Iraq Isn't Like Vietnam -- Except When It Is

[SWJED]

20 May Washington Post - Iraq Isn't Like Vietnam -- Except When It Is by Robert Dallek.

These days, it's not terribly original to say that the Iraq war is like the Vietnam War. Many doves use the comparison lazily, invoking Vietnam to urge the United States to pull out. Like most historical analogies, it's a pretty inexact one. (For one thing, Vietnam began as a guerrilla war and ended as a conventional one, while Iraq began as a conventional fight and degenerated into an insurgency.) But having studied President Lyndon B. Johnson's descent into the Vietnam abyss, and having just spent several years poring over Vietnam-era papers and tapes from President Richard M. Nixon and Henry Kissinger, I've found that some of the parallels sound disturbingly familiar today. They're not perfect, but they're instructive -- and give us a disquieting sense of how hard it can be for policymakers to learn from history...

[Steve Blair]

This is similar to something board regulars may remember me expressing on numerous occasions....

The similarities between Iraq and Vietnam are not necessarily on the ground, but in the response of some of our institutions to those situations. To its eternal credit, the Army has been MUCH more responsive than it was during Vietnam, but our decision-making levels seem intent on making the same mistakes, right down to Congress possibly betraying yet another government we created and promised to support.

[Sargent]

Two years ago David Kaiser (Naval War College) gave a lecture at the Army War College that compared the two wars. Perhaps the forum will find this over-view of the talk an instructive adjunct to Dallek's commentary. In brief, he came down to the same conclusion that Dallek starts with -- there is as much that is different as similar. Learning from the former to inform the latter requires a decent understanding the similarities and differences.

http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrow...BjCQ&user=&pw=

[Culpeper]

This is similar to something board regulars may remember me expressing on numerous occasions....

The similarities between Iraq and Vietnam are not necessarily on the ground, but in the response of some of our institutions to those situations. To its eternal credit, the Army has been MUCH more responsive than it was during Vietnam, but our decision-making levels seem intent on making the same mistakes, right down to Congress possibly betraying yet another government we created and promised to support.

Your posts on this matter has not gone unread. I'm beginning to see your point on this subject matter.

[carl]

Let's see, where do we start with Mr. Dallek's article.

First the "surge" isn't a fundamental change in the way the war is prosecuted, it is just a simple increase in the number of troops. Okay....

The ARVN couldn't and wouldn't fight. Didn't they provide all the ground combat forces that stopped the Easter Offensive in 1972?

The TET offensive showed VC strength. Well, yes it did. He doesn't mention that it also shattered that strength never to recover.

Ending the war in Vietnam enhanced the international credibility of the US. That is a bit inconsistant with my sad memories of the late 70's.

He forgot to make one last point about Vietnam. I'll make it for Mr. Dallek. The loss in Vietnam also resulted in the millions of innocent people losing their lives and in decades of misery for more millions. Since the point of his article is how things apply to Iraq, I think this thing applies most directly of all.

[Culpeper]

Carl:

My first gut reaction to the Iraq-Vietnam compare and contrast was much the same. But we are looking at the platform used to prosecute both conflicts. Not the size and magnitude differences.

The similarities between Iraq and Vietnam are not necessarily on the ground, but in the response of some of our institutions to those situations.

Yes, it is easy to state that the mere casualty rates and the intensity of fighting alone are so much lighter than Vietnam. I have stated the same thing more than once on these forums. Nevertheless, the similarities are the shortcomings that are currently costing lives whether we consider the casualty rate light or not. In that respect, the same mistakes are being made. And it is coming with an opportunity cost.

From an historical perspective, during the Civil War tens-of-thousands of lives in one day was not unusual. During WWI high casualties to achieve a worthless effort was considered acceptable just to find out if an planned offensive was worthwhile or not. During WWII thousands of casualties to take an island that was strategical useful for a short period was considered acceptable. During the Korean Conflict hundreds of casualties were acceptable to take a hill. Just to take the hill with no strategic value. In Vietnam, we ran into conventional warfare as well as counterinsurgency warfare. Nearly 60,000 KIA was not acceptable to America for a "police action". Iraq has turned into a police action counterinsurgency war. Today, the loss of two lives in a forward outpost platoon can be serious because we have, in the past, already lost too many American lives due to police action tactics that didn't work at one time. Overall, the problem is we are not looking that far back in time except for historic statistical purposes. So, today the loss of light casualties are having the same effect on moral as lets say, Hamburger Hill during that particular conflict. It is not because the troops are less aggressive or brave. It is just in this war there are not going to be any Hamburger Hills.

A tax auditor will have a hard time completing an application for a manufacturing tax credit because it is in the nature of the auditor to look for a liability against the taxpayer, when the purpose of the application is to enhance manufacturing in his area. A high ranking commander in Iraq may have a hard time with COIN decisions because it is in his nature to seek out and destroy the enemy with acceptable losses on three fronts; his troops, the enemy, and the population, which will have a negative impact when the actual goal is to enhance our image with the population. We can't do this with acceptable losses of troops and the general population. This is where some are missing the picture on Vietnam as I have in the past. In some places during the Vietnam Conflict the same mistakes are being made in Iraq overall. Not seeing the trees because of the forest. It takes a while to get over it.

[carl]

The similarities between Iraq and Vietnam are not necessarily on the ground, but in the response of some of our institutions to those situations.

Culpeper:

I agree with you and Steve. Another institutional response I fear will be repeated was the unshakable determination to ignore the killing and the dying after we left.

[aktarian]

He forgot to make one last point about Vietnam. I'll make it for Mr. Dallek. The loss in Vietnam also resulted in the millions of innocent people losing their lives and in decades of misery for more millions. Since the point of his article is how things apply to Iraq, I think this thing applies most directly of all.

However it didn't result in domino theory spread of communism through Asia. So any prediction about what will happen to Iraq after US leaves (Aq gaining secure base, Iraq becoming new Taliban's Afghanistan and such) has to take that into account.

[Old Eagle]

Not ALL the dominoes fell.

Laos didn't go communist
Cambodia didn't go communist
Burma didn't go communist

oops

One of the most eloquent defenses of the Vietnam war I heard was one of the other SEAsian leaders explaining that the time from 1965-75 allowed the ASEAN countries enough time and outside resources to build strong enough institutions/economies to ward off communism. And, as I posted elsewhere, we are still going to win the war in Vietnam.

Now, it seems to me, the parallel question is, who in the middle east is making the reforms that Thailand, Malaysia, etc made in SAE? I just don't see it. Every once in a while there's a glimmer of hope here or there, but no bright shining lights.

That said, I do like the economic and social changes shown by Dubai. Politically, it's still 7th century, but that may change too.

What think?

[Culpeper]

Culpeper:

I agree with you and Steve. Another institutional response I fear will be repeated was the unshakable determination to ignore the killing and the dying after we left.

That is my biggest fear right now. That Congress will, in effect, create a massacre by trying to run the war from within D.C. This sort of massacre happened after Vietnam. It happened after the Gulf War. And will surely happen in Iraq.

Eagle:

I've never looked at the Southeast Asia conflict in that manner but you're correct. Most people didn't see that reform in neighboring regions during that period. Maybe we can't see this happening in much the same way in the Middle East. Too focused on the fighting in the present. I mean Libya changed her tune real quick. Syria is nervous as a cat on a hot tin roof. Iran is on the brink of some sort of change, and so forth.

[Sargent]

[QUOTE=Culpeper;16395]That is my biggest fear right now. That Congress will, in effect, create a massacre by trying to run the war from within D.C. This sort of massacre happened after Vietnam. It happened after the Gulf War. And will surely happen in Iraq.[QUOTE]


Wouldn't the Commander in Chief bear a large portion of that responsibility? In each of the cases cited, it was the President who made the decisions that led to a situation that Congress (ie, the people) ultimately found objectionable and not in American interests. If he is the one to decide to use military power, if he is the one to set the strategy, if he is the one to set the expectations for that strategy, and so forth, isn't he similarly responsible for the outcomes? If only in the current example, had OIF turned out to be a success, would anyone be running to give the credit to Congress for _supporting_ the President's policies? In at least the Vietnam and Iraq 2 cases, we are dealing with military interventions that American administrations unilaterally _chose_. If an administration chooses a conflict and does not even have a sensible strategy to maintain public support -- let alone achieve the policy objectives -- whose fault is that? Call me crazy, but I put the responsibility for that on the administration.

[Mike in Hilo]

Always sad to see those old misconceptions repeated ad infinitum--this time by Dallek. Blair has pointed out the real Iraq/VN similarity succinctly and well. On the other hand, a point by point rebuttal of Dallek would not leave much at all of the article intact. In this regard, Carl's responses to some key points have been spot on. The two cents I would throw in are to reference that 500 pound gorilla--Sure, two US Presidents felt the war was lost, as Dallek puts it: Both correctly recognized North Vietnamese irredentism as the driving force to the conflict and both (yes, even Nixon) felt a palpable fear of what the Soviets and/or Chinese would do if we hit North Vietnam hard enough to effect its strategic defeat....And so they held back, knowing that doing so insured that victory would elude the Allied side. (No similar situation in today's unipolar world.) Dallek's failure to mention this renders his claim about his extensive examination of pertinent VN War documents laughable--to me at least.

Cheers,
Mike.

[Culpeper]

[QUOTE=Sargent;16403][QUOTE=Culpeper;16395]That is my biggest fear right now. That Congress will, in effect, create a massacre by trying to run the war from within D.C. This sort of massacre happened after Vietnam. It happened after the Gulf War. And will surely happen in Iraq.

Wouldn't the Commander in Chief bear a large portion of that responsibility? In each of the cases cited, it was the President who made the decisions that led to a situation that Congress (ie, the people) ultimately found objectionable and not in American interests. If he is the one to decide to use military power, if he is the one to set the strategy, if he is the one to set the expectations for that strategy, and so forth, isn't he similarly responsible for the outcomes? If only in the current example, had OIF turned out to be a success, would anyone be running to give the credit to Congress for _supporting_ the President's policies? In at least the Vietnam and Iraq 2 cases, we are dealing with military interventions that American administrations unilaterally _chose_. If an administration chooses a conflict and does not even have a sensible strategy to maintain public support -- let alone achieve the policy objectives -- whose fault is that? Call me crazy, but I put the responsibility for that on the administration.

There is a lot of "He's" in that statement. I'm seeing Congress setting a timetable that the CIC is finding not in the best interest of everything you stated is his responsibility. You are never going to find public support for going to war. Even the "America First Committee" which included Charles Lindbergh, objected to FDR declaring war against Nazi Germany.

Charles Lindbergh provided Americans with a portrait of the European war that differed substantially from the one conceived by the Roosevelt administration...

You can pick and choose and change the names around a little with the above quote and you will get something similar to your response and the Iraq War. But that don't make it right.

[Sargent]

"There is a lot of "He's" in that statement."

The three Presidents in question were men. I didn't think the grammatically neutral he/she was necessary.

"Even the "America First Committee" which included Charles Lindbergh, objected to FDR declaring war against Nazi Germany."

Hence FDR did not make the first move to declare war on Nazi Germany. Note, the speech that Lindbergh was meant to give on 12 December in support of the America First movement was cancelled, and Lindbergh sought to be reinstated as an officer as America went to war against the Axis powers. The America First Committee disbanded in the face of the declarations of war against the US. They didn't have much of a leg to stand on in terms of convincing the American public to support their agenda. And, throughout the war, FDR (another he) and his administration did a pretty good job of maintaining public support -- notwithstanding some pretty withering criticisms from, for example, the Hearst newspapers (featuring, on occasion, Doug McCarthy, who spoke out in an article in one of them on the incompetence of the Navy/Marine Corps amphibious ConOps in the aftermath of Tarawa).

Russell Weigley posits the notion of an American Way OF War (American in Bellum, if you will). I would submit that there is an American Way TO War (American ad Bellum) -- that is, the best way that America goes to war -- usually in response to an "unprovoked" attack, which awakens the sleeping giant from its peaceful slumber to fight the evil in great righteousness. Americans, I would submit, aren't altogether keen on the idea of being the first to cross the line of departure, but neither are they particularly keen to turn the other cheek once they've been kicked upside the head.

[aktarian]

Not ALL the dominoes fell.

Laos didn't go communist
Cambodia didn't go communist
Burma didn't go communist

oops

What about others? Thailand, Philippines etc etc.

One of the most eloquent defenses of the Vietnam war I heard was one of the other SEAsian leaders explaining that the time from 1965-75 allowed the ASEAN countries enough time and outside resources to build strong enough institutions/economies to ward off communism. And, as I posted elsewhere, we are still going to win the war in Vietnam.

Good point.

Now, it seems to me, the parallel question is, who in the middle east is making the reforms that Thailand, Malaysia, etc made in SAE? I just don't see it. Every once in a while there's a glimmer of hope here or there, but no bright shining lights.

That said, I do like the economic and social changes shown by Dubai. Politically, it's still 7th century, but that may change too.

What think?

Well "reforms" can go in two ways. One is democratic other is secular autoritarism. Neither are perfect, in former you can get islamists in power (something that happens every time these countries have anything resembling democratic elections) later only supresses them and doesn't really solve them.

[Steve Blair]

The biggest issue I see with Congress getting involved at this stage in the way that they have (much like they did in Vietnam) is that there is no accountability for them. Popular memory (not necessarily history) remembers Watergate, not Kennedy making political hay out of the casualties at Dong Ap Bai (Hamburger Hill). It also remembers the photos of the last helicopters out of Saigon, not the lackluster political decisions made by Congress that led up to that moment.

Bush has certainly made mistakes with Iraq, and they will be remembered as his. But within the anonymity of "consensus" and "voting blocks" Congress may once again be able to evade theirs. To borrow some of Nagl's framework, this certainly does NOT make Congress a "learning institution," and perhaps teaches them a dangerous lesson: They can act (or fail to act) with near impunity because of their sheer size and lack of political accountability. Elections certainly are not accountability in this case, especially when one considers the Senate. Kennedy has never been held accountable for his poor decisions in the late 1960s, and he seems to have failed to learn from them. The same could be said for many of his colleagues.

[Sargent]

The biggest issue I see with Congress getting involved at this stage in the way that they have (much like they did in Vietnam) is that there is no accountability for them. Popular memory (not necessarily history) remembers Watergate, not Kennedy making political hay out of the casualties at Dong Ap Bai (Hamburger Hill). It also remembers the photos of the last helicopters out of Saigon, not the lackluster political decisions made by Congress that led up to that moment.

Bush has certainly made mistakes with Iraq, and they will be remembered as his. But within the anonymity of "consensus" and "voting blocks" Congress may once again be able to evade theirs. To borrow some of Nagl's framework, this certainly does NOT make Congress a "learning institution," and perhaps teaches them a dangerous lesson: They can act (or fail to act) with near impunity because of their sheer size and lack of political accountability. Elections certainly are not accountability in this case, especially when one considers the Senate. Kennedy has never been held accountable for his poor decisions in the late 1960s, and he seems to have failed to learn from them. The same could be said for many of his colleagues.

Neither am I particularly keen on putting them in charge of running a war, and I agree that their track record doesn't bode well for them getting much right. Several hundred people as CINC? Ugh. But in cases where they have stepped in to muck things up, the action was in response to a backlash from the public, and it was, in each of the cases of Vietnam and Gulf 2, after giving the Executive Branch several years to pursue its policy. In Vietnam, the American public was pretty supportive -- until Tet put the lie to the Light at the End of the Tunnel. I would submit that the American public gave this administration's policy a fair shake -- given the various lines that were coming out of the administration -- before losing patience.

That's what any administration needs to remember about the American public -- you have to be mostly on target on the level of commitment and how long it will take, and certainly don't give them false hope, because the people get very impatient when that is dashed. FDR never promised anything about WWII -- it was "for the duration," and nobody thought the duration was just about to end at any point. Possibly that's why the collective memory of the war is so positive -- given the enormity of the conflict, for the Americans it probably ended sooner than expected.

The bottom line is that managing public perception and support is a significant piece of the strategic picture in the American case. And as tempting as it is to use optimism as a means of building the right image of the policy and maintaining positive feelings towards it, it's a very risky way to go about things, because of the problems associated with dashed expectations. And in the American system, if there is not the option to dump the administration when the public loses patience with the policy or the handling thereof, the second recourse is to the Congress. Hence my strong sense of executive responsibility in such cases -- because that second option is sub-optimal.

[Steve Blair]

Neither am I particularly keen on putting them in charge of running a war, and I agree that their track record doesn't bode well for them getting much right. Several hundred people as CINC? Ugh. But in cases where they have stepped in to muck things up, the action was in response to a backlash from the public, and it was, in each of the cases of Vietnam and Gulf 2, after giving the Executive Branch several years to pursue its policy. In Vietnam, the American public was pretty supportive -- until Tet put the lie to the Light at the End of the Tunnel. I would submit that the American public gave this administration's policy a fair shake -- given the various lines that were coming out of the administration -- before losing patience.

That's what any administration needs to remember about the American public -- you have to be mostly on target on the level of commitment and how long it will take, and certainly don't give them false hope, because the people get very impatient when that is dashed. FDR never promised anything about WWII -- it was "for the duration," and nobody thought the duration was just about to end at any point. Possibly that's why the collective memory of the war is so positive -- given the enormity of the conflict, for the Americans it probably ended sooner than expected.

The bottom line is that managing public perception and support is a significant piece of the strategic picture in the American case. And as tempting as it is to use optimism as a means of building the right image of the policy and maintaining positive feelings towards it, it's a very risky way to go about things, because of the problems associated with dashed expectations. And in the American system, if there is not the option to dump the administration when the public loses patience with the policy or the handling thereof, the second recourse is to the Congress. Hence my strong sense of executive responsibility in such cases -- because that second option is sub-optimal.

True to a degree, but this still does not answer the question of the accountability of Congress. Who took them to task for selling South Vietnam down the drain? That's really my basic thrust with this. Once Congress steps in, any possibility of accountability disappears. I agree completely with executive responsibility, but I don't see much of a balance in Congress with a "get out of jail free" card. This is especially true with the Senate, which often has years between elections to cover their tracks.

With Word War II, one thing most people don't remember is that FDR flew in the face of public opinion by putting Europe first. One reason he didn't declare war on Germany initially is that there was little real public or Congressional support for it. It took Pearl Harbor, and Hitler's ill-advised declaration of war on the US, to give him that window.

Tet is an interesting case, and one that will be debated for many years yet. I tend to fall into the camp that feels that Tet was really a military victory for the US and SVN, even though it obviously ended up a political loss of major proportions. Tet exposed much of the VC infrastructure, and saw it destroyed in the bargain. That may not matter in the historical long run, but it's an interesting balancing factor.

[Culpeper]

"There is a lot of "He's" in that statement."

The three Presidents in question were men. I didn't think the grammatically neutral he/she was necessary.

"Even the "America First Committee" which included Charles Lindbergh, objected to FDR declaring war against Nazi Germany."

Hence FDR did not make the first move to declare war on Nazi Germany. Note, the speech that Lindbergh was meant to give on 12 December in support of the America First movement was cancelled, and Lindbergh sought to be reinstated as an officer as America went to war against the Axis powers. The America First Committee disbanded in the face of the declarations of war against the US. They didn't have much of a leg to stand on in terms of convincing the American public to support their agenda. And, throughout the war, FDR (another he) and his administration did a pretty good job of maintaining public support -- notwithstanding some pretty withering criticisms from, for example, the Hearst newspapers (featuring, on occasion, Doug McCarthy, who spoke out in an article in one of them on the incompetence of the Navy/Marine Corps amphibious ConOps in the aftermath of Tarawa).

Russell Weigley posits the notion of an American Way OF War (American in Bellum, if you will). I would submit that there is an American Way TO War (American ad Bellum) -- that is, the best way that America goes to war -- usually in response to an "unprovoked" attack, which awakens the sleeping giant from its peaceful slumber to fight the evil in great righteousness. Americans, I would submit, aren't altogether keen on the idea of being the first to cross the line of departure, but neither are they particularly keen to turn the other cheek once they've been kicked upside the head.

Lindbergh's speech he canceled due to Pearl Harbor.

also:

In a speech at an America First rally on 11 September 1941 in Des Moines entitled "Who Are the War Agitators?" Lindbergh claimed that the three groups who had been "pressing this country toward war [were] the British, the Jewish and the Roosevelt Administration"

It sort of hard to vindicate Lindbergh when he would apparently blame everything on the old cliche of the Jews and who ever happens to be President.

Lindbergh served his country during WWII first as a civilian consultant to aviation companies and later participated in bombing raids in the Pacific but still as a civilian. This period was about six months in length.

[Sargent]

True to a degree, but this still does not answer the question of the accountability of Congress. Who took them to task for selling South Vietnam down the drain? That's really my basic thrust with this. Once Congress steps in, any possibility of accountability disappears. I agree completely with executive responsibility, but I don't see much of a balance in Congress with a "get out of jail free" card. This is especially true with the Senate, which often has years between elections to cover their tracks.

With Word War II, one thing most people don't remember is that FDR flew in the face of public opinion by putting Europe first. One reason he didn't declare war on Germany initially is that there was little real public or Congressional support for it. It took Pearl Harbor, and Hitler's ill-advised declaration of war on the US, to give him that window.

Tet is an interesting case, and one that will be debated for many years yet. I tend to fall into the camp that feels that Tet was really a military victory for the US and SVN, even though it obviously ended up a political loss of major proportions. Tet exposed much of the VC infrastructure, and saw it destroyed in the bargain. That may not matter in the historical long run, but it's an interesting balancing factor.

I don't disagree with your points on Congress -- I don't know how to solve the problem either.

Yes, FDR did have a problem putting Europe first -- both before and after Pearl Harbor. In the end, although that was the official strategy, the Allies ended up fighting both theatres simultaneously. And, to a degree, the Pacific theatre was the one in which the Allies could begin the substantive fight more effectively first.

As for Tet, there is an intermediate picture that is often missed between the we won the military fight/lost the strategic battle. If you look at Truong Nhu Tang's memoir (_A Viet Cong Memoir_), the dedicated South Vietnamese nationalist/communist fighters were not particularly interested in uniting all of Vietnam under the North's regime. The North was aware of this. So, to an extent, by defeating the VC/NLF during Tet, we solved a problem for Hanoi. We made certain that if we did exit precipitously or before the matter was settled that Hanoi would have an easier time over-running the South and uniting the entire country under its regime. (We also probably had a hand in radicalizing that regime, but that's another matter entirely.) This was the NLF's great disappointment in 1975.

This seems to be something that certain segments of the Iraqi resistance have come to understand in the current fight. Isn't this what the Shia Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq party was aiming at in dropping the "Revolution" from their name? To distance themselves from Iran?

One thing that I've come to believe about the Vietnam War is that there were two wars going on -- one fought by the North, one fought by the South Vietnamese nationalist insurgents. The latter war was the one the US missed. It was also the one we probably didn't need to fight.