I think you're missing the point on the "exit ramp" suggestion. First, you don't offer it to Putin, you offer it direct to the separatists in the field. They've been at it for a while, they're tired, a lot of them are dead, they haven't had the support they expected, they have issues with each other. You're offering them a chance to go home to their families without penalty, and some superficial "autonomy" concessions (official language status, whatever else would not compromise Ukrainian sovereignty).
More important, you know they are not going to accept the offer. Ok, a few individuals or units might, but Putin and his puppets certainly won't. That's not the point. The point is to undercut the narrative of direct threat to ethnic Russians that you say the Russians are trying so hard to build. It's hard to claim that you have to intervene to protect ethnic Russians when the ethnic Russians have a generous offer of re-integration on the table.
It's a propaganda move. Given your focus on propaganda I'd think that would be obvious. Of course the offer won't be accepted; that's not the point. The point is to undercut the narrative and the pretext, and to sow some doubt among the cannon fodder out in the field.
Again, the whole point of the "exit ramp" proposal is to undercut the argument for that "humanitarian option to invade".
You say here that there have been "two serious attempts" to move in, both of which have pulled back. You also say that "when the diplomatic tone gets hard Russia pulls back". If that's true, and that if mere words can get them to pull back, that would suggest a high degree of uncertainty and indecision, even fear. Why else would they pull back from a course already decided on?
If the Russians pull back over nothing more than a change in diplomatic tone, they are running scared and the current approach is working. I'm actually not convinced that this is the case, but you're making some fairly convincing arguments that it is.
I agree. I've said from the start that the preferred response would be multilateral, economic, and graduated. Economics is realistically the primary relevant weapons system for the US in this fight, because everyone in the picture knows the US isn't going to war over the Ukraine no matter who sits in the White House.
True, and it's also pretty clear that the West will support the Ukraine with more aggressive sanctions. That leaves Putin with an unpleasant choice to make. The ball's pretty much in Putin's court, and we'll see what he does. The threats are on the table, he has to calculate the costs and benefits either way. I do hope the Ukrainians refrain from direct moves into urban areas where high collateral damage is inevitable. A bunch of dead ethnic Russian civilians will make intervention a lot easier for Putin.
Can't really buy the two-front war argument. As above, we all know the US isn't going to war with Russia over the Ukraine, and the US is very unlikely to put ground troops back into Iraq. The constraint in Iraq is US public opinion, not declining power, and the reluctance to push another nuclear power to the wall in open conflict in their own front yard goes all the way back to the 50's. MAD still matters.
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