Bill,

I think our own approaches to the events of 9/11 have been far more damaging to the ideals contained within the US Constitution, the US Bill of Rights and the Declaration of Independence than anything done anywhere by any of our perceived "threats."

I will agree that dealing with Assad is not the key, and certainly not one we are postured to turn. We do, however, need to recognize that ISIL is the government of a newly emergent Sunni Arab State, and that the "defeat" of ISIL does not solve the problem, it only knocks it back into being a Sunni Arab Revolutionary Insurgency. Worse, it makes that population even less likely to listen to what the US has to say on how to move forward in addressing the very real and reasonable concerns these Sunni Arabs have with continuing to live under the Shia dominated governments of Syria and Iraq.

Better we focus on what we still retain some degree of control over, and work to offer to the Sunni the same partial-sovereignty package we shaped for the Kurds. This would have to be complete with some scheme for revenue sharing between the three primary systems of governance that is tied more to population than to geography.

When we tell the average Sunni that we are against ISIL, but not them - and in the same breath say we are dedicated to restoring the Iraqi state, it simply does not resonate. We drive the people into ISIL's arms with this policy.

So, to reiterate my concern with Dave Kilcullen - he is too threat-centric, and only offered a strategy that suggested one could defeat an insurgent threat by bribing a population to accept the status quo of governance they are revolting against.

We must become problem-centric. The Sunni Arab population of Syria and Iraq have a reasonable concern and are acting out to resolve it. So far, ISIL is the only one offering a realistic solution. We need to offer a better solution if we hope to outcompete ISIL and render them moot.

Bob