Ah...the truth concerning Russian loses in the Ukraine came out ans then "suddenly" disappeared.
RU paper 'Delovaya Zhizn' removed article on 2,000 Russian warriors KIA & 3,200 WIA in combat in east #Ukraine [pic] pic.twitter.com/CJhsTblIjm
Kohver, #Sentsov, #Savchenko - victims of #Putin's jihad against int'l rules, norms and law http://www.rferl.org/content/meet-pu.../27197872.html … pic.twitter.com/mtLCeurrNi
Ah...the truth concerning Russian loses in the Ukraine came out ans then "suddenly" disappeared.
RU paper 'Delovaya Zhizn' removed article on 2,000 Russian warriors KIA & 3,200 WIA in combat in east #Ukraine [pic] pic.twitter.com/CJhsTblIjm
20:30 #Maryinka @hyeva_maryinka [vk] Boarding school: machine guns. #Krasnohorivka: boomsOriginally Posted by OUTLAW 09
Avdeevka shooting started 20:40 https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/sta...33258028670976 …
VIDEO: Results of shelling from GRAD MLRS - Avdiivkahttps://m.youtube.com/watch?v=hINkLT3dAeQ … pic.twitter.com/C1l4w2sCtL
besides tankers, low loaders hauling 3 T-80 to Donetsk from Zhdanivka https://twitter.com/KornerSe/status/636242574639022080 …
21:25 #Donetsk @postz5 fighting started
Krasnogorivka 21:00 no changes, machineguns, occasional heavy booms https://twitter.com/hyeva_maryinka/s...41643398672384 …
Spotter for militant attack in Donetsk region confesses - watch on - http://uatoday.tv http://uatoday.tv/crime/shelling-of-sartana-481054.html …
Avdeevka, Peski, maybe Mariinka - be prepared, it's gonna be loud. https://twitter.com/LuftGanze/status/636244567323484160 …
20:30 #Russia|n's beginning to spread false information of Ukrainian attacks - Worrying given #Russian build up https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/sta...35293746704384 …
LNR in Luhansk prepared for "UA advance". a lot of equipment, counterstrike planned. No dates given. Gonna be scary https://twitter.com/Karlik_Pu/status/636246993489293312 …
Donetsk 21:20
Outgoing fire from Trudovsky https://twitter.com/77bot1/status/636247410826739712 …
3 loaders carried T-72s. passed Mayak in Donetsk. we're waiting them near Peski. https://twitter.com/sex_Dombas/statu...43221883056129 …
Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 08-25-2015 at 07:08 PM.
Aroz---
BTW--working late tonight in a major switching center, listening to Eurodance music out of Australia--- Energy FM Australia--, trying to type this on a German keyboard with no English spell check that wants to capitalize a word when it thinks the word is German and needs a capitalization.
Ah.. the life of a networker on a long night shift---company owner working right along with his team ---who would have thought that these days---but it beats the heck out of my previous "life".
For those that do not know it--the IT break fix world also has a "war room" and uses military terms when fighting a major issue and as my team is all Swedish which is strange for this business and all certified White Hat hackers ---so the long all nighters are rather interesting as about 0300 the pizzas will be coming in-somehow they can exist only on pizzas.
Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 08-25-2015 at 06:47 PM.
This Is What New Massive Escalation In East Ukraine Looks Like
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Nub...CjqBC-&index=5 …
#Mariupol pic.twitter.com/vllcMhGl7D
Despite its counterterrorism tough talk, Russia has been sending jihadis from the North Caucasus to Syria: http://www.thedailybeast.com/article...r.html?via=ios …
Various reports of telecoms networks down in eastern Ukraine tonight. We ask our Electronic Warfare monitoring team for news, but no reply!!
We have (had?) a secure channel, but it appears it's being actively blocked by Russian EW from unknown source/location. Bummer!
Will be posting in the next few days a summary of key points taken out of the Russian "New Generation Warfare" and "informational warfare" current doctrine that we in the West in the discussion on the Russian UW strategy "non linear warfare" have largely overlooked in our discussions that help in placing into context Russian military activities in eastern Ukraine..
10 April: Russian invaders built pontoon bridge across Siverskyi Donets River to secretly deploy weapons in Donbas http://en.censor.net.ua/photo_news/3...pons_in_donbas …
15 million roubles for doing the #Kremlin’s dirty work in #Ukraine? http://khpg.org/index.php?id=1440447628 …
#Girkin pic.twitter.com/4HkUe41W1N
From Kremlin-armed Donbas militants to millionaire criminal bosses :: http://khpg.org http://khpg.org/index.php?id=1440447628 …
OSCE fixed 120 civilian trucks which transported Ukrainian coal to Russia https://twitter.com/unian/status/636235317289320449 …
Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 08-25-2015 at 07:08 PM.
The 'fog of war' thickens
MAP---
NSDC Claims Russian Troops Have Set Up Pontoon Bridges On Seversky Donets River http://bit.ly/1Nza11i pic.twitter.com/Omfibcn2Cp
Krasnohorivka 22:07
Shooting.
Noisy, almost non-stop. https://twitter.com/arthurnkua/statu...53675783122946 …
Donetsk 22:19
From Zasyadko mine - Mineralne area ruscist artillery battery working, at least 4 guns https://twitter.com/nixer79/status/636257366305079296 …
Avdiivka 22:20
Incoming, in city center https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/sta...56985093173248 …
Donetsk 22:18
Buzz heard from Motel area, equipment on move https://twitter.com/Dusya60000018/st...56775679922177 …
22:28
BMP on move from Abakumova mine settl. towards #Staromykhailivka https://twitter.com/hyeva_maryinka/s...59213484945409 …
22:20 Donetsk north @UkraineSuper1 outgoing [salvos]
Krasnohorivka
22:00 Machine guns now more intense
22:11 Volleys from something heavy https://twitter.com/hyeva_maryinka/s...58305917235200 …
Makeevka 22:16 Artillery began shooting, smwh in W suburbs (Mineralne-Zemlyanka?)
22:35 After ~20 shots calmed down https://twitter.com/VasyaMakeevskiy/...56539599179777 …
Donetsk: More military equippment on the move + outgoing artillery fire
22:41
In #Staroignatievka area loud, shelling https://twitter.com/062_Region/statu...62119206481920 …
Donetsk 22:33
#Pisky, airport - battle. Small arms, mortars. https://twitter.com/062_Region/statu...60053796945920 …
Volnovakha 22:39
"Here we go. Artillery started" https://twitter.com/solomazheka/stat...61586458554378 …
22:39 #Staroignatievka #Starohnativka
Volleys closer and stronger https://twitter.com/Staroignatievca/...61628036689921 …
Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 08-25-2015 at 07:50 PM.
Got to get back to my real job--heavy shellings are being reported all along the eastern front lines and heavy equipment is on the move.
Will pick up the reporting in the next day or so.
Still not a single major comment and or statement by Obama, his NSC, Hollande and Merkel about the shellings and figthting.
Sounds idyllic...
Firstly, I think that the White House is concerned that any unilateral moves might face headwinds from certain EU/NATO "partners". The Kremlin is very determined to extricate the US from Europe and to dismantle both the EU and NATO. Any US involvement beyond the "allied" consensus would serve Russia's initiative. I realize that these are the same European governments that were over-eager to overthrow Ghaddafi, and depended upon US logistical support and SEAD during their little adventure, and who now seem to think Ukraine is someone else's problem.
Secondly, the US has been ambiguous about responses to a Russian/Separatist advance beyond the Minsk II boundaries e.g. towards Kharkiv, Mariupol and/or Odesa. Its "partners" have been silent. However, it is worth noting that if the US announced its responses (e.g. anti-tank weapons, counter-battery radars, exclusion from SWIFT, etc.), Russia would have time to undermine support for any or all of these measures. There is enough discussion of these options, however, to signal to the Kremlin that there will be a firm response. Therefore, it is Putin that is guessing this time around. This could explain why the separatists' Marinka offensive was supposedly countermanded by the Russians.
Thirdly, there is a scenario whereby the screws on Russia's economy are turned too tightly and provoke a collapse of the government. At that stage all those 1990s thrillers about rogue Russian generals with nuclear warheads will start to sound less fantastical. On the one hand, Russia can't get away with invading and annexing its neighbors; on the other, we don't want to help spawn a rogue or failed state with thousands of nuclear weapons.
2k Russian dead and 3.2k invalids
Whoops:Link:http://www.independent.co.uk/news/wo...-10472603.htmlAccording to Forbes, Russian news site Business Life (Delovaya Zhizn) revealed what seem to be official figures detailing the number of Russian troops killed and injured in "Eastern Ukraine." The site, which generally focuses on coverage of markets, finance and leisure, posted a piece entitled “Increases in Pay for Military in 2015,” that at first glance would be uncontroversial....
Paul Roderick Gregory continues in his translation, "as of 1 February 2015, monetary compensation had been paid to more than 2,000 families of fallen soldiers and to 3,200 military personnel suffering heavy wounds and recognized as invalids.”
davidbfpo
Good catch. The numbers actually don't sound that high if one considers the number of Russian troops involved, the intensity of some fighting and the duration of the occupation. The fallen and maimed of the various other types of forces fighting for Putin should get handled through different channels.
On the other hand the official Ukrainian casualities seemed the last time I checked, a rather long while ago, considerably underreported.
... "We need officers capable of following systematically the path of logical argument to its conclusion, with disciplined intellect, strong in character and nerve to execute what the intellect dictates"
General Ludwig Beck (1880-1944);
Speech at the Kriegsakademie, 1935
Interesting point is that this only includes those paid some kind of death compensation---many Russian families have been via Russian social media and military family groups complaining they have received no compensation, some have received no death notices but know they died because of others telling their families and some families have not heard a word from their family members after departing for the Ukraine and nothing from the Russian military--so the death rates are actually higher.
If one takes a look at how the Russian MoD has been shuttling in units for only 3 months--this to avoid any high loses from occurring in any one specific unit--that is why they are maintaining such a high presence on the borders.
If we take the steady state of 9K which is actually has been except for the short spike in August 2014 to 12K---say formally 2K KIAs, 3.5 seriously wounded WIAs, an unknown high number of just WIAs, and say an average of roughly 1.5K in unpaid compensation cases of KIAs--MIAs are evidently not being reported BUT there have been a high number of burials in unmarked graves inside eastern Ukraine and on the Rostov border area of 1.2K graves formally dug in the Rostov region in the last year ie from August 2014 to August 2015.
Total them up and calculate against the say average of 9K for the year's worth of fighting--THEN the numbers are actually quite high.
A loss rate of KIAs/WIAs and MIAs of say 30-49% average for the year August 2014 to August 2015 is definitely not so good.
Might actually explain just why the Russian current offensive has been lacking a punch--even when in a heavy ground fight the Russians are not fighting through the UAF resistance--if the resistance had been tough the Russians in the end pull back and have not been exploiting their armor/artillery overweight.
Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 08-27-2015 at 12:47 PM.
UPDATE: Heavy losses reported near strategic port city of #Mariupol http://uatoday.tv/politics/ukrainian...ng-482398.html … pic.twitter.com/4w56DCtcNu
Russian forces in #Komsomolske garrison/ammo dump #2 http://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=47...77878&z=18&m=b … pic.twitter.com/Bs0PSFn5Yx
Russian financial magazine accidentally publishes official figures of Russian soldiers deaths in Ukraine
http://www.forbes.com/sites/paulrode...-east-ukraine/ …
Seven Ukrainian soldiers killed, 13 wounded in Donbas in last day
http://www.unian.info/war/1115922-se...-last-day.html … pic.twitter.com/hwgSaufqZy
Ukraine, separatists to strive for full ceasefire from September 1 http://news.yahoo.com/ukraine-separa...193241107.html …
.@Poroshenko in #Brussels calls for immediate ceasefire, not from Sep 1 "No fire is a direct obligation of Russia [under Minsk-2 accord]"
Some thoughts on the Russian "new generational warfare" or what we call hybrid warfare---that we tend to forget in the last six months of fighting in the eastern Ukraine.
Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine
Breaking the Enemy’s Ability to Resist
András Rácz
Senior Research Fellow
The Finnish Institute of International Affairs
This below refers to the two Russian doctrinal types mentioned in the article:
The Nature and Content of a New-Generation War
Col. S.G. CHEKINOV (Res.),
Doctor of Technical Sciences
Lt. Gen. S.A. BOGDANOV (Ret.),
Doctor of Military Sciences
New-generation war: step by step Chekinov and Bogdanov describe the phases of the way in which a new-generation war is likely to start in such a detailed manner that their description warrants further attention. The authors divide the war into an opening and a closing period.
The opening period starts with an extremely intensive, months-long coordinated non-military campaign launched against the target country, including diplomatic, economic, ideological, psychological and information measures. Added to this, a heavy propaganda campaign has to be conducted in order to depress the enemy population, spark discontent vis-à-vis the central government and weaken the morale of the armed forces. Deceiving and bribing governmental and military officers in the target country is an important way of decreasing the functionality of enemy armed forces in advance.
They prescribe that secret agents have to be deployed within the target country, properly supplied with funds, weaponry and other materials in order to commit terrorist acts, conduct provocations and
create chaos and instability.
The authors also anticipate the arrival of international militants in the target country to exacerbate the situation. Directly prior to the start of the military phase, large-scale reconnaissance and subversive missions are to be expected, which use all possible means and methods of information gathering, ranging from diplomatic signaling tools to espionage in order to locate and map out enemy military units, key governmental facilities and critical infrastructure.
This is to be followed by a full-scale electronic warfare operation, an ‘electronic knockdown’ aimed at disabling the enemy’s government and military. Immediately thereafter, the real military attack would begin, probably with a massive aerial operation involving precision missiles, drones and other automated weapons, as well as long-range artillery. According to the authors, by the end of the opening phase, the enemy country would have its main government and military control centres destroyed, and critical infrastructure heavily damaged to such an extent that it would be rendered ungovernable. Hence, it would also be unable to properly deploy its defence forces. The next, closing phase of a new generation war would see the attacker’s regular ground forces entering the target country, in order to isolate and destroy the remaining points of resistance. This second phase is much less detailed; in contrast to the several pages dedicated to the opening phase, the closing phase constitutes only one paragraph.
This reinforces the impression that Chekinov and Bogdanov consider the first, predominantly non-military phase of the conflict to be much more important than the second. There is a striking similarity between the new generation war theoretically described by Chekinov and Bogdanov in 2013 and the
events that took place in Ukraine in 2014, particularly prior to and during the Russian operation in Crimea.
As the authors prescribed, a several-months-long non-military preparatory campaign against Ukraine must have started well before the EuroMaidan, in mid-2013 at the latest, but probably even earlier. Interestingly enough, the original Chekinov-Bogdanov article was published in the No. 10. issue of the Voyennaya Misl’ in 2013. This may well mean that the Russian strategy that was already being employed against Ukraine was published at that time, which is indeed a rare case in military history.
However, this did not help the new Ukrainian leadership that came to power in February 2014 to stop the hybrid war and prevent the Russian annexation of Crimea.
The timeframe of 2012/2013 is interesting for a number of reasons---but more specifically the USAREUR Russian exercise scenario called Atlas vision 2012 and 2013 with 2014 being cancelled due to the Crimea annexation. BTW it took the DoD a really long time to cancel the 2014 AV exercise.
Background story to the AV scenario---in mid 2012 the Russian MoD approached USAREUR about restarting combined exercises that were stopped five years earlier named the Torgau scenario.
The Russian MoD wanted suddenly to engage within approximately eight weeks and hold a combined “peacekeeping” scenario and they laid emphasis on their desire that it involve logistics planning and logistic operations—again this was mid 2012. USAREUR via the JMTC Mission Command team built the scenario but did not include the logistics piece as it was not possible in such a short timeframe.
Those that attended from the Russian side were—a COL from the Ministry of Defense, reps from their Military Academy, and the entire staff and commander of the 14th Mech Brigade one of their two dedicated peacekeeping brigades and the commander and small staff of one of their BNs in the 14th—commanded by the old style kill them LTC.
What was unusual about the sudden request was that USAREUR had attempted since the last Torgau eecise (four years) to get an invitation for the then Commander General Hertling to visit the Russian High Command with no success what so ever.
Approximately 28 Russian officers attended the AV 2012-38 attended in AV 2013.
NOW kicks in the serious lack of understanding by the US Army in 2012---USAREUR had for a number of years a five person Russian intel analysis section who many of which spoke Russian and had some insight into the Russian Army activities but not much ---as the powers to be in DC decided to eliminate the entire section as we were at “peace with Russia this no need for them to exist”—one of the most shortsighted mistakes made by DoD since 2012. EUCOM was no much better off.
During the December 2012 joint planning session the team lead for this Russian analysis team a GS14 told me point blank I had far more understanding than most about the Russian processes and had been able to get them to reveal far more than anything they had seen in years. Then she left for the States.
Why do I say that—with the outbreak of Russian activities in Crimea I made a comment here that it appeared that the entire US intel community at EUCOM blew it on the Indications and Warnings side of the house—up popped a SWJ commenter who stated that was not the case and they had been watching the developments and when I pushed back and replied then why was the US response –totally stunned?
No reply came back from him which convinces me they were taken by surprise as well but did not want to admit it.
Back to the Atlas Vision scenarios---the exercise was pulled off and the Russians were relatively happy.
THEN came the demands—BUT at the next AV we want logistic planning and operations included and we will run with the US Army’s decision making model—ie let’s try to take the Russian decision making model and layer it over the US model for a hybrid approach to joint command.
I spent an entire week in the Marshall Center negotiating with three LTCs (one from the Russian MoD, one from the Russian General Staff and an Airborne officer who spoke a good quality English) over the joint operating model ie using the US Army Decision making concept MDMP even down to the common reports needed for each step of the decision making model-fully translated into Russian.
Basically building a blueprint for the Russian General Staff to fully understand the US military decision making in the smallest of ways.
During both exercises INSCOM was more interested in trying to block Russian FSB/SVR than they were interested in trying to understand why the urgency by the Russians to conduct both exercises and the emphasis on the number of Russian MoD entities—ie General Staff, Military Academy and Peacekeeping
Planning when they had been so silent for over five years.
NOW go back to the initial paragraphs and notice that the two Russian doctrinal types mention the use of peacekeeping forces in their concert of “non linear warfare.
NOW if one had the Russian slide presentations from the Atlas Vision 2012—you will notice that the Russian Army has a number of reasons that it can logically and from the Russian point of view argue “legally take actions” which in the end supports their non linear warfare.
Taken from that presentation:
Documents the Russian Army uses for “peacekeeping operations”
Constitution of the Russian Federation;
United Nations Charter;
Military doctrine of the Russian Federation;
CIS Charter;
Contract of the common security of CIS (CTSO);
Russian Federal laws.
Notice just how only one point out of the six points is from the UN and the rest based on Russian definitions of their use of peacekeeping forces—NOW go back up to the article and reread it keeping these points in mind.
THEN notice this from the slide Peacekeeping Operations;
Peacemaking operation (activities) can be conducted without the agreement of opposing forces or with the agreement of 1 of the sides—now go back to the article and reread it keeping this point in mind.
So an interesting question arises—was the sudden Russian interest in peacekeeping operations tied to an intel operation to gather everything they could on the way the US plans logistical operations in general and as well just how a standard Army BCT makes decisions for use in the Ukraine.
AND did they know in the summer of 2013 with the Atlas Vision 2013—they were going to move into Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014.
Think so-------
Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 08-27-2015 at 01:05 PM.
And so the loop closes to the above comment---
Now couple this article with the fact that a number of verified social reports and geo tagged photos of vehicles of the 14th peacekeeping brigade were in 2014 seen on the on in the immediate area of the border to the Ukraine in August 2014 and inside the Ukraine after August 2014 and recently again photos of vehicles of the 14th were reported inside the Ukraine in July 2015.
In the first closed thread of the Ukraine war has a number of my posts which were pointing to members of the Russian GRU inside the Ukraine during the Maidan events and immediately after the end of the Maidan up through the timeframe August 2014.
The same Russian brigade we trained in AV 2012 and AV 2013----
Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine
Breaking the Enemy’s Ability to Resist
András Rácz
Senior Research Fellow
The Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Taken from Page 59----
The preparatory phase of hybrid war — or, in other words, those
traditional measures of Russian foreign policy that may serve as the basis
for a hybrid war — can be divided into three sections, as shown below:
Section 1. Strategic preparation
• Exploring points of vulnerability in the state administration,
economy and armed forces of the target country.
• Establishing networks of loyal NGOs and media channels
in the territory of the target country.
• Establishing diplomatic and media positions in order to
influence the international audience.
Section 2. Political preparation
• Encouraging dissatisfaction with the central authorities in the target country
by using political, diplomatic, special operation and media tools.
• Strengthening local separatist movements and fuelling
ethnic, religious, and social tensions, among others.
• Actively using information measures against the target government and country.
• Bribing politicians, administrative officials and armed
forces officers, and then ‘turning them over’.
• Establishing contacts with local oligarchs and business people; making
them dependent on the attacking country via profitable contracts.
• Establishing contacts with local organized crime groups.
Section 3. Operational preparation
• Launching coordinated political pressure and disinformation actions.
• Mobilizing officials, officers and local criminal groups that have been ‘turned over’.
• Mobilizing the Russian armed forces under the pretext of military exercises.
During the preparatory phase, no violence is openly engaged in, and the measures taken do not contravene any political or legal threshold that would make the target country take serious, active countermeasures. However, if the targeted government detects these steps and gets concerned about them, this already serves Russia’s purposes, as the pressure felt may make the other country more receptive to Russia’s demands and interests. Self-doubt and fear constitute important parts
of Moscow’s foreign policy inventory.
The attack phase of the hybrid war can again be divided into three
sections, as follows:
Section 4. Exploding the tensions
• Organizing massive anti-government protests and riots in the attacked country.
• Infiltrating special forces, disguised as local civilians, deliver the first
sabotage attacks, capture the first administrative buildings in the
targeted regions (with the active or passive support of corrupt local
officials and police), in cooperation with local criminal groups.
• Provocations and sabotage attacks are taking place everywhere in the target
country, in order to divert the attention and resources of the central power.
• The media of the attacking country launches a strong disinformation campaign.
• Meanwhile, counter-attack possibilities by the attacked government are
blocked by Russian regular forces, which are lined up on the border, to
present an imminent threat of an overwhelming conventional attack.
Section 5. Ousting the central power from the targeted region
• Disabling the central power by capturing administrative buildings and
telecommunications infrastructure in the targeted region.
• Blocking the central power’s media, establishing
communication and information monopoly.
• Disabling the local armed forces of the central power in non-armed
ways: blockading their barracks, bribing their commanders, breaking their
morale, etc. Disabling the border guards is of particular importance.
• Meanwhile, the diplomacy, media, economic actors and armed forces of the attacking
country put strong pressure on the target country. The media of the attackers tries to
mislead and disorientate the international audience, and discredit the target country.
Section 6. Establishing alternative political power
• Declaring an alternative political centre, based on the captured administrative
buildings, by referring to real or fabricated traditions of separatism.
• Replacing administrative organs of the central power with newly
established political bodies, thereby creating a quasi-legitimacy.
• Media of the attacking country strengthens the legitimacy of the new political bodies.
• Alienating local population from the central power via the information monopoly.
• Counter-attack options of the central power are continuously
blocked by the threat of a conventional military attack.
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