Hamid Hussain a regular contributor comments:
As usual, after Seymour Hersh’s piece about OBL killing, many good friends asked few questions. I thought Hersh’s story will get some traction for a while but it didn’t last even two weeks. Anyway, my two cents below
Due to size his commentary is in two parts.

Four weeks ago, veteran investigative journalist Seymour Hersh published account of killing of Osama bin Ladin (OBL) in London Review of Books. Hersh disputes official versions of Pakistan and United States and claims a massive cover up. Hersh is a well known investigative journalist and his two most important works were uncovering of My Li massacre in Vietnam and prisoner torture at Abu Gharaib prison. However, some of his most recent works especially imminent U.S. attack on Iran proved to be incorrect. In his recent work, Hersh’s admit that he doesn’t have any conclusive proof about his conclusions but believes his sources.

Hersh’s main sources of information include one retired senior U.S. intelligence official who only had knowledge about the initial intelligence about OBL and two consultants to Special Operations Command. Hersh gives opinion of few others especially The New York Times reporter Carlotta Gall that she was told by a Pakistani official that Pasha knew about the raid and a Pakistani author Imtiaz Gul’s statement that four Pakistani intelligence operatives told him that they believed that Pakistani military must have knowledge of the operation although they had no proof. Hersh is not on a solid ground but rather on thin ice with these sources. However, there are many aspects of Hersh’s story which are true and he raises many genuine questions which are still unanswered. Answers of such questions about covert operations usually take decades but we are living in the age of Julian Assange, Private Bradley (now Chelsea) Manning and Edward Snowden and hope that we may find answers sooner than later.

Hersh’s main conclusions are;

- CIA learned about OBL from a former senior Pakistani intelligence officer who betrayed the secret for the $25 million reward.

One retired Brigadier/Major General rank officer who served with Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) settled with his family in United States around that time period. However, many Pakistanis including army officers migrate to United States and Canada and though there is suspicion about this particular officer but no one is sure. All the evidence suggests that no one was sure about the identity of OBL and if true, it is most likely that this officer had some suspicion and he shared this with Americans. It is not clear whether he met Americans in Islamabad or in Dubai? I’m pretty sure that this officer had retired and was not serving at ISI at the time he contacted Americans. There is some confusion about the events as Americans used some retired Pakistani army and police officers for surveillance of OBL compound. However, these officers had no idea about the identity of the resident of the compound. It has been suggested that this team was also moved out of Pakistan just before the launching of the operation.

- OBL was prisoner of ISI since 2006. He was in Hindu Kush mountains from 2001 to 2006 and ISI got hold of him by bribing local tribal people. However, Saudi Arabia paid for his upkeep. Pakistan wanted to keep OBL as a hostage to ensure that al-Qaeda and Taliban stayed in their own lane. If they deviated then Pakistan would hand over OBL to United States for some kind of a deal in future. Saudi Arabia wanted to keep OBL out of U.S. reach for fear of their own connection with OBL. Pakistanis were worried that Washington may learn from Saudis while Saudis were fearful that Washington may learn from Pakistanis.

If we believe this version of events then ISI officials even if small in numbers from 2006 to 2011, some local tribesmen and members of Saudi royal family as well as U.S. officials were in the loop since 2006. Even if we keep to bare minimum considering compartmentalization of intelligence apparatus, it will still include at least several dozen individuals from three different countries. This is very unlikely and the weakest link is local tribesmen. Tribesmen are selling the information to anyone who is holding the purse. Intelligence agencies of many western countries, Afghanistan, India, Saudi Arabia and Iran get all kind of information from local sources. After getting money from Pakistan, these tribesmen would be running to everybody and his cousin to get the mother load of cash for OBL information. OBL never trusted tribesmen on both sides of the Durand Line.

If Pakistanis were holding OBL as an insurance against al-Qaeda and Taliban attacks on Pakistani targets then this theory doesn’t hold any water. In fact from year 2006 to 2011, Pakistani security establishment saw a string of very high profile attacks from al-Qaeda as well as Taliban. The list includes bombing of an army recruiting center at Dargai in November 2006, bombing of a bus carrying employees of ISI in Rawalpindi in September 2007, bombing of a mess of Special Services Group (SSG) at Tarbela in September 2007, bombing of ISI regional headquarters at Peshawar in Novemebr 2009, bombing of ISI office in Multan in December 2009, bombing of police headquarters and ISI office in Lahore in May 2009, attack on army’s General Head Quarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi when General Kayani was in his office in October 2009 and in December 2009 militants attacked a mosque in cantonment area of Rawalpindi killing several army officers including a Major General, a Brigadier and two Lieutenant Colonels. In addition, a serving Lieutenant General (Surgeon General), former commander of SSG Major General Amir Faisal Alvi and Major General Muhammad Bilal were assassinated by militants. In a two weeks time period, militants targeted three serving Brigadiers in Islamabad area killing Brigadier Moinuddin Ahmad while Brigadier Waqar Ahmad Malik and Brigadier Sohail Ahmad survived the bullets of the assassins. These are examples of only high profile attacks on military installations and individuals and does not include countless bombings that killed hundreds of policemen, paramilitary forces and civilians. These facts simply demolish the myth that OBL was parked in Abbottabad by Pakistani army brass as leverage against al-Qaeda or Taliban.


- Then Pakistan Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani and then DGISI Lieutenant General Ahmad Shuja Pasha cooperated with Americans in operation. They provided blood sample of OBL to Americans to confirm identity of OBL, provided all details of the compound, ensured no resistance, made sure that the SEALS helicopters reached Abbottabad without triggering any alarms and provided a liaison office for CIA at Tarbela Ghazi; a site of ISI covert operations. Pakistani cooperation in the operation included allowing two Chinook helicopters to park at ISI covert operation base at Tarbela Ghazi, a Pakistani ISI liaison officer accompanied SEAL team in helicopter from Afghanistan and ISI guards of the compound were told to leave the compound as soon as they heard the noise of helicopter rotors.

If we accept this version then we have to accept that several dozen officers from the rank of army chief to sepoys guarding the compound were in the loop. Tarbela is where Special Services Group (SSG) has a base and to my knowledge there is no specific site at Tarbela for any activities or training of ISI. At different time periods, some small American technical teams were embedded with Pakistanis troops for signal intelligence and intercepting militant communications. If Pakistanis had already arranged everything for the Americans from confirming OBLs identity with blood test, details of the compound, and a safe passage to all helicopters and sending all guards on furlough on the night of operation, do they still need to put an ISI liaison officer on the American chopper probably to give them directions. The man on chopper was a Pushtu speaking American posted with a SEAL outside the compound to speak to locals in their language in case anybody came inquiring about the action. It is most likely that even he didn’t know about the nature of the operation or the identity of OBL until the show was over.

- Kayani only asked the Americans to bring in a small team and make sure to kill OBL. In addition, killing of OBL should be kept secret for about seven days and then a carefully crafted cover story should be released announcing that OBL is killed in a drone strike in Hindu Kush on Afghan side of the border. The reason Pakistan army wanted to use this cover because OBL was a hero to many Pakistanis.

I’m not convinced that Pakistanis wanted to embark on such a complicated course for such a flimsy reason.

- Pasha told Americans that he could not keep OBL in the compound any longer as too many people in Pakistani high command knew about his presence. Head of air defense command and many local commanders were fully briefed by Kayani and Pasha about the whole mission.

Such type of sensitive operation cannot be kept secret if so many people are involved.