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    Council Member CrowBat's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by JWing View Post
    Yesterday I wrote about the Shiite militia mobilization in Iraq in response to the insurgency, most of which is being directed by Iran. Today I go into the Iranian mobilization which has included advisers, weapons deliveries, bringing in Lebanese Hezbollah advisers, and involves running some of the security portfolio for Baghdad. Here's a link.
    I like your excellent articles on developments in Iraq, and found most of them near flawless so far. But, in this case I feel kind of prompted to offer some commentary - as a co-source of Aviationist, and in certain other relations too.

    1.) Tehran was not caught 'off guard' by the fall of Mosul and related developments in Iraq: it was caught while unable to respond. Reasons were multiple, but primarily related to:
    - a) preoccupation with Syria, which necessitated immense spending ('rumour' if you like, has it that they were delivering at least US$1 billion in cash to Damascus, every single month since November 2011, plus about US$ 500 million in fuel), and

    - b) which, in combination with the latest round of sanctions against Tehran, caused a de-facto bankruptcy of the regime and the IRGC.

    The latter is a little known fact, primarily because the internet (and especially the blogosphere) is meanwhile full of supposed Iranian 'security experts' that are feeding it with fake and constructed information and messages creating an image of 'undefeatable' Iran, that is trouble-free and flush with cash. That's why one can read messages like, 'for us it's not about money, but about not abandoning our friends, we're not the USA' (in relation to Syria); or 'our defence sector is flourishing because we're flush with money', and then especially something else that I'm going to mention below.

    Actually, for Tehran the spread of the ISIS through eastern Syria and north-western Iraq couldn't have come at a better moment. It directly resulted in a situation where the IRGC was saved by Iraqi money (lent by China).

    That all aside... well, simply imagine international reaction in the case Tehran would have had the money and launched a pre-emptive military intervention against the ISIS inside Iraq (which would have been perfectly along its declared doctrine of national defence)...

    But, it couldn't, because it didn't have the money, nor the necessary influence and support (whether inside or outside Iraq).

    2.) IRGC-QF C-in-C Soleimani... Since he took over as C-in-C of the IRGC-QF's battlefield HQ in Syria, back in mid-2013, and especially since that famous Filkins' article about him for NYT, Soleimani is a kind of star in the Western media. Actually, that's precisely the picture the IRGC wanted to be created about him. Then, in reality he is neither the mastermind, nor as influential or crucial for all the developments with which he's usually connected. Soleimani is warrior, an intelligent, combat-proven commander and officer, no doubt about all of this. But, his primary duty is that of an executor: foremost, he can't farth without permission from Vahid. So, it's not his ideas he's realizing, but those from Khamenei and the clique surrounding him. And neither that clique, nor Soleimani, are as omni-present or as overpowering as usually described. Difference to earlier times (especially those of the Iran-Iraq War) is that his/their actions are usually aiming at much more realistic aims, precisely because that clique now knows to appreciate opinions of such like Soleimani (i.e. because the IRGC now has its own, combat-proven warriors, and is listening to them). Translation: this means you'll not see the IRGC-QF launching operations like Valfajr or Kerbala, aiming to deploy 100,000 Basiji to assault Basra and similar aims. It's working in entirely different fashion nowadays.

    3.) I'm getting sick and tired of everybody explaining 'these Sukhois were actually Iraqi': this is simply not truth.

    Yes, in 1991, Iraq, in accordance with an agreement between Baghdad and Tehran from August 1990, flew 130+ of its planes to Iran (colloquial 'knowledge' is 124, but I've got a full list of serials from an ex-Brig Gen of the Iraqi Air Force Intel Dept.M; large excerpts from that list - as far as related to specific combat aircraft formerly in service with the IrAF - can be found in the book Iraqi Fighters, authored by Brig Gen Ahmad Sadik and your very own). But, Tehran has officially declared these planes (that is: those that landed safely in Iran, minus few that were shot down or crashed while underway, and minus a few that officially never reached Iran) as impounded and its ownership, in the name of reparations for Iraqi invasion of 1980 - which is a perfectly legal claim, considering that even the USA have acknowledged that Baghdad was responsible for its own aggression. Therefore, these planes are Iranian and no sugarcoating of this is going to change that fact ever.
    Accept it, live with it, finally.

    4.) Not all of the Su-25s sent by the IRGCASF (IRGC Air & Space Force) are ex-Iraqi. On the contrary, over the time the IRGC has taken every single Su-25 airframe it could put its hands upon. It's a long story (actually, I could discuss the history of every single airframe, should that be necessary), so sufficient to say that only some 3-4 of these seven sent to Iraq are indeed 'ex-Iraqi'.

    Whatever: this is a reason more why I would strongly recommend anybody trying to say something of that kind to strictly avoid babbling that these planes were 'actually Iraqi'.

    5.) That is: they were Iranian...erm... possession of the IRGCASF - until they were flown to Iraq. And the reason they were flown to Iraq was Iraqi money, plus Russian promises about delivery of additional high-tech weaponry (all paid for by Baghdad) to the IRGC (officially: the IRGC in Iraq; unofficially... well, who can prevent the IRGC taking that weaponry wherever it wants, once it's in Iraq). So, de-facto, the IRGCASF has sold its Su-25s to Iraq - in exchange for a) cash, b) official permission for its presence in Iraq, c) immense Iraqi orders of arms and ammo from the Iranian defence sector, and d) Iraqi orders/payments for Russian arms for the IRGC.

    6.) Yes, it's Iranians only that are flying Su-25s in Iraq. Indeed, although the IQAF has few officers that used to fly Su-25s back in the late 1980s, that's a far cry from what's necessary. On the contrary, the IRGCASF and supporting industry have a relatively well-developed support infra-structure for the type at home (good enough to run regular overhauls and even do some upgrades too). Iranians are maintaining and flying even Su-25s recently delivered by Russia too - which, BTW, was another PR-coup: the planes arrived in Iraq in very poor condition, with only a bare minimum of maintenance necessary to make them operational again. Actually, it's the Iranian personnel that has to make them operational...

    ...though which is possible thanks to Iraqi financing of this IRGC-QF deployment.

    7.) Meanwhile, it's not only the IRGC-QF that's deployed inside Iraq, but the regular Iranian military too. Check with US and British SF operators that were in Sinjar who was the actual 'first' there.

    8.) Meanwhile #2: and Iranians are happily delivering plane-loads of their arms and ammo to Kurds in Erbil too - 'happily', because 'somebody's' tax-payers are paying for these too. Congrats Obama and Bibi.

    Overall, the crisis in Iraq caught the Iranians (and especially Khamenei and the IRGC) unprepared, but it couldn't come at a better moment and they're exploiting it in best possible fashion - although in different ways than usually described.
    Last edited by CrowBat; 08-21-2014 at 07:11 AM.

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