A number of points (not in priority):
1) Contrary to briefings the Taliban do fight at night, especially in the hours after dusk and of course most IEDs are planted then. Secondly they do snipe accurately; example cited of blowing loopholes in compound walls and fire directed instantly at the holes.
2) The maps used in Helmand are based on aerial photograph, with a very high scale (1:70,000) and all pre-arrival training used "normal" maps and scales (1:25,000 and lower). It can take sometime to adjust upon arrival. UAV product is not available for operational elements i.e. printed out.
3) The quality of the ANA is very variable, one platoon in a joint patrol just ran off after the first shots were fired and drifted back hours later when situation resolved. There is little confidence in the ANA improving.
4) "Mowing the lawn" remains a fitting description of UK activity. Poppy fields were never seen to be eradicated; the locals would often ask about the Poppyfield Eradication Force (PEF), who they hated and were reassured UK activity was not PEF.
5) Due to cultivating the heroin poppy many of the locals are addicted to heroin; originally from cutting the poppy and the sap touching the skin - on the hands primarily so a transmission occurs (not sure about the science of this). The rooftop storage of drying material can include phials and syringes. Clothing and footwear are stained with poppies (is that a health issue?)
6) Not once have UK forces except by accident destroyed a poppy crop.
7) A heroin seizure (large amount) was only destroyed as different ROE existed for the units involved; the heroin was burnt in situ and later reported as a great success.
8) Patrolling with such full packs, citing up to 100 punds, was crazy; exhaustion commonly reduced effectiveness and when the opposition was darting around with just ammunition and a far lighter load stupid. Even buying local beasts of burden, donkeys would help.
9) Unlike Canadian "terps" (interpreter) the UK rely on locals recruited, without vetting, in Kandahar and the quality is very low. They are also not well treated by their UK partners and are given poor equipment. OPSEC is an issue and searching before going on ops / patrol can be required.
10) There is next to no operational intelligence available, not even historical reports are made available and awareness of local facts is limited. Example cited of going on patrol to a village, with a trusted "terp", who upon arrival announced being unable to help as the village spoke Dari only. Surely that language awareness is available?
11) The 'intelligence cycle' appears to be unknown and OPSEC plus obstructed any briefing efore planning operations. Company int cells appear to be dominated by TA staff who want an operational tour and effectively become "errand boys".
12) Firepower works when the Taliban are in the field; SAW replaced with GPMG gave an edge, but against compound walls little to hand worked.
13) Each UK brigade changes something in the tactical resource mix and this can quickly be detected by the opposition.
14) Successful covert observations and the resulting tactical successes can arouse opposition from vested local interests and even from Kabul.
15) It would be valuable if deploying brigades sent some personnel a month beforehand, to work alongside and learn from those in situ. Reading papers and talking in the handover is no substitute.
16) Track down the personnel who appear to do multiple tours and back to back.
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