Not the least: it's your picture that's incomplete.Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09
Since IRGC is in control of regime's forces again (October this year), the renewed practice of squandering re-trained units (which we could monitor through the summer), ceased, and 'economy of force' was re-introduced. Means, the regime is holding out in most of places, while only one major offensive operation and one major besieging operation are undertaken at time.
Per province, the situation is something like this:
- Idlib: JAN + Ahrar ash-Sham kicked out SRF and Hazzm, but nothing changed about regime's position (indeed, a major JAN offensive on regime in Idlib City collapsed with heavy loss)
- Lattakia: regime's position stabile (it remains in control over more than 95% of this province)
- Aleppo: regime on advance, about to cut off remaining IF and FSyA insurgents in eastern part of the city; JAN is squandering own units, time and resources for pointless attacks on Nubol and az-Zahra
- Raqqa: under Daesh control since months, with minor pockets held by insurgents in between
- Hassakah: partitioned between Daesh and Kurds, with few minor regime garrisons holding out
- Dayr az-Zawr: regime smashed a major Daesh offensive with help of chemical weapons (see 'chlorine') and stabilized the situation; means, everything is back to positions from October
- Tartus: undisputedly under regime control
- Hama: JAN and Ahrar forced remnants of the former 11th Armoured Division to withdraw from Wadi ad-Dayf to Moarek; this is praised as a 'big victory', but is actually changing very little (it's a very bleak 'revenge' for the loss of Moarek); besides, about 1,000 regime troops managed to escape together with a significant quantity of intact armour (the latter is particularly important because the regime is meanwhile short on operational armour)
- Homs: under firm regime control bar the pocket between ar-Rastan and Talbiseh now controlled by the JAN, and a Daesh-held pocket near T.4, which is now jeopardised because of regime's victory in Dayr az-Zawr.
- Damascus and Rif Dimashq: Jobar nearly overrun by regime, about 800 insurgents boxed into an area less than 1km in diameter; rest of Eastern Ghouta should be much easier to overrun; this is continuation of defeats of insurgents in this part of Syria
- Quneitra: no major insurgent advances since months
- Dera'a: this is the only province where regime is losing lately, and the only majority of which is still held by insurgents not Jihadists or the Daesh. But, capital of Dera'a is still under regime's control, and the regime is able to supply it down the highway from Damascus. Recent insurgent capture of Sheikh Miskin was an important victory, but foremost a morale bolster: it was stopped by a strong regime counterattack. Overall, even should the insurgents breach-through in direction of Damascus, they would run into a chain of major military bases surrounding the city, and I do not see them having the strength to take even one of these. Furthermore, the SF and JAN are increasingly at odds, especially because of creation of first Daesh cells, and this is no good sign: usually, such disputes end with collapse of moderates.
- as-Suwayda: thin area along its western border to Dera'a held by insurgents, rest under firm control of pro-regime Druze.
Overall:
No matter what happened at Wadi ad-Dayf, I do not see regime really 'losing' anything important. With the decline of oil prices, even possession of the Sha'er gas field is not as important. On the contrary, the IRGC will see to complete the siege of Aleppo and its methodical advance in Eastern Ghouta (Rif Dimashq province), and I do not see a trace of hope of either situation changing any time soon.
With these two exceptions, nothing really changed for most of this year. Foremost: since the Daesh squandered its offensive capability by fruitless attacks on Ayn al-Arab and Dayr az-Zawr, the regime (i.e. IRGC and Hezbollah) is now the only force with proven capability to advance and then hold the territory it occupied.
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