One strategic lesson for the US should be this:

"Military capacity built in support of a fundamentally illegitimate government by a foreign power cannot stand up to a legitimate foreign challenger, or an illegal domestic challenger perceived as legitimate by it's followers."

Consider the track record of the United States in this regard. Since emerging on the global stage in 1900 the United States implemented a strategy of creating governance we perceived as good for US interests and the development of military capacity to secure those de facto illegitimate governments in the following places:

Philippine Islands, 1900-1941: Defeated by the Japanese in short order (though the subsequent Filipino resistance for far more legitimate rationale proved quite strong)
Vietnam 1955-1975
Iraq 2003 - present
Afghanistan 2001 - present

All with the same result. Helping a sovereign partner with governance perceived by it's population as legitimate is a good investment in regional security. We have a solid track record of this with many nations around the globe. But investing in the security of governance lacking in popular legitimacy as in the four examples above is a proven failure.


As to ISIL vs AQ: AQ conducted a non-state approach to UW, and their great strength was their non-state status. It gave them sanctuary from state action, having no territory or population to defend; and it relieved them of the duties of governance having no territory or population to govern. But to win they had to become tangible, and that would destroy both these strengths, so they remained the champion of a virtual Caliphate.

ISIL, on the other hand, sought purposely to create and emerge as a de facto state, and a tangible nucleus for a physical "Caliphate" (the names scares us, but in effect little more than a state dedicated to the laws and values of Sunni Muslims that is free from excessive external influence). This resonated with the same revolutionary movements and populations engaged by AQ, and many, grown weary of the promise of virtual Caliphate, are embracing the opportunity for something real that ISIL offers. This is the strength of the ISIL state-based approach to UW; but it also saddles them with the burden of governance, and gives them all the liabilities common to small, weak states.

I don't think the West has accurately characterized either organization, and have therefore not handled either particularly well. We exaggerate the dangers, we confuse the rationale for their existence and appeal, and we seek to make them be what we want them to be, rather than to deal with them for what they actually are.

How well ISIL fights is actually a clear metric of the inherent legitimacy they possess. We would do well to ponder on that thought.