Ukraine (closed; covers till August 2014)

[JMA]

Wrong questions... what happens if Ukraine does not suppress the Russian aggression? What would Russia's next move be?

BTW AP... are you running interference for Obama or the Russians or both? Seriously.

Outlaw,

Let's say that Ukraine successfully suppresses the insurgency and the violence ends with a clear government victory. What does the state of play in Europe look like then? What are the long-term effects on the Russian-European and Russian-American relationships? How will it affect U.S. interests in Syria, Iran, and Central Asia? I think we are risking fixation on one issue at the expense of others, so how far do we go in pursuing this?

[mirhond]

Cossacks on the warpath

http://24tv.ua/home/showSingleNews.do?kozaki_viyska_donskogo_paradno_v idpravlyayutsya_voyuvati_proti_ukrayinskoyi_armiyi _video&objectId=468312

It would be nice if they all will be killed in Donbass.

[AmericanPride]

Wrong questions... what happens if Ukraine does not suppress the Russian aggression? What would Russia's next move be?

BTW - it is the right question. From the Russian foreign ministry today:

"The additional sanction list is direct evidence that the EU countries have set a course for fully phasing out cooperation with Russia over the issues of international and regional security. This includes the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, organized crime, and other new challenges and dangers," a statement said.

Here's the problem: the U.S. is in retrenchment. One, it's exhausted from the War on Terrorism. Two, it's more or less paralyzed by bitter political infighting (and it doesn't look like the mid-term elections will ease that pressure). And this infighting is sharpened by the measurable decline in the U.S.' relative power. Three, demands for U.S. actions abroad have not declined. Ukraine. Iran. Iraq. Syria. Libya. The list goes on.

The U.S. is not a hegemon. It does not have the power to unilaterally enforce it demands on any state or combination of states. The last year's worth of events have made this painfully obvious. It's not a matter of mustering sufficient political will. That's an unrealistic expectation. Consequently, the U.S. now more than any time in its recent history must rely on diplomacy to achieve its interests. What outcome in Ukraine is in the best U.S. interest? What kind of relationship with Russia is in the U.S. interest? What are the linkages between the U.S.-Russian relationship and other U.S. interests around the world? These are questions you have failed to answer. Ukraine is not the only issue - or the most important one - facing the U.S.

So - we freeze out the Russians because of Ukraine. Fine. What next? Does the U.S. now commit itself to Ukraine's security for the foreseeable future? To what extent is that commitment elevated? NATO membership? What signal does increased U.S. commitment to Ukraine send to Moscow? Where does the cycle of escalation end? How will Moscow now act as a spoiler in the international arena on issues of U.S. interest?

[OUTLAW 09]

BTW - it is the right question. From the Russian foreign ministry today:



Here's the problem: the U.S. is in retrenchment. One, it's exhausted from the War on Terrorism. Two, it's more or less paralyzed by bitter political infighting (and it doesn't look like the mid-term elections will ease that pressure). And this infighting is sharpened by the measurable decline in the U.S.' relative power. Three, demands for U.S. actions abroad have not declined. Ukraine. Iran. Iraq. Syria. Libya. The list goes on.

The U.S. is not a hegemon. It does not have the power to unilaterally enforce it demands on any state or combination of states. The last year's worth of events have made this painfully obvious. It's not a matter of mustering sufficient political will. That's an unrealistic expectation. Consequently, the U.S. now more than any time in its recent history must rely on diplomacy to achieve its interests. What outcome in Ukraine is in the best U.S. interest? What kind of relationship with Russia is in the U.S. interest? What are the linkages between the U.S.-Russian relationship and other U.S. interests around the world? These are questions you have failed to answer. Ukraine is not the only issue - or the most important one - facing the U.S.

So - we freeze out the Russians because of Ukraine. Fine. What next? Does the U.S. now commit itself to Ukraine's security for the foreseeable future? To what extent is that commitment elevated? NATO membership? What signal does increased U.S. commitment to Ukraine send to Moscow? Where does the cycle of escalation end? How will Moscow now act as a spoiler in the international arena on issues of U.S. interest?

AP--this has been a battle of values and will be going forward much as the Cold War was about the battle of ideologies. By the way the US is an hegemon---via it's global economic power just check the current set of sanctions against Russia.

Why values---even when Dayuhan seems t think it is already known that the colored revolts and the Arab Springs are threats to governments --he failed to ask the follow on question ---why is that?

It is all about and again it seems to be a constant repeat---the rule of law and good governance---but here is the difference---determined by the effected populations and their definitions of those two concepts not ours, the EU or China for that matter.

Why does the Ukraine look towards Europe---it is this ideal that has stuck in their heads---at least the police function a little bit equally for all, the economic system does not close everyone out who is not a member of the oligarchs or ruling elite and the court system tends to generally be fair. Meaning it is really about jobs, security and personal development for a family and their children --it sounds hooky but it is their view of the world not ours as the the US lost that drive a long time ago if one looks at current US politics.

The Ukrainians are still in that Soviet era industrial age of counting of tons not quality---will it hurt to adjust to the EU yes it will but they are willing to try it---that is theiir decision not the US/EU or Russia's.

It seems that they are willing to fight and die for that set of values--once a ragtag group of individuals they are with the increasing fighting gaining experience from the day to day combat and this is the big key---they are fighting for their sovereignty and their flag not for the Red Flag or the EU flag--but theirs that actually they tried to do in 1945 but failed as the Red Army used an entire Corp to suppress it.

When the SU fell there was a massive sigh of relieve even in Moscow that it might be able to move forward economically, shake off the could corrupt legal/political/party system and somehow become like "Europe". Historically Russia has always tried to reach out to the West.

Putin has shoved that back under the rug---one just needs to talk to the young Russians here in Berlin that are in envy of the "German" model and their total dislike for Putin to fully understand why Putin fears the colored revolts. The young well educated-- the core of a country are leaving Russia in droves. Why? German/EU values.

[OUTLAW 09]

AP--just a side comment---watch for small tidbits of reporting coming out of Moscow in the coming days of a massive internal inside the inner circle to Putin ongoing shouting match between the oligarchs and the hardliners on whether to continue or to pull back.

The oligarchs side says the economy being destroyed is not worth the puesdo ethnic nationalism that Putin has been pushing as at some point it will hit the population hard and which is actually now starting to happen. They also fear the formal isolation which will kill any chance of industrial development for the next 10 years thus pushing Russia even more backwards.

Thus the hardliners heavy push into law all the new "anti-color" laws. the hardliners are anti West united by their hatred of the West and the values the West represent to them and the decadence of the West.

We will see the outcome of that internal debate in the Ukraine in the coming days---more weapons and troops or less and throttling back of the separatists.

If the hardliners win out in the debate--then seriously to heart the words the Joint Chief of Staff General Dempsey released in his article yesterday.

Something interesting that came up in comments yesterday out of a Russian western think tank in Moscow.

Throughout the eastern Ukraine crisis, now in its fourth month, Putin and his officials have consistently portrayed the conflict as Ukraine's unprincipled assault on its own citizens, rather than as a move to take back a sizeable part of the country seized by heavily armed separatists.

The aim is to discredit the Kiev authorities without openly opposing them. Putin even spoke face-to-face in June with Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, who had just been elected following the ouster of Viktor Yanukovych in the wake of months of mass protests. But on Tuesday, he stepped up the aspersions in a meeting with his security council.

"True, they held elections after the takeover," Putin said. "However, for some strange reason, power ended up again in the hands of those who either funded or carried out this takeover."

This is where the long game appears to take shape.

By aggressively suggesting that Ukraine's instability is a prelude to Western designs on Russia, Putin not only deflects attention away from the plane crash, but strikes a chord in the Russian psyche. Russia characteristically sees itself as both a vast and mighty world power and as forever beleaguered by devious and violent forces dating back to the Mongol hordes and later including Napoleonic France, Poland, Sweden and, finally, Nazi Germany.

Even as he expresses concern about Russia's vulnerability, Putin also declares that "the recipes used regarding weaker states fraught with internal conflict will not work with us."

Dayuhan--take notice of this comment concerning the Russian psyche---it is the target of the information war not the US.

[Dayuhan]

Actually Dayuhan then you quite do not understand the depth of it's pull here in Europe, the Ukraine where it is being used very effectively as well as in Russia where Putin's poll numbers are still off the charts.

Didn't you just post this piece suggesting that in some quarters at least there's a perception that Putin's popularity is sliding?

Strelkov’s mission in Ukraine, whoever gave it to him, has been bigger than just the defense of the DPR. Strelkov claims to be defending Putin’s reputation and power in Russia, too. In an interview with The Daily Beast on Thursday, Strelkov adviser Druzd spoke about the importance of Russians coming to Donbass in order to prevent a revolution like the Maidan in Kiev from spreading to Moscow.

“Putin’s popularity is fading away, since nobody has stopped the slaughter of Russians in Donbass," Druzd said. “The president’s approval rating is much lower in Moscow and St. Petersburg than in the provinces. As we know, revolutions—both French and October—were done in capitals; unfortunately, we cannot exclude attempts of the Maidan type of protests in Moscow,” Druzd explained. “For now Russia mostly sends us information and humanitarian help,” he said, when what the rebels need to defend Russian interests is “significant military support.”

Putin is increasingly between a rock and a hard place: nationalists will still give him credit for taking Crimea, but in politics you're only as good as your last show, and if he doesn't act in the Ukraine he will be accused of abandoning his proxies (an accusation with which Americans will feel some sympathy). If he does move, the oligarchs and the licit and illicit business community will accuse him of risking damage to both the Russian economy and to their individual economies. In short, he's moving into a situation where different sides of his support base have widely divergent interests and demands. Not a comfortable place to be.

Secondly, colored revolts threaten in fact every type of government why-it usually is about something that the population as a whole takes issues with---again it is all about the rule of law and good governance which in the case of say the Ukraine was using the EU image to voice it's displeasure with the government rit large.

Color revolutions specifically threaten governments where the populace does not feel that it has the ability to change the government, typically dictatorships and pseudo-dictatorships. Where the populace has confidence in the electoral system, they may take to the streets when they see lousy government, but they generally won't directly try to overthrow the government, because they know that in due time they can overthrow it legally with a lot less risk and trouble. I think you'll find that the key determinant that pushes public unrest to the color revolution level is less public perception of bad governance than the public's confidence in existing mechanisms for changing governance. Democratic governments need to be worried about being voted out if they don't deliver good governance, but they face much less threat from color revolutions than countries that are either non-democratic or where the public has little or no confidence in the nominally democratic mechanisms.

Dayuhan--take notice of this comment concerning the Russian psyche---it is the target of the information war not the US.

I suppose that's why they don't bother publishing RT in English, or hiring stooges to pack the comments sections of English-language publications...

Propaganda is advertising by another name. As with any type of advertising, the measure of success is not the structure of your campaign or the number of people it reaches. The only relevant measure of success is sales of the product. The Russian propaganda campaign is extensive and the structure of it is fairly sophisticated. The content remains extremely crude, and structure without content gets you nowhere. The question remains... who is being convinced, and where? That question can only be answered with actual evidence... market research as it were. Anecdotal evidence doesn't count.

[OUTLAW 09]

Didn't you just post this piece suggesting that in some quarters at least there's a perception that Putin's popularity is sliding?



Putin is increasingly between a rock and a hard place: nationalists will still give him credit for taking Crimea, but in politics you're only as good as your last show, and if he doesn't act in the Ukraine he will be accused of abandoning his proxies (an accusation with which Americans will feel some sympathy). If he does move, the oligarchs and the licit and illicit business community will accuse him of risking damage to both the Russian economy and to their individual economies. In short, he's moving into a situation where different sides of his support base have widely divergent interests and demands. Not a comfortable place to be.



Color revolutions specifically threaten governments where the populace does not feel that it has the ability to change the government, typically dictatorships and pseudo-dictatorships. Where the populace has confidence in the electoral system, they may take to the streets when they see lousy government, but they generally won't directly try to overthrow the government, because they know that in due time they can overthrow it legally with a lot less risk and trouble. I think you'll find that the key determinant that pushes public unrest to the color revolution level is less public perception of bad governance than the public's confidence in existing mechanisms for changing governance. Democratic governments need to be worried about being voted out if they don't deliver good governance, but they face much less threat from color revolutions than countries that are either non-democratic or where the public has little or no confidence in the nominally democratic mechanisms.



I suppose that's why they don't bother publishing RT in English, or hiring stooges to pack the comments sections of English-language publications...

Propaganda is advertising by another name. As with any type of advertising, the measure of success is not the structure of your campaign or the number of people it reaches. The only relevant measure of success is sales of the product. The Russian propaganda campaign is extensive and the structure of it is fairly sophisticated. The content remains extremely crude, and structure without content gets you nowhere. The question remains... who is being convinced, and where? That question can only be answered with actual evidence... market research as it were. Anecdotal evidence doesn't count.

Dayuhan--thanks for finally agreeing even if you take 2000 words to agree and a couple of roundabout thought processes. You need to shorten the thoughts.

You really do need to understand the use of propaganda---we use classify it --white, grey and black and believe me the white sometimes actually appears to be the truth. Doubt seriously if you have ever worked in a section that drove propaganda---it would open you eyes and make you even question articles that you quoted in the past.

Really go back and dig out the chart I posted here in this thread about the extent and depth of their info war and then tell me it is not and or was not grabbing.

Then come back with comments focused on the extent of that chart and the campaign it outlines and then ask yourself can I even trust the materials I myself find good?

And Dayuhan---finally write something that you yourself put together---cutting and pasting is now a great research tool- if you like Microsoft--and it is if one likes to debate. Debating wastes time and effort these days as it in the end tends to go nowhere.

[AmericanPride]

BTW AP... are you running interference for Obama or the Russians or both? Seriously.

That's for you to find out.