wm references an article regarding a single incident as apparent support for the theory that airpower causes more collateral damage (sorry Tom) than ground power. One story from the BBC (YGBSM) doesn't prove a theory. I've said this before and I'll say it again: I deal in facts.
Law,

Again I am not talking collateral casualties as a purely airpower issue. If you insist that you are dealing in facts, then when you mention me in a response to WM, cite me factually.

As for airpower in COIN, I understand that the AF is developing smaller weapons and all that. Even when those weapons are developed, the use of them in COIN will be decided on the ground. COIN is ground centric because its ultimate success or failure depends on human beings looking each other in the eyes and coming to an understanding.

Here I will offer an opinion: General Dunlap's glib writing on this reminds me of an equally glib AF one star I met as a Major one evening in early August 1990. The general was in Checkmate and he gave 3 of us a briefing for how the AF was going to take down the Iraqi regime. I had another Army guy--an Apache driver--and an AF A-10 driver with me. We listened and the general pitched us. I asked one question, that is what airpower was being put against the Iraqi forces in Kuwait. We the Army and Marine forces on the ground--were short on anti-tank munitions and any attacks against Iraq could prompt the heavy Iraqi corps in Kuwait to attack south. The answer to my question was "none," and with a wave of the hand the AF general added he didn't think that was necessary. I told him he was nuts, an opinion supported by the A-10 driver. Needless to say we were not invited to stay longer. General Dunlap offers examples that don't apply to the situation in Iraq or Afghanistan, those being Kosovo and the opening phases of OEF, then waves the reality of COIN away just as dismissively as the one star in 1990 regarding an Iraqi heavy corps.

Regards,

Tom