Future Peer Competitor?

[Steve Blair]

In terms of the two air component discussion, I'd think we'd do better to either increase Marine or Navy air assets to fill the COIN role. By chopping A-10s to Marine Air, and increasing the amount of medium and light lift aircraft they can operate (airframes of C-130 and smaller size) I think you'd hit a good balance. You could do the same with Navy air, although it would have to be land-based (which would cause a different set of problems to be sure). Giving the Army an increased medium to light lift capability would help, and also free up AF project funds for their own uses.

My fear with splitting the AF in that way is that you'd see the SAC vs. TAC mentality all over again, with MAC left out in the cold to get by with what was left over. If the AF doesn't want to deal with COIN now (and I have yet to be convinced that the majority of the service really DOES want to deal with it...there are of course exceptions), I can't see how splitting the funding between two "branches" of the AF would improve the situation. Keep the AF ready for major conflicts (as in more conventional engagements) and strip some of their small wars capability away and chop it to services (or branches) that have it as a day-to-day concern.

We may have to agree to disagree on some of these points, because I still do think that some of the AF's problems when it comes to airframe age and the like are of their own making (banking the future of the force on high-tech that takes decades to come down the pipeline and is subject to silver bullet design theories...an issue that in all fairness does impact the other services as well...like the Osprey, FCS, and other programs).

[FascistLibertarian]

There is no reason the US Navy has to be as big as it is. The concept that it must be able to fight two wars at the same time is just there to justify military spending.
The American M.I.C. is big government spending to prop up the economy. I agree America must stay ahead of its rivals but right now there is not arms race.
It makes no sense that the Army is funded less than the Navy and the Air Force when its being asked to do the most.
Think how many infantry could be trained and equiped for one f22.
In general the US M.I.C. needs more oversight, goals, and less pork.
just my 2 cents.

[LawVol]

I agree America must stay ahead of its rivals but right now there is not arms race.
It makes no sense that the Army is funded less than the Navy and the Air Force when its being asked to do the most.
Think how many infantry could be trained and equiped for one f22.
In general the US M.I.C. needs more oversight, goals, and less pork.
just my 2 cents.

I'm not so sure I buy into your statement that there isn't an arms race. Certainly it is not in the same vein as during the Cold War, but China has increased its military spending dramatically. Recently studies I've read indicate that China is looking beyond a Tiawan scenario. Whether this is global or only regional, it still presents a problem for us. They've increased their ballistic missle capability, are looking into a true blue water navy, and are now seeking to challenge us in space. Now some of this is really years down the road, but I don't really want to give them a head start. However, in the space realm, the anti-satellite shot is a significant development. They've destroyed a satellite with a moblie launcher. Imagine a non-state actor with that capability (it can be sold). Whether in a COIN environment or a big war, knocking out one of our comm or GPS satellites would cause significant problems. The AF is looking into ways to develop mini-satellites that can be more quickly launched to replace destroyed or damaged ones, but guess what it takes? That's right, money. You might have a fully trained division, but what are they going to do with no comm and no GPS?

I don't know how much it takes to train up a division (or what an F-22 costs for that matter) but let's assume they're equal for the moment. What's the shelf life of your division? My F-22 will last about 25-30 years. Sure this really isn't an equal basis argument but it makes my point. Your division requires an influx of new people that need new training. Yes, the F-22 will require upgrades, but in the long run I think we make out quite well. Besides, how many F-22s are you willing to trade? Our F-15s are already approaching the 30 year mark and the Chinese have a new J-10 and something on the way. If we do fight them, do you want to trust air superiority to a 30 year old plane? How effective is your division going to be without that?

And now to the "do the most" comment. While I certainly agree that kicking down doors has much more risk than fueling or maintaining a jet (and my old grunt side has much respect for those guys), let's not lose sight of the fact that everyone has a different job. Quite frackly, I do not want avionics mechanic tapped to an Army line unit. Its a wasted talent. This mechanic, and alot more like him, are needed to keep our aircraft flying. The same aircraft that provides top cover, airlift, ISR, etc.--all the stuff groundpounders tend to take for granted (I did). BTW, alot of these same guys were maintaining the same aircraft back in Desert Storm. Alot of folks like to forget that the AF has been fighting in Iraq since 1991. Sure it wasn't the same as it is now, but our aircraft don't know the difference between flying a routine patrol or actually dropping bombs. Flying is flying and it all provides wear and tear. I don't recall hearing AF guys saying anything about the Army not "doing the most" from 1992-2001. They simply understood that deploying to support no-fly zones was their duty.

As for oversight, goals, and less pork, I couldn't agree more.

[Steve Blair]

Just to bite onto this one...divisions and F-22s both require the same constant flow of cash. I was at Ellsworth when the B-1 came online, and they had to remodel many of the hangers to accommodate it. I expect that they are doing the same thing with the F-22. Add into that the training of the pilots AND the maintainers (which has to be reaccomplished every time someone leaves the service or there's an upgrade to the systems) and you see the same kind of rolling cost. That same division is most likely using the same equipment (at Fort Riley in the late 1990s an O-6 visited the motor pool and found the same 5-ton truck he'd driven as an O-1 in Vietnam, by way of an example) over the same span as the F-22 is in service. So everyone really faces the same issue when it comes to that. FL's comparison isn't really valid in that sense.

And the navy's been operating at more or less the same clip as the AF during the same period (possibly higher if you consider evacuations and disaster relief efforts in addition to normal cruises). I for one tend to worry about the retirement of things like the A-6 and F-14...all in hopes that the F-35 will be what it's advertised to be. If LV is correct that we take air superiority for granted, I'd say we have the same blind spot when it comes to control of the seas and the ability to project a pretty massive strike into a region (complete with a sizable ground force component) with very little notice.

[Ski]

Agree with Steve - DoD cannot even be audited at this point, so the comparison can (and has been widely) made that it's just throwing more money into a very deep if not bottomless pit.

Personally, I like simplicity and easy maintenance in equipment. I see millions of lines of code in new procurement programs and I shudder. I hear first hand reports of the difficulty in sustaining qualified people on some of the ABCS equipment and I get worried. I see hundreds of private contractors working as maintenance techs on certain pieces of equipment, and I start to wonder if we can sustain a fighting force in a high intensity war. I look at the time it takes to bring new equipment into the line units (especially major end items), and the lack of facilities and factories that actually create the equipment, and I understand why we have backlogs at the few depots that are up and running.

But the bottom line is that if I was to wargame the United States, the absolute last thing I'd do would be to fight us conventionally. You'd have to be a stone cold moron to do that when there is a proven record of success or at least a draw when someone fights the US in a counterinsurgency since the 1960's.

But again, what is a peer competitor?

[Rob Thornton]

From Facsist Libertarian:

There is no reason the US Navy has to be as big as it is. The concept that it must be able to fight two wars at the same time is just there to justify military spending.

Why don't you think the US Navy needs to be the size it is? There are plenty of arguments that our ship building capability is in danger, and that there are not enough ships and subs to do the work we ask them to do.

The Navy tends to be a bit more low key in their role in GWOT - although the CBGs in the Persian Gulf keeping it from being anything else but a designation for that body of water are related. Their humanitarian role in the Tsunami may have garnered us more positive IO then anything else we've done lately. Their EW and intercept use, their role as a secure base for C2 of operations, their ability to offer bases of operations when the neighborhood is tricky, their role in NEOs whne there are no friendly bases around, many people are still building and buying SSNs and will probably buy/build SSBNs - since everybody wants a nuke. Firing a cruise missile is a handy option for policy. It seems to me the Navy has a strong case for growth with all the foreign policy challenges we have.

Any Navy folks out there want to share their thoughts - certainly from a historic perspective they have played a large role in America's Small Wars. If anybody can do a ship to task list that indicates we need a Jeffersonian Navy - I'd be happy to hear it. Guarenteeing a Sea LOC is available when you need it (and we do allot of shipping) is pretty important for a capitalist economy.

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Ski -

But again, what is a peer competitor?

Rand Study on peer competitor

Excerpt

The potential emergence of a peer competitor is probably the most important long-term planning challenge for the Department of Defense. This report addresses the issue by developing a conceptual framework of how a proto-peer (meaning a state that is not yet a peer but has the potential to become one) might interact with the hegemon (the dominant global power). ...

Or you can take my Bog-tagz definition - its a guy who competes for the same things you do and threatens to fill your environmental niche using capabilities which can challenge you. There are four types as I understand it - near peer - which speeks to somebody who has exploited niche technologies ("exploited" has a wide definintion) which can offer you pain, and Peer - which means he's in the same grade as you. Also used are regional and global to describe the influence of said peer.

But the bottom line is that if I was to wargame the United States, the absolute last thing I'd do would be to fight us conventionally. You'd have to be a stone cold moron to do that when there is a proven record of success or at least a draw when someone fights the US in a counterinsurgency since the 1960's.

I agree with you, but I'm not sure that stops a potential enemy from building and retaining a conventional capability - they are useful beyond just preparing for us. Most of our enemies have natural enemies in their own neighborhood, and it might be nice to have some conventional stuff around when your own population decides you have stolen enough. I sort of like the Iranian model - You've got a little bit of everything - a well trained, dedicated and fanatic para-military that can also inform on the people and slip across the border to destabilize neighbors, an investment in reasonably good conventional hardware you are getting on the cheap through the promise of providing fossil fuels, and you are developing nuclear weapons so anybody who screws with you must contend with that - oh and as an auxillary you support a powerful non-state terrorist group through a partner state who stymied what most westerners consider to be a first rate military power. These guys have clearly done their homework. Anybody looked at the Zagros mountains as a place to go rock climbing - that is ugly terrain- unless you are defending in them, or using them as a base of operation for an insugency.

[Granite_State]

Hey Ski -

I sort of like the Iranian model - You've got a little bit of everything - a well trained, dedicated and fanatic para-military that can also inform on the people and slip across the border to destabilize neighbors, an investment in reasonably good conventional hardware you are getting on the cheap through the promise of providing fossil fuels, and you are developing nuclear weapons so anybody who screws with you must contend with that - oh and as an auxillary you support a powerful non-state terrorist group through a partner state who stymied what most westerners consider to be a first rate military power. These guys have clearly done their homework. Anybody looked at the Zagros mountains as a place to go rock climbing - that is ugly terrain- unless you are defending in them, or using them as a base of operation for an insugency.

Great observation. Be interesting to see if others (Chavez?) head in the same direction.

[120mm]

Two of the above posters included the words "more oversight" and "less pork" in a sentence. I wish you wouldn't do that. I would suggest that inverse is more likely. "more oversight" probably equals "more pork".

I am currently embroiled in a "paper scandal". The army is spending tens of thousands of dollars at my place of work, in order to save a few hundred dollars in paper.

Coincidentally, all my co-workers just spent nearly two weeks doing Local Quarters Allowance paperwork that probably saved the government $2000, total. 10 x 80 hours contract labor is considerably greater than $2000.

I would suggest that trusting people to do the best job possible, and prosecuting to the extreme those who violate public trust would be a more cost effective, and possibly just effective way to save public monies.

[Rob Thornton]

We had DR. Milan Vego from the Naval War College guest lecture this morning on Naval Theory and theorists. As the morning progressed it struck me how relevant the discussions (particularly the sidebars that were generated) were to this thread. One thing that really struck me was the question of: Does our pursuit of means (in our culture this might mean a quantum technological leap forward) determine the limits of our strategy, or should our strategy determine the means we pursue?

One of the things discussed was the Navy’s pursuit of the Littoral Combat Ship and nuclear submarines. Both are very expensive, and both have been debated in regards to futures type strategy – Seapower 21, Airpower 21, Force 21, NCW, etc. The idea that a vastly capable platform has “savings” over multiple technologically inferior platforms – read the LCS, a FCS BCT, JSF/F-22 because they are networked and can leverage technology.

Since we have hit the budget and that the amount of the Nation’s budget spent on Defense is hard to change (you’d probably need an existential threat to convince the public), then you have a choice to make in regards of quality (perceived or real) over quantity (generally proven and more affordable tech – but requiring more people). I think this is an important because while we are very engaged in a single theater, there are other strategic challenges that are evolving – you can call them peer or near peer, but what I think is important is that there are states and non-states who are looking to take advantage and have decided that this is a good opportunity because the one cop that is always on the beat is pretty busy.

We live in a world of finite resources. People covet those resources and as much as we’d prefer to come to an amicable co-usage of those resources, it seems biological to anticipate your greater needs and to try and secure an advantage, if for nothing else, out of fear. While we hope diplomacy and economic benefits will point out the advantages (first among them avoidance of the costs of war), it is a longer road, and there will probably be those who feel disenfranchised, or just don’t want to wait. Some will feel as though they should not have to wait for something they believe is inherently theirs. Some will mistake the reaction of others and see a bloodless gain bought by inability and apathy from others.

So no matter if we are discussing small wars or big wars, the imbalance brought about by pursuing an acquisition strategy which might allow us to gain superiority in a specific location while limiting our ability to respond to multiple challenges forces us into the uncomfortable game of guessing which place is more important to be. Given the multitude of competing state interests in pursuit of resources and given the viral spread of destabilizing non-state entities, are we building a force which we will be too scared to use/commit as an instrument of policy, and which once used will be too expensive (or too difficult) to reconstitute either through loss, or over-usage? I think a force that is too expensive in those terms may not be a very good policy tool, and may put us at a disadvantage as we try and respond to too much with too little.
Dr. Vego had a great observation about WWII. By the destruction of our battleships at Pearl Harbor, the Japanese forced us out of a Mahanian pursuit of a major capitol ship engagement, and into exploiting the advantages of the Aircraft Carrier. This is not to advocate the use of Airpower in the Pacific Theater, but that of breaking away from accepted notions that no longer conform to environmental realities. There is a danger in building your strategy to justify acquisition – it’s a leap of faith of an unknown height. Where national security is concerned, it may be a technological “bridge too far”. I thought about his observation and I wondered if OIF and OEF might be a sort of Pearl Harbor catalyst to consider how we wage war, and how to regain balance between investing in the people who fight war and the technology which provides us advantages.

[Granite_State]

Agree with Steve - DoD cannot even be audited at this point, so the comparison can (and has been widely) made that it's just throwing more money into a very deep if not bottomless pit.

Personally, I like simplicity and easy maintenance in equipment. I see millions of lines of code in new procurement programs and I shudder. I hear first hand reports of the difficulty in sustaining qualified people on some of the ABCS equipment and I get worried. I see hundreds of private contractors working as maintenance techs on certain pieces of equipment, and I start to wonder if we can sustain a fighting force in a high intensity war. I look at the time it takes to bring new equipment into the line units (especially major end items), and the lack of facilities and factories that actually create the equipment, and I understand why we have backlogs at the few depots that are up and running.

But the bottom line is that if I was to wargame the United States, the absolute last thing I'd do would be to fight us conventionally. You'd have to be a stone cold moron to do that when there is a proven record of success or at least a draw when someone fights the US in a counterinsurgency since the 1960's.

But again, what is a peer competitor?

I like Rob's definition. I'd basically say a peer is someone who is, maybe not an existential challenge, in the sense that I think invading the U.S. is virtually impossible, but someone who can fight you on your level, in terms of both technology and military size and effectiveness. I don't see how anyone is getting to that level anytime soon, and even if they do, I agree with Van Creveld that the advent of nuclear weapons has fundamentally changed the rules of the game. You don't see great power wars anymore, because the stakes are too high.