostly paraphrasing an interview with one of Saddam's former secret police types if I remember correctly.
"We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene
You sure it wasn't Outlaw/Richard's own article for SWJ?
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art...raq-and-why-it
The Kurdish Peshmerga moved into the disputed territories in northern Iraq when the Iraqi Security Forces collapsed after the fall of Mosul. One area is Jalawla, Diyala which has always been an insurgent hotbed. Kurdish attempts to secure the area have been constrained by the budgetary crisis Kurdistan is facing due to Maliki cutting off the region's share of the national budget over disputes over oil policy. Peshmerga forces have not been able to clear and hold areas and have been told they can only respond to fire because they are short of ammunition as a result of their financial problems. Here's a link to the article.
Just published a comprehensive article on security in Iraq in July. Were almost 5,500 casualties last month. Charts on dead and wounded in 2014, breakdown by province, car bombs in 2014 and in July, civilian death by govt shelling & air strikes, bodies dumped in Baghdad plus review of general situation between insurgents and government forces/militias. Check it out.
That's a shockingly long list of casualities.
The Kurdish budget and it's financial struggle make for some depressing reading, just like Iraq's one or the state as a whole. Oil seems to be often more of a curse then a gift, at least in the hands of many unresponsible governments.
Last edited by Firn; 08-01-2014 at 06:43 PM.
... "We need officers capable of following systematically the path of logical argument to its conclusion, with disciplined intellect, strong in character and nerve to execute what the intellect dictates"
General Ludwig Beck (1880-1944);
Speech at the Kriegsakademie, 1935
Here are links to my articles from yesterday and today. Yesterday I published a review of the casualty figures by the 5 groups that track them. While the range between them was huge they all noted a drop in deaths from June to July likely caused by the fighting somewhat stabilizing after the insurgents charge across northern Iraq. Here's a link. My article from today is about insurgent in fighting in eastern Diyala. Has been going on since the spring has now turned into a low level war between the Islamic State versus the Baathist Naqshibandi, Ansar al-Islam and the Islamic Army of Iraq. IS is repeating its history of attempting to dominate other factions and push out its rivals just like it did previously in Iraq and is doing now in Syria. Here's a link to that article.
AQI/ISIL/IS can never seem to get the 10 standing orders of an insurgency right---notice point 6---do not fork the insurgency---this is what caused them grief the last time around.
Taken from the Global Guerrilla blog site in 2010 referencing a concept called "open source warfare".
1.Break Networks
2.Grow Black Economies
3.Virtualize your organization
4.Repetition is more important than scale
5.Coopetition
6.Don't fork the insurgency
7.Minimalist rule sets work best
8.Self-replicate
9.Share everything that works
10.Release Early and Often
11.Co-opt, don't own, basic services
Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 08-05-2014 at 09:08 PM.
Ignoring John Robb might be considered evidence that they are thinking critically, rejecting philosophies based on nebulous buzzwords, and exercising intelligent discrimination in their selection of influences.
“The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary”
H.L. Mencken
Then you Dayuhan have never trained, led nor fought with a guerrilla unit---if you had expanded the definitions under each section then you would have recognized exactly what a guerrilla unit thinks and acts as it is a living breathing organism that has to survive in a hostile counter insurgent environment that wants to kill him.Ignoring John Robb might be considered evidence that they are thinking critically, rejecting philosophies based on nebulous buzzwords, and exercising intelligent discrimination in their selection of influences.
If you would have looked more intensely at the Ukrainian Army and their major wins in the last two weeks has come from a centering of odd SF type units (Alpha, SF, Airborne, Airmobile) into a UW commando unit that has been their lead fighting element.
So again before you make comments think through the comments.
By the way everyone of the sections I saw countless times being used in Iraq and if you had read my article on Musings then you would seen these standing orders in play every single day as the Sunni insurgents groups to include AQI and especially now the IS practice them everyday--BUT IS is violating again point six exactly as they did in 2006 when they attempted to do the allegiance oath thing with the Sunni's which then spun off the Awakening movement---exactly the same thing today.
So Dayuhan think through the words, not the author, nor the philosophies nor the buzzwords before you critique---actually that is why you tend to tear comments apart and never produce a solid comment for others to think over/about.
Especially since you have never yourself trained, led nor fought with a guerrilla unit being chased by counter insurgents.
Also go back and review Dave Maxwell's comments from the last couple of days referencing UW.
THEN especially go back and read if you have not ---the eight steps of the new Russian military doctrine New Generation Warfare that is actually UW tied to political warfare and then tell me you are not seeing that doctrine being applied daily in the Ukraine.
THEN on the top of all this Google "swarm attacks" and find the RAND study and then you will see the IS and Sunni coalition tactics in play inside Iraq that has been the trademark of their current successes---at least Dayuhan you are right the insurgent is a thinking organism that learns from his mistakes except in this case IS has again not learned point six that led the first time to their failure.
Again think though before you comment especially if it is in an area that is not your expertise.
Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 08-06-2014 at 06:46 AM.
My latest interview. I talked with Dr Nicholas Krohley author of the Death of the Mehdi Army about Sadr's difficult relationship with Iran. Sadr was a staunch nationalist based upon his father's teachings that Iraqi Shiite Arabs should control the Najaf clerical establishment. His need to arm his militia however led him to a marriage of convenience with Iran. Tehran however wanted more pliable partners which was what led it to support breakaway factions of the Mahdi Army like Asaib Ahl Al-Haq which would do its bidding. Here's a link.
Nance went by the nom de guerre of Abu Buckwheat when posting on the SWC. He seems to have lowered his internet profile considerably since authoring his waterboarding article.
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