Strangely, the innovative high-tech/low-cost approaches that worked in Kosovo and toppled the Taliban in Afghanistan are shunned. For example, airpower is marginalized into a mere five-page annex in FM 3-24's lengthy 282-page text. Instead, the doctrine insists that only masses of troops on the ground can defeat insurgents. Thus, it is much premised on conventional COIN theory of winning hearts and minds through ground-level engagement of the population by thousands of U.S. troops.
One time-honored tactic for some airpower enthusiasts is to declare victory when they wish and go home. Hence the Afghanistan reference above, which it should be noted doesn't mention the guys on the ground marking targets for those lovely high-tech approaches. And innovative? Many of the techniques used in Kosovo were pioneered in Vietnam (airborne FAC and so on), and the main platform was the A-10 (which the AF doesn't like in the first place). This struck me as a very snippy piece. And I have yet to see any real solutions put forward by the author. Our own LawVol has done more in that regard, and he's published less (I believe...correct me if I'm wrong, LV).

I have yet to see anything worthwhile regarding an airpower solution to COIN. "Bombing 'em all back to the stone age" doesn't work.