Quote Originally Posted by carl
I don't know exactly which "effective tools" you want retained, but if they enrage the populace of Iraq and Afghanistan, cause the citizens of the United States to question whether we are on the side of evil or good, bring moral opprobrium down upon our country and tempt young, inexperienced people into sadistic behavior; I think these "tools" are best discarded.
Carl, both extremes have been visited. On the side you are referring to, in the past there have been formal permissions given for the use of methods that are either unquestionably illegal, or teeter so close to the edge that they shouldn't be considered. As has been discussed on SWC, this is not only wrong and degrades our soldiers, but it is a tremendous strategic liability.

On the other hand, what SFC W is referring to - overreaction by commanders to negative perceptions of interrogation ops - has definitely occurred. In some cases this has reduced interrogations to nothing more than an interview. This can be a significant operational and tactical liability.

In essence, this is a leadership problem. Commanders need to fully understand the capabilities of their interrogation assets, and the legal parameters within which they must operate. Moving back and forth between overly-broad permissions and knee-jerk imposition of restrictions does nothing for effective collection. This stands true for HUMINT ops in general; not just interrogation.