Ukraine: military (Aug '14 to mid-June '15) closed

[Dayuhan]

I agree with this assessment. There's a couple of outstanding questions:

Most of these questions are of course unanswerable. For one thing the government of the Ukraine will play a major role in determining the post-conflict landscape, and their positions are not yet clear. The US and the EU will have very substantial influence over the post-war Ukraine, which will be an economic dependency for years to come, but I personally think it would be a bad idea for the US/EU to degrade Ukrainian sovereignty by dictating policy. It will be a fairly delicate bit of balancing.

o What will Ukraine's post-war political landscape look like? Will it be inclusive of ethnic Russian interests (and what are those interests)?

We don't know. Part of the problem will be differentiating between ethnic Russian interests and Russian national interests... for example, the Russian demand for autonomy with a veto over foreign policy decisions is clearly intended as a Russian level over possible NATO membership and other links tot he West, and is incompatible with Ukrainian sovereignty. At the least the ethnic Russia community could be offered recognition of their language as official, as the Quebecois got in Canada. It would help a great deal if the ethnic Russians can develop a moderate leadership that can articulate expectations and desires of the community without being controlled by Putin. Whether or not that is possible we do not yet know.

o What will be Ukraine's relationship with EU and NATO? What kind of security and economic guarantees will be extended to Ukraine from those organizations?

Ukraine will be effectively dependent in economic terms. The extent of the assistance they receive, and the conditions attached to that assistance, will have to be carefully worked out.

o Assuming a Ukrainian victory over the insurgents, where will the defeated fighters go? This region has a history of roaming armed brigades so if defeat seems imminient, will they withdraw to Russia (or Crimea) and establish a base in exile? Will Russia disarm them or keep them on a low burn for future political leverage?

Ideally you'd send the Russians back to Russia and let Putin deal with them, and allow at least the rank and file of the local insurgents to stay without penalty. Of course that is hypothetical and the governments in question will have a lot to say about it. There may be some agitation among ethnic Russians for full scale relocation to Russia. There is some precedent for this: much of the ethnic Russian population of Kazakhstan has returned to Russia. Whether the Russians would be amenable, or how it could be done in a way that doesn't look like ethnic cleansing, is anyone's guess. My guess is that it will be handled badly and make a mess.

o What will Russia's political landscape look like? The conflict thus far seems to have strengthened the nationalists and realists in his administration - there seems to be a very distant hope that any liberal (read: Western) influence on policy will ever return. If defeated in Ukraine and sanctions continue, will this trigger a political crisis in Moscow (I doubt it)? Who could come to power afterwards?

Not possible to know or control.

o What relationship does the U.S. and Europe want with Russia post-conflict? And how will the outcome affect Russia's perspective on other international security issues (i.e. Syria, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Central Asia, etc)?

I think the risks to "the relationship" are in many ways overrated. The commercial interests on both sides are too strong to repress out of enduring pique, and I'd expect trade relations to be renewed pretty quickly if the conflict is resolved. If the resolution of the conflict is handled in a way intended to inflict outright defeat (or emasculation) of Russia, we can expect them to disrupt our strategic interests to the greatest extent of their ability. Of course that doesn't have to happen.

I classify the conflict in Crimea and eastern Ukraine as two different conflicts even though the belligerents are the same. The reason is that IMO Russia's intention in Crimea and eastern Ukraine are very different: it just so happens that Russia executed two wars (one direct, one proxy) simultaneously against the same adversary. Crimea is materially important for strategic and political reasons, and Russia's political claims are least nominally valid in comparison to the ones made regarding eastern Ukraine (why didn't Russia annex Donetsk after the region's independence referendum?). The conflict in eastern Ukraine, however, I think is aimed at keeping Russian interests at the bargaining table when Ukraine's political crisis is finally resolved and, failing that, weakening Ukraine to the extent that it cannot seriously impede Russian security interests in Europe.

The problem here is that "Russian security interests in Europe" seem to require an allied or at least neutral Ukraine, and short of outright conquest that no longer appears to be achievable. How that sorts out is anybody's guess. The west cannot promise a neutral Ukraine, because that would intrude on the sovereign right of the Ukraine to choose its own alliances. If the Ukraine goes firmly pro-west, even without Crimea, the only ally the Russians have on their western border is Belarus, and that's a shaky ally at best. If Russia can't control the eventual transition out of Lukashenko's rule, they may be left with exactly the situation they want to avoid: the West on their doorstep with no buffer. What Russia will try to do about that is, of course, up to them.